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I. INTRODUCTION
Unlike earlier theological attempts to ground law in religion or the
Divine,' participants in the modern debate rarely, if ever, argue for a
theological or religious legitimation of law. Religion is viewed as "a
special kind of problem for the law" rather than a source of legitimation
2
or justification. For instance, in his dissenting opinion in Bowers v.
Hardwick,' Justice Blackmun suggested that Georgia's anti-sodomy law
violated the Establishment Clause of the First Amendment because it
lacked a justification "beyond its conformity to religious doctrine., 4 The
1. See, e.g., St. Thomas Aquinas, Summa Theologica, t-II, q. 91, art. 2 & q. 95, art. 2,
in 2 BASIC WRITINGS OF ST. THOMAS AQuINAS 750, 784 (Anton C. Pegis ed., 1945)
(arguing that human law is not legitimate unless it meets the dictates of natural law which
are "nothing else than the rational creature's participation of the eternal law [Divine
Reason]").
2. Steven D. Smith, Legal Discourse and The De Facto Disestablishment, 81 MARQ.
L. REV. 203, 212-13 (1998) (arguing that "religion is not viewed as a resource or a
potentially helpful approach to understanding the day-to-day issues of law" like
"economics, for instance, or moral and political philosophy, or feminist or critical race
theory, or history, or (more occasionally) literary theory or sociology or psychology" but
as "a special kind of problem for the law").
3. 478 U.S. 186 (1986).
4. Id. at 211 (Blackmun, J., dissenting). Justice Blackmun noted that the state of
Georgia invoked "Leviticus, Romans, St. Thomas Aquinas, and sodomy's heretical status
during the Middle Ages" in support of the anti-sodomy law. Id. By contrast, Chief Justice
Burger's concurring opinion maintained that Georgia's anti-sodomy law had a rational
basis because it was "firmly rooted in Judaeo-Christian moral and ethical standards." Id.
at 196 (Burger, J., concurring). Although not explicitly adopting this religious
justification, the majority upheld the criminal prohibition of sodomy as applied to
homosexuals based on its "ancient roots" in the common law which it found constituted a
rational basis for the law. Id. at 192-96. The Court further declined to find a fundamental
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Supreme Court's recent overruling of Bowers in Lawrence v. Texas,' may
have eliminated Justice Blackmun's concerns by holding that the criminal
prohibition of homosexual sodomy violates the fundamental right of
privacy of consenting homosexual adults.6 At about the same time, the
House of Bishops at the General Convention of The Episcopal Church
USA confirmed the election of "the first openly gay bishop of any
American church, 7 and "officially recognized the blessing of same-sex
unions."" If religious convictions both affirm and deny aspects of
homosexual relationships, how do we determine whether the judicial
interpretations of the concept of liberty in the Due Process Clause of the
Fourteenth Amendment were independent of religious convictions?
Moreover, the indeterminancy of the U.S. Constitution and other laws
raises this issue for other contentious legal issues such as abortion,
physician-assisted suicide, the free exercise of religion, and the scope and
nature of property rights. Legal indeterminacy thus raises the normative
issue of whether all judges' decisions in hard cases may be based on
religious or comprehensive convictions.
The current consensus about judicial decision making rejects this
possibility because the "Law" is presumed to be autonomous. It
allegedly has its own internal rationality which generates a full
justification of all judicial decisions without judges resorting to their
religious convictions. For some theorists,9 this presumed autonomy
constitutes a legal objection to relying on religious convictions in judicial
decision making based on the Establishment Clause of the First
Amendment."' For example, judges should not cite passages from
Genesis, Leviticus, and St. Thomas Aquinas, like Chief Justice Roy
Moore of the Alabama Supreme Court (the "Ten Commandments
Judge") has done, to justify "a strong presumption of unfitness" against
right to engage in homosexual sodomy protected by the Due Process Clause of the
Fourteenth Amendment. Id. at 190-91.
5. 123 S. Ct. 2472 (2003).
6. Id. at 2484.
7. Martha Sawyer Allen, Gay Bishop Approved, STAR TRIB. (Minneapolis-St. Paul),
Aug. 6, 2003, at A2.
8. Alan Cooperman, Episcopal Church Ratifies Compromise on Gay Unions, WASH.
POST, Aug. 8, 2003, at Al. For those readers who may be curious as to whether my own
religious convictions have influenced my arguments in this article, I am an Episcopalian
and cherish the open and honest debate about the Christian faith that is part of this
tradition.
9. See, e.g., KENT GREENAWALT, LAW AND OBJECTIVITY 222 (1992) (arguing that
"[g]iven principles of religious liberty and separation of church and state that guide us, a
reason that rests on a theological truth that is not generally accepted should not count as a
reason for what the existing law provides").
10. The Establishment Clause provides that "Congress shall make no law respecting
an establishment of religion...." U.S. CONST. amend. I.
20041
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homosexual parents for custody of their children." Even Justice
Kennedy, who advocates substantial accommodation of religion by the
state, has declared that "[i]t is beyond dispute that, at a minimum, the
Constitution guarantees that government may not ... act in a way which
'establishes a [state] religion or religious faith, or tends to do so.""' 2
Despite this prohibition, the Supreme Court has rejected claims that
the Establishment Clause is violated by "federal or state regulation of
conduct whose reason or effect merely happens to coincide or harmonize
with the tenets of some or all religions.' 3 The Court has emphasized
that the fact that criminal prohibitions on murder, adultery, polygamy,
and theft "agree[ ] with the dictates of the Judaeo-Christian religions
while [they] may disagree with others does not invalidate the
regulation[s]."' 4  By implication, if judges set forth nonreligious
justifications in their written opinions, their decisions do not violate the
Establishment Clause merely because they are consistent with judges'
religious convictions.
For other theorists, the autonomy of law is part of a modern
philosophical consensus that the world has been disenchanted. 5
Disenchantment means that the world can no longer be rationally viewed
as an integrated meaningful whole under a religious or metaphysical
worldview and that the law can no longer be legitimized by its religious
or metaphysical foundations.16  Disenchantment thus constitutes a
11. See Ex Parte H.H., 830 So.2d 21, 26 (Ala. 2002). For a discussion of why Chief
Justice Moore is referred to as the "Ten Commandments judge," see infra note 31.
12. Lee v. Weisman, 505 U.S. 577, 587 (1992) (quoting Lynch v. Donnelly, 465 U.S.
668, 678 (1984)).
13. McGowan v. Maryland, 366 U.S. 420, 442 (1961) (holding that "a uniform day of
rest" was a significant secular purpose for a Sunday closing law).
14. Id. at 445. Cf Scott C. Idleman, Religious Premises, Legislative Judgments, and
the Establishment Clause, 12 CORNELL J.L. & PUB. POL'Y 1, 6 (2002) (arguing that "the
case law and doctrines that comprise contemporary Establishment Clause jurisprudence"
support his claim "that laws informed by religious moral premises generally do not, by that
fact alone, violate the First Amendment"); see also infra Part VII.A.
15. See, e.g., JURGEN HABERMAS, BETWEEN FACTS AND NORMS: CONTRIBUTIONS
TO A DISCOURSE THEORY OF LAW AND DEMOCRACY 26 (William Rehg trans., 1996)
[hereinafter HABERMAS, BETWEEN FACTS AND NORMS] (assuming that the modern
legitimation of law starts from the dilemma of "how can disenchanted, internally
differentiated and pluralized lifeworlds be socially integrated if, at the same time, the risk
of dissension is growing, particularly in the spheres of communicative action that have
been cut loose from the ties of sacred authorities and released from the bonds of archaic
institutions?").
16. See FROM MAX WEBER: ESSAYS IN SOCIOLOGY 355 (H. H. Gerth and C. Wright
Mills eds. & trans., 1946) (arguing that since the Enlightenment, the increasing
rationalization of Western culture has disenchanted the world so that there can no longer
be a religious or metaphysical justification for law, politics, morality, etc.).
[Vol. 53:709
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philosophical objection to relying on religious convictions in judicial
decision making.17
The rancorous debate over the appointment of U.S. Supreme Court
Justices and other judges, however, suggests that average citizens and
legislators intuitively understand that judges' decisions about issues
involving abortion, euthanasia, and homosexuality depend upon their
comprehensive or religious beliefs."' This intuition makes sense because
it is consistent with the overwhelming consensus among legal theorists
that the law is indeterminate. The law is indeterminate because there are
hard cases where the apparently relevant statutes, common law,
contracts, or constitutional law provisions at issue fail to resolve disputes.
Legal indeterminacy raises a crucial, unanswered question: on what
normative basis do judges determine which extra-legal norms are valid
and which valid norm or norms are controlling in deciding hard cases?
Current legal theory has generally avoided this crucial question. Legal
indeterminacy is widely recognized, but the debate has focused on the
descriptive questions of whether the law is indeterminate' 9 and on the
17. For a critique of the philosophical objections of Jurgen Habermas, John Rawls,
and Kent Greenawalt to relying on religious convictions in judicial decision making, see
MARK MODAK-TRURAN, REENCHANTING THE LAW: THE RELIGIOUS DIMENSION OF
JUDICIAL DECISION MAKING 42-178 (unpublished Ph.D. Dissertation, University of
Chicago, 2002) (on file with author) [hereinafter MODAK-TRURAN, REENCHANTING THE
LAW]. See also Mark Modak-Truran, The Religious Dimension of Judicial Decision
Making and The De Facto Disestablishment, 81 MARO. L. REV. 255, 266-71 (1998)
[hereinafter Modak-Truran, De Facto Disestablishment] (arguing that Rawls's idea of
public reason fails to provide a solution to legal indeterminancy because public reason is
indeterminate and because no religious person (no matter how reasonable) could accept
his "'political not metaphysical' ordering of political values" because it requires them to
deny their comprehensive convictions and accept Rawls's comprehensive conviction);
Mark Modak-Truran, Habermas's Discourse Theory of Law and the Relationship Between
Law and Religion, 26 CAP. U. L. REV. 461, 461-64, 477-78 (1997) (arguing that Habermas's
discourse theory of law is circular and fails to explain how intersubjective agreement can
validate the law independently of religious convictions).
18. See Sanford Levinson, The Confrontation of Religious Faith and Civil Religion:
Catholics Becoming Justices, 39 DEPAUL L. REV. 1047, 1048 (1990) (discussing the
contentious public discourse surrounding the appointment and confirmation of Catholic
Justices to the United States Supreme Court); Howard J. Vogel, The Judicial Oath and the
American Creed: Comments on Sanford Levinson's The Confrontation of Religious Faith
and Civil Religion: Catholics Becoming Justices, 39 DEPAUL L. REV. 1107, 1109 (1990)
(exploring the hypothetical confirmation of a Quaker and a secular moralist and the
problematic role of a civil religious creed which has been embodied in senators' questions
in the confirmation process).
19. On the one hand, extreme-radical deconstructionists such as Anthony D'Amato
have argued that even the U.S. constitutional requirement that the President be thirty-five
years of age is not an easy case (i.e., indeterminate). Anthony D'Amato, Aspects of
Deconstruction: The "Easy Case" of the Under-Aged President, 84 Nw. U. L. REV. 250
(1989) [hereinafter D'Amato, Aspects of Deconstruction]. On the other hand, Ronald
Dworkin maintains that his interpretative theory of law provides an understanding of law
2004]
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degree of legal indeterminacy"' rather than on the normative justification
of judicial decision making under the conditions of legal indeterminancy.
Contrary to the current consensus, religious convictions are central to
understanding judicial decision making under these conditions.
Religious convictions are the most comprehensive normative convictions
that humans hold, and all humans who act with reflective self-
understanding (even if they do not believe in God) are religious. Some
people observe traditional religions like Christianity, Judaism, Islam,
Hinduism, and Buddhism while others follow nontraditional religions
like humanism, communism, and other so-called secular comprehensive
perspectives. In either case, religious convictions provide answers to
questions about when meaningful human life begins and ends and what
sexual orientations are genuinely human. As a result, a full justification
of the extra-legal norms judges rely on in hard cases and the choice
among them requires judges to rely on religious convictions.
At the same time, the Establishment Clause prohibits the text of the
law from including a religious justification. Without a religious
justification in the law, judges cannot fully justify their decisions in hard
cases from within the law. The law must be indeterminate because the
Establishment Clause proscribes this full justification. This does not
mean that the Establishment Clause prohibits judges from fully justifying
their decisions during their deliberations about hard cases. It only
prohibits judges from including that full justification in their written
opinions. Deliberation and explanation are separate stages of judicial
decision making that should be kept distinct. Given this distinction, my
thesis is that judges should fully justify their decisions in hard cases by
relying on their religious or comprehensive convictions in their
that is quite determinate so that the law provides "right answers" even in hard cases based
on the criteria of "fit" with prior precedent and "justification" according to the principles
of political morality underlying the law. See RONALD DWORKIN, LAW'S EMPIRE 225, 255
(1986). With respect to fit, he argues that "in a modern, developed, and complex [legal]
system" a tie with respect to fit would be "so rare as to be exotic." RONALD DWORKIN, A
MATTER OF PRINCIPLE 143 (1985). The principles of political morality can further
determine a right answer when the criteria of fit fails so that "[i]f there is no right answer
in a hard case, this must be in virtue of some more problematic type of indeterminacy or
incommensurability in moral theory." Id. at 144.
20. For example, Ken Kress notes that:
[V]ersions of indeterminacy differ according to whether they claim that the court
has complete discretion to achieve any outcome at all (execute the plaintiff who
brings suit to quiet title to his cabin and surrounding property in the Rocky
Mountains) or rather has a limited choice among a few options (hold for
defendant or plaintiff within a limited range of monetary damages or other
remedies), or some position in between.
Ken Kress, Legal Indeterminacy and Legitimacy, in LEGAL HERMENEUTICS: HISTORY,
THEORY, AND PRACTICE 200, 201 (Gregory Leyh ed. 1992).
[Vol. 53:709
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deliberation (religionist deliberation) but that judges' religious
convictions should only implicitly inform the legal explanation of their
decision in their written opinions (separationist explanation). I refer to
this as the religionist-separationist model of judicial decision making
which maintains that religious convictions are the "silent prologue" to
any full justification of the law.2'
Recognizing religious convictions as a silent prologue does not
presume that all religious convictions are a legitimate basis for fully
justifying judges' decisions. The religionist-separationist model further
requires that judges critically validate their religious convictions based on
reason and common human experience before relying on those
convictions. Promoting self-critical religious reflection by judges
acknowledges that religious truth is never a finished product but a
continuous process of reflection and debate. As a consequence, the
religionist-separatinist model not only recognizes the centrality of
religious convictions for judicial deliberation in hard cases but also
prevents stifling religious pluralism by prohibiting judges from
dogmatically establishing an official religious conviction in their written
opinions. Given that the United States has become "the world's most
religiously diverse nation, 22 the religionist-separationist model results in
a legitimate plurality of religious convictions implicitly informing the law
and thereby reenchanting of the law.
In light of the current consensus about the autonomy of law,
advocating the religionist-separationist model of judicial decision making
and the reenchantment of the law is no small matter. In this article, I
focus mainly on arguments for the religionist-separationist model and on
the likely objections to it. Before setting forth my constructive argument,
Part II clarifies the issues I will address and charts the logically possible
models for the relationship between law and religion in judicial decision
making, while Part III sets forth my assumptions about the nature of
religion and legal indeterminacy. Part IV then presents a general
21. Cf DWORKIN, LAW'S EMPIRE, supra note 19, at 90. Dworkin argues that:
Any practical legal argument, no matter how detailed and limited, assumes the
kind of abstract foundation jurisprudence offers, and when rival foundations
compete, a legal argument assumes one and rejects others. So any judge's
opinion is itself a piece of legal philosophy, even when the philosophy is hidden
and the visible argument is dominated by citation and lists of facts.
Jurisprudence is the general part of adjudication, silent prologue to any decision
at law.
Id.
22. See generally DIANA L. ECK, A NEW RELIGIOUS AMERICA: HOW A "CHRISTIAN
COUNTRY" HAS Now BECOME THE WORLD'S MOST RELIGIOUSLY DIVERSE NATION
(2001) (chronicling the increasing diversity of American religious practice and proposing a
pluralistic vision for a new America).
2004]
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account of the role of religious convictions in fully justifying extra-legal
norms and the choice among them in the process of deliberating about
hard cases. To practically demonstrate this account, Part V analyzes the
en banc Ninth Circuit Court of Appeals and Supreme Court opinions in
Washington v. Glucksberg23 and attempts to show that the judges had to
rely on comprehensive convictions to provide a full justification of their
decisions about whether the Fourteenth Amendment protects a
fundamental right to die. Part VI examines another hard case, Lyng v.
Northwest Indian Cemetery Protective Ass'n,24 to establish the necessity of
relying on comprehensive convictions for fully justifying judges' decisions
even when societal consensus on extra-legal property norms is present.
Subsequently, Part VII addresses both philosophical and legal versions of
the Secular Purpose Objection and argues that relying on religious
convictions in judicial deliberation about hard cases does not present
Establishment Clause problems. Part VIII, however, contends that the
Establishment Clause prohibits writing religious justifications into
judicial opinions, and Part IX maintains that the Establishment Clause
provides a normative justification of legal indeterminancy. Part X
further shows that religious convictions may be rationally justified and
that a proper understanding of religious pluralism also provides a
normative justification of legal indeterminacy. Finally, Part XI specifies
some of the consequences of reenchanting the law for legal theory.
II. CLARIFYING THE ISSUES AND MODELS
My analysis of whether judges ought to rely on comprehensive or
religious convictions will not start from assumptions about what role
judges should play in a democratic political system. Rather, the
normative issue will be approached from the perspective of asking what
kinds of convictions or claims judges must rely on to provide a full
justification for their decisions in hard cases. However, this analysis will
not involve an empirical inquiry to determine what particular claims
actual judges rely on in hard cases25 but will be an attempt to determine
in principle what kinds of claims must be relied upon by judges in
resolving hard cases.
23. 521 U.S. 702 (1997).
24. 485 U.S. 439 (1988).
25. See, e.g., Thomas C. Berg & William G. Ross, Some Religiously Devout Justices:
Historical Notes and Comments, 81 MARQ. L. REV. 383 (1998) (exploring how "the
religious beliefs and activities" of U.S. Supreme Court Justices may have been related to
their judicial decision making); Scott C. Idleman, The Role of Religious Values in Judicial
Decision Making, 68 IND. L.J. 433, 473-78 (1993) (analyzing the role of religious values in
judicial decision making from four perspectives, including the historical-constitutional,
political-philosophical, utilitarian, and empirical perspectives).
[Vol. 53:709
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This analysis will proceed from the basic assumption that many
decisions made by judges in deliberating about cases are left
unarticulated in their opinions or only partially articulated. For example,
judges rarely give explicit accounts of: 1) why certain facts are included in
the statement of facts and others are not; 2) why the issue is framed the
way it is; 3) why a particular social policy is normative; or 4) what
method of legal interpretation is the best one. 6 In other words, judicial
reasoning cannot be reduced to the arguments articulated in judicial
opinions. In order to take this into account, I will treat the process of
judicial decision making as including two stages: deliberation and
explanation. The process of deliberation is the more complete stage
because it includes all the reasons for a judge's decision whether or not
those reasons are articulated in the explanation of the judge's decision in
a written opinion. The processes of deliberation and explanation thus do
not completely mirror one another. Nevertheless, most normative
accounts of law addressing the issue of the role of religious beliefs in
judicial decision making have failed to differentiate these stages of
judicial decision making. Consequently, the religious dimension of
judicial decision making has remained hidden or concealed from view, in
part, because of this failure.
Given that judicial decision making involves both deliberation and
explanation, the question about the role of religious beliefs in judicial
decision making should be more precisely analyzed into two separate
issues: 1) Is it proper for a judge to rely on religious convictions in
deliberating about a case, and if so, under what circumstances and in
which cases?; and 2) Is it proper for a judge to announce a religious basis
for a decision in a judicial opinion, and if so, under what circumstances
and in which cases? The first issue concerns what is entailed in the
process of legal reasoning as such (the deliberative process), while the
second issue concerns what types of reasons judges should be allowed to
rely on in written judicial opinions (the process of explanation) in a
pluralistic democratic society.
By keeping these issues distinct, there are four possible models of
judicial decision making:
MODELS OF JUDICIAL DECISION MAKING27
26. Cf DWORKIN, LAW'S EMPIRE, supra note 19, at 90.
27. For an earlier version of these models and my version of the religionist-
separationist model, see Modak-Truran, De Facto Disestablishment, supra note 17, at 259.
It should be noted that allowing judges to rely on religious beliefs or convictions in judicial
deliberation or explanation could take the form of a permissive use of these beliefs (can)
or a required use of these beliefs (should) while a prohibition against relying on religious
beliefs or convictions in judicial decision making only takes the form of a requirement not
2004]
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Deliberation Explanation Model of Judicial Decision Making
Religious Beliefs no no separationist
Can or Should Be yes yes religionist
Relied on in Judicial no yes separationist-religionist
Decision Making yes no religionist-separationist
From this chart, one can develop four different models of judicial
decision making. I will refer to the first possibility as the separationist
model of judicial decision making. This model maintains that religious
beliefs or convictions should not be relied on either in deliberation or
explanation. Given the predominance and often unexamined or blind
acceptance of this model, the conclusion is usually that religion should
have nothing to do with judicial decision making. As discussed in Part
VII, the models of judicial decision making offered by John Rawls and
Jirgen Habermas represent two versions of the separationist model that
are part of this consensus. This consensus is so widespread that the other
three models are usually not given a second thought. The separationist
model blinds us from fully appreciating these other models.
One reason for this pervasive blindness is that the second model,
which maintains that religious convictions can or should be relied on in
judicial deliberation and explanation (the religionist model), is usually
considered the only alternative to the separationist model. In fact, if
deliberation and explanation are not differentiated, this is the only
alternative to the separationist model. Within certain constraints, the
religionist model was vigorously embraced by judges in the nineteenth
century. For example, in Vidal v. Girard's Executors," Justice Story
made his famous claims that the United States was a "Christian country"
and that "the Christian religion is a part of the common law of
Pennsylvania. ,29
to rely on these beliefs. For an alternative matrix of models for the role of religion in
judicial decision making, see Daniel 0. Conkle, Religiously Devout Judges: Issues of
Personal Integrity and Public Benefit, 81 MARQ. L. REV. 523 (1998).
28. 43 U.S. 127 (1844).
29. Id. at 198; see also Joseph Story, Christianity a Part of the Common Law, 9 AM.
JURIST 346 (1833); CUSHING STROUT, THE NEW HEAVENS AND NEW EARTH:
POLITICAL RELIGION IN AMERICA 99 (1974) (noting that many early state court decisions
"assumed that Christianity was itself part of the common law inherited from England");
Harold Berman, The Interaction of Law and Religion, 31 MERCER L. REV. 405, 407 (1980)
(noting that courts in the nineteenth century "declared very often that the Christian
[Vol. 53:709
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Currently, this position does not receive much support,3' but there are
some exceptions such as the "Ten Commandments Judge," former Chief
Justice Roy Moore of the Alabama Supreme Court.' He recently wrote
a startling concurring opinion that provided a religious justification of his
claim that there should be "a strong presumption of unfitness" against
homosexual parents for custody of their children. 32  To support his
argument, Chief Justice Moore cited passages from Genesis, Leviticus,
and St. Thomas Aquinas and concluded that "[h]omosexuality is strongly
condemned in the common law because it violates both natural and
religion is the law of the land, that Christianity is part of the common law, and that the
Constitution on its face shows that the Christian religion was the religion of the framers").
30. See KENT GREENAWALT, PRIVATE CONSCIENCES AND PUBLIC REASONS 142
(1995) [hereinafter GREENAWALT, PRIVATE CONSCIENCES] (arguing that judges
recognize "that people in this country have variant religious views .... no particular
religious view is seen to be embedded in the legal materials themselves or to be part of
some common understanding or technique of reason that stretches beyond the legal
materials but can be a source of guidance"). But cf. Wendell L. Griffen, The Case for
Religious Values in Judicial Decision-Making, 81 MARQ. L. REV. 513, 518 (1998) (arguing
that judges "have the right to include religious sources when [they] justify the decisions
[they] reach" even though "religious values are not universally shared by all persons, or
even all judges for that matter"). Michael Perry has also made some statements that
suggest support for this model in certain circumstances. See MICHAEL J. PERRY,
RELIGION IN POLITICS: CONSTITUTIONAL AND MORAL PERSPECTIVES 103-04 (1997)
[hereinafter PERRY, RELIGION IN POLITICS]. Perry argues that "[i]f a plausible secular
premise does support [a political] choice . . . government, including the judicial branch,
may rely on a religious premise." Id. at 103. Perry subsequently questions whether a legal
decision can be "'reasoned and available to the public' if in its opinion a court conceals
one of the premises on which it has consciously relied" and thus implies that the court
should disclose its reliance on a religious premise in its opinion. Id. at 104.
31. Former Chief Justice Moore was named the "Ten Commandments Judge" when,
as a circuit court judge in Alabama, he refused to remove a plaque of the Ten
Commandments that he had placed behind his bench. Two high-profile cases were
brought regarding this practice but both were dismissed as non-justiciable. See Ala.
Freethought Ass'n v. Moore, 893 F. Supp. 1522, 1544 (N.D. Ala. 1995) (finding plaintiffs
lacked standing to bring Establishment Clause challenge to Moore's Ten
Commandments); Alabama ex rel. James v. ACLU, 711 So.2d 952, 954 (Ala. 1998)
(dismissing action by State of Alabama seeking declaratory judgment that Judge Moore's
practices were consistent with Establishment Clause). When elected to the Alabama
Supreme Court, Chief Justice Moore "installed a two-and-one-half ton monument to the
Ten Commandments as the centerpiece of the rotunda in the Alabama State Judicial
Building. He did so in order to remind all Alabama citizens of, among other things, his
belief in the sovereignty of the Judeo-Christian God over both the state and the church."
Glassroth v. Moore, 335 F.3d 1282, 1284 (11th Cir. 2003). The court noted that Moore
claimed, like "southern governors who attempted to defy federal orders during an earlier
era," he was not subject to any federal court order below the U.S. Supreme Court. Id. at
1302. The Eleventh Circuit, however, affirmed the district courts' holding that the
monument violated the Establishment Clause and their order to remove the monument.
Id. at 1284.
32. Ex Parte H.H., 830 So.2d 21, 26 (Ala. 2002).
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revealed law., 33 For reasons specified in Part VIII, this opinion and the
religionist model violate the Establishment Clause of the First
Amendment by favoring one or more religions or religious teachings and
in effect discriminating against others.- Furthermore, this article
analyzes the interminable practical problems that arise from Chief
Justice Moore's opinion." Given these arguments, this article will not
consider the religionist model as a viable alternative to the separationist
model.
In addition, these reasons and others would also eliminate the third
model, which holds that religion should not be relied on in deliberation
but can or should be relied on in explanation (separationist-religionist
model). If a judge accepts the distinction between "legal reasons" and
"religious reasons" with respect to deliberation, it is hard to think of a
reason why she would give up on this distinction with respect to the
process of explanation. Unless the judge was part of a society that was
explicitly ruled by religious law (e.g., an Islamic country), it is hard to see
this model as viable. Consequently, because this is not the case in the
United States, this does not appear to be a viable model worthy of
further consideration.
However, despite the strong likelihood that explicit religious
references in judicial opinions (the process of explanation) violate the
Establishment Clause, this does not necessarily mean that religion can or
should be eliminated from judicial deliberation. The fourth model
(religionist-separationist model) maintains that judges can or should rely
on religious convictions in their deliberation about certain cases (the
process of deliberation) but should not rely on religious convictions in
their written opinions (the process of explanation). The religionist-
separationist model was first identified by Kent Greenawalt16 and, soonthereafter, embraced by Stephen Carter37 and Michael Perry. 38 As 1
33. Id. at 33.
34. See Part VIII.A; see also MODAK-TRURAN, REENCHANTING THE LAW, supra
note 17, at 257-75.
35. See Part VII.B.
36. See KENT GREENAWALT, RELIGIOUS CONVICTIONS AND POLITICAL CHOICE
239-41 (1988); KENT GREENAWALT, PRIVATE CONSCIENCES, supra note 30, at 142-50.
37. Stephen L. Carter, The Religiously Devout Judge, 64 NOTRE DAME L. REV. 932,
943 (1989) (arguing that "if religious conviction plays a role at all, it would enter into the
deliberative process, but not the process of justification").
38. PERRY, RELIGION IN POLITICS, supra note 30, at 6 (emphasis added). Michael
Perry has recently changed his interpretation of the nonestablishment norm, and he now
argues that the "best answer to the question of whether political reliance on religiously
grounded morality violates the nonestablishment norm" does not require that judges and
other government officials always have a "plausible, independent secular grounding" for
their political choices. Michael J. Perry, Why Political Reliance on Religiously Grounded
Morality Does Not Violate the Establishment Clause, 42 WM. & MARY L. REV. 663, 670
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argue in Part VII and elsewhere,9 however, their formulations of the
religionist-separationist model suggest, like the separationist model, that
religious or comprehensive beliefs can or should be kept out of judicial
decision making in most cases and provide incoherent accounts of
judicial decision making. Conversely, I will propose a much more
distinctive version of the religionist-separationist model. This version
maintains that judges ought to rely on religious convictions about
authentic human existence in all (not just some) hard cases in order to
justify their decisions fully. My version of the religionist-separationist
model thus provides distinctive contribution to the debate about the role
of religious beliefs in judicial decision making.
III. DEFINING RELIGION AND LAW
A. A Formal Definition of Religion
Martin Marty has observed that:
Everyone "knows" what religion is. Many members of publics
simply define it in terms of what is normative or privileged in
their culture or sub-culture. Religion, for instance, is what goes
on in religious institutions. Yet the modern situation shows that
much religious activity and reflection occurs outside such
institutions. Or, religion has to do with God. Yet many
religions manifestly do not."
Although everyone claims to "know" what religion is, there appears to
be little agreement about what it is. In addition, there are various
methods of analyzing religion such that "[r]eligion is one thing to the
anthropologist, another to the sociologist, another to the psychologist,"
another to the theologian, and another to the philosopher.4' This results,
in part, from the different purposes of the many types of inquiries that
(2001). See generally Michael J. Perry, Why Political Reliance on Religiously Grounded
Morality Is Not Illegitimate in a Liberal Democracy, 36 WAKE FOREST L. REV. 217 (2001);
Michael J. Perry, Christians, the Bible, and Same-Sex Unions: An Argument for Political
Self-Restraint, 36 WAKE FOREST L. REV. 449 (2001); Michael J. Perry, Catholics, the
Magisterium, and Moral Controversy: An Argument for Independent Judgment (With
Particular Reference to Catholic Law Schools), 26 U. DAYTON L. REV. 293 (2001). Perry's
most recent book on religion and politics collects these essays into a more integrated and
comprehensive argument. See MICHAEL J. PERRY, UNDER GOD? RELIGIOUS FAITH
AND LIBERAL DEMOCRACY (2003). Despite Perry's modification of his position, his prior
position still represents a distinctive alternative version of the religionist-separationist
model of judicial decision making and warrants consideration in this article.
39. See Part VII.B; see also MODAK-TRURAN, REENCHANTING THE LAW, supra
note 17, at 136-78.
40. MARTIN E. MARTY, WHAT IS MODERN ABOUT THE MODERN STUDY OF
RELIGION? 5 (1985).
41. JOHN HICK, PHILOSOPHY OF RELIGION 3 (2d ed. 1973).
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analyze the nature of religion including the anthropology of religion,42
sociology of religion,43 psychology of religion," history of religions,45
theology,46 and philosophy of religion. For example, sociology of religion
42. See, e.g., CLIFFORD GEERTZ, THE INTERPRETATION OF CULTURES 87-141
(1973). Geertz defines a religion as "(1) a system of symbols which acts to (2) establish
powerful, pervasive, and long-lasting moods and motivations in men by (3) formulating
conceptions of a general order of existence and (4) clothing these conceptions with such an
aura of factuality that (5) the moods and motivations seem uniquely realistic." Id. at 90.
43. See, e.g., EMILE DURKHEIM, THE ELEMENTARY FORMS OF THE RELIGIOUS
LIFE (Joseph Ward Swain trans., 1915). Durkheim comments that "religion is something
eminently social. Religious representations are collective representations which express
collective realities." Id. at 22. More specifically, he proposes a famous definition of
religion as:
[A] unified system of beliefs and practices relative to sacred things, that is to say,
things set apart and forbidden-beliefs and practices which unite into one single
moral community called a Church, all those who adhere to them. The second
element, which thus finds a place in our definition, is no less essential than the
first; for by showing that the idea of religion is inseparable from that of the
Church, it makes it clear that religion should be an eminently collective thing.
Id. at 62-63; see also PETER L. BERGER, THE SACRED CANOPY: ELEMENTS OF A
SOCIOLOGICAL THEORY OF RELIGION (1967).
44. See, e.g., WILLIAM JAMES, THE VARIETIES OF RELIGIOUS EXPERIENCE: A
STUDY IN HUMAN NATURE (1982) (Martin E. Marty ed.). James states that religion
"shall mean for us the feelings, acts, and experiences of individual men in their solitude, so
far as they apprehend themselves to stand in relation to whatever they may consider the
divine." Id. at 31; see also Don Browning, Can Psychology Escape Religion? Should It?, 7
INT'L J. PSYCHOL. RELIGION 1, 3 (1997). Browning defines religion as "a narrative or
metaphorical representation of the ultimate context of reality and its associated
worldview, rituals, and ethics ... Furthermore, the concept of religion assumes that the
narratives, worldviews, rituals, and ethics are held and celebrated by some identifiable
community." Id.
45. See, e.g., MIRCEA ELIADE, THE SACRED & THE PROFANE: THE NATURE OF
RELIGION (Willard R. Task trans., Harcourt Brace Jovanovich & World, Inc. 1959).
Eliade argues "that sacred and profane are two modes of being in the world, two
existential situations assumed by man in the course of his history" and notes that his chief
concern is "to show in what ways religious man attempts to remain as long as possible in a
sacred universe, and hence what his total experience of life proves to be in comparison
with the experience of the man without religious feeling, of the man who lives, or wishes to
live, in a desacralized world." Id. at 13, 14. He further emphasizes that "the completely
profane world, the wholly desacralized cosmos, is a recent discovery in the history of the
human spirit." Id. at 13.
46. See, e.g., PAUL TILLICH, I SYSTEMATIC THEOLOGY (1951). Paul Tillich defines
religion in terms of the concept of ultimate concern. Id. at 11-12. He states:
The religious concern is ultimate; it excludes all other concerns from ultimate
significance; it makes them preliminary. The ultimate concern is unconditional,
independent of any conditions of character, desire, or circumstance. The
unconditional concern is total: no part of ourselves or of our world is excluded
from it; there is no 'place' to flee from it. The total concern is infinite: no
moment of relaxation and rest is possible in the face of a religious concern which
is ultimate, unconditional, total, and infinite.
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views religion "in terms of social interaction" and studies religion "with
reference to the general concepts of sociology, including leadership,
stratification, and socialization., 47  Accordingly, no generally accepted
definition of religion exists and probably never will exist.4"
For the purposes of this article, however, the central concern is to
understand the role of religious convictions or claims in legal reasoning.
The primary concern is with the kind of claims religion makes and how
religious claims are related to other types of claims such as legal and
moral claims. In contrast to the other approaches to understanding
religion, the philosophy of religion has typically focused on these
questions. Therefore, I will take a philosophy of religion approach and
define religion in such a way as to outline the relationship between
religious claims and legal and moral claims.
Regarding the definition of religion, I will adopt Schubert Ogden's
definition of religion as "the primary form of culture in terms of which
we human beings explicitly ask and answer the existential question of the
meaning of ultimate reality for us. '49 According to this account, religion
explicitly asks what is "authentic human existence" or "how we are to
understand ourselves and others in relation to the whole." '  The
existential question, the question of meaning, is the question which is
Id. See also DAVID TRACY, PLURALITY AND AMBIGUITY: HERMENEUTICS, RELIGION,
HOPE 84 (1987). For Tracy, "religions are exercises in resistance. Whether seen as
Utopian visions or believed in as revelations of Ultimate Reality, the religions reveal
various possibilities for human freedom that are not intended for that curious distancing
act that has become second nature to our aesthetic sensibilities." Id. He further claims
that religious questions are "limit questions" which "must be logically odd questions, since
they are questions about the most fundamental presuppositions, the most basic beliefs, of
all our knowing, willing, and acting." Id. at 86, 87.
47. GEORGE A. THEODORSON & ACHILLES G. THEODORSON, A MODERN
DICTIONARY OF SOCIOLOGY 406 (1969).
48. Cf. Winnifred Fallers Sullivan, Judging Religion, 81 MARQ. L. REV. 441, 454
(1998) (pointing out the difficulties of defining religion and identifying that "the goal of
religious studies in the academic, legal, and political context, as well as in a scholarly
setting, is to develop a common discourse about religion and religious difference").
49. SCHUBERT M. OGDEN, Is THERE ONLY ONE TRUE RELIGION OR ARE THERE
MANY? 5 (1992) (emphasis added) [hereinafter OGDEN, IS THERE ONLY ONE].
50. Id. at 6. In more technical terms, the existential or religious question involves a
metaphysical aspect and an ethical aspect that are closely related. In its metaphysical
aspect, "it asks about the ultimate reality of our own existence in relation to others and the
whole." Id. at 17. Unlike metaphysics proper, which determines the structure of ultimate
reality itself, the metaphysical aspect of religion tells us the meaning of ultimate reality for
us. In addition, in its ethical aspect, religion "asks about our authentic self-
understanding." Id. at 18. Here again, there is a difference between ethics proper, which
asks how we are to act, and the ethical aspect of religion, which tells us how we are to
understand ourselves. Moreover, each specific religion answers both the metaphysical and
ethical aspects of the existential question.
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S 51presupposed by all other questions. It is the "comprehensive question"
concerning "what is the valid comprehensive self-understanding" or
"comprehensive human purpose., 52  Religion explicitly answers the
existential or comprehensive question by providing the "concepts and
symbols whose express function is to mediate authentic self-
understanding."53  In other words, religion includes a comprehensive
evaluation of human activity in terms of the nature of existence to
determine "how human activity as such ought to make a difference to the
larger reality of which it is a part.
54
If the existential or comprehensive question is presupposed by all
other questions, does that mean that answering any question (such as
which party should win a law suit) presupposes an answer to the
existential question? Yes and no. Ogden argues that "everything that
we think, say, or do, insofar, at least, as it makes or implies a claim to
validity, necessarily presupposes that ultimate reality is such as to
authorize some understanding of ourselves as authentic and that,
conversely, some understanding of our existence is authentic because it is
authorized by ultimate reality.,15 In this sense, answering any question
implies an understanding of what constitutes authentic human existence
or an answer to the comprehensive or existential question. Franklin
Gamwell clarifies that this does not mean that all human activity is
religious but that "the character of human activity as such implies the
possibility of religion, in the sense that it implies the comprehensive
question and, therefore, the possibility that this question is asked and
answered explicitly. ' '56 Human activity is thus religious only to the extent
that the existential or comprehensive question has been explicitly asked
and answered.
To differentiate between explicitly answering and implicitly
"answering" the comprehensive question, Ogden refers to the former as
religion and the latter as a "basic faith (or confidence) in the meaning of
51. FRANKLIN I. GAMWELL, THE MEANING OF RELIGIOUS FREEDOM: MODERN
POLITICS AND THE DEMOCRATIC RESOLUTION 22-23 (1995) ("[Elvery human activity
asks and answers, at least implicitly, the comprehensive question, namely, what is the valid
comprehensive self-understanding?... [WJhat is the comprehensive human purpose?").
52. Id. Gamwell further recognizes that his "definition and discussion of religion is
nothing other than an attempt to appropriate [Ogden's] formulations for the purpose of
the present inquiry." Id. at 15 n.1; cf. Smith, supra note 2, at 216 (claiming that "what we
call 'religion' typically amounts to a comprehensive way of perceiving and understanding
life and the world; it affects everything").
53. OGDEN, IS THERE ONLY ONE, supra note 49, at 8.
54. GAMWELL, supra note 51, at 25.
55. OGDEN, IS THERE ONLY ONE, supra note 49, at 7.
56. GAMWELL, supra note 51, at 23 n.5.
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life. ' 7 Ogden argues that this basic faith is presupposed by all human
activity." It involves "accepting the larger setting of one's life and
adjusting oneself to it."59  It implicitly answers the existential or
comprehensive question because it involves a self-conscious adjustment
to these conditions. 6 Unlike other animals, human animals not only
"live by faith" but "seek understanding." 61 Humans are "instinct poor;"
"[n]ot only the details of our lives but even their overall pattern as
authentically human remain undecided by our membership in the human




In other words, humans do not live by merely accepting their setting and
adjusting to it (basic faith); they seek a reflective self-understanding of
reality (the whole) and their place in it (authentic human existence).
Religion provides the concepts and symbols for human reflective self-
understanding; it attempts to make sense "of our basic faith in the
meaning of life, given the facts of life as we actually experience it. '63 To
the extent that humans act with reflective self-understanding or have an
explicit comprehensive understanding of authentic human existence, they
are religious. Consequently, for the purposes of this discussion,
"religion" will be equated with an explicit "comprehensive claim or
conviction about human authenticity."
Accordingly, religion not only includes the recognized world religions
of Christianity, Judaism, Islam, Hinduism, and Buddhism, but it also
includes humanism, capitalism (when proposed as a normative rather
than as a positive theory), 6' communism, and other so-called secular
57. OGDEN, IS THERE ONLY ONE, supra note 49, at 7.
58. SCHUBERT M. OGDEN, ON THEOLOGY 70 (1986) (arguing that "to exist in the
characteristically human way is to exist by faith").
59. Id.
60. For clarity, it should be noted that Ogden argues that both basic faith and religion
involve understanding and faith. See id. at 71. However, basic faith is not reflective while
religion is reflective. See id. In terms slightly different to those used here, he distinguishes
between "the existential understanding or faith [basic faith] that is constitutive of human
existence as such and the reflective understanding or faith [religion] whereby what is
presented existentially can be re-presented in an express, thematic, and conceptually
precise way." Id. at 71.
61. Id. at 106.
62. OGDEN, Is THERE ONLY ONE, supra note 49, at 6.
63. Id. at 18.
64. See David R. Loy, The Religion of the Market, 65 J. AM. ACAD. RELIGION 275,
275 (1997). After adopting a functionalist view of religion "as what grounds us by teaching
us what the world is, and what our r6le in the world is," Loy argues that:
[O]ur present economic system should also be understood as our religion,
because it has come to fulfill a religious function for us. The discipline of
economics is less a science than the theology of that religion, and its god, the
Market, has become a vicious circle of ever-increasing production and
consumption by pretending to offer a secular salvation. The collapse of
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answers to the existential question. This means that there is and always
has been a plurality of religions or comprehensive self-understandings.
Moreover, all human activity (including legal interpretation) is either
explicitly informed by a plurality of religious convictions or implicitly
informed by a basic faith in the meaningfulness of existence.
As more fully specified below, the distinction between religion and
basic faith is very important because to the extent judges attempt to give
a full justification for their decision, they have to rely on religious
convictions. A "full justification" means that any extra-legal norm relied
upon by judges must be justified. Judges may cite analogous legal
precedent, historical precedent, or policy positions as justifications for
their decisions. Despite their apparent authority, these intermediate
level norms must be justified. For example, why should the policy of
certainty in the commercial law context trump doing what is fair under
the particular circumstances of each case? Religious or explicit
comprehensive convictions provide this full justification because a
religious conviction "purports to identify the necessary and sufficient
moral condition or comprehensive condition of all valid moral claims.61
They are the normative framework for all of life. Accordingly, Part III
attempts to demonstrate how justifying any extra-legal norm requires
that judges finally rely on a religious conviction about authentic human
existence.
In addition, although definitions are not something that can be said to
be definitively true or right, Ogden's formal definition of religion serves
the purpose of putting on equal footing all "extra-legal" claims about
"authentic human existence." 66 As a practical matter, this is very helpful
because it treats all of these normative claims as similar for purposes of
considering the legitimacy of legal decision making under conditions of
legal indeterminacy. By calling all these claims religious, we signal both
that they are typically considered "extra-legal" and that they are
communism-best understood as a capitalist 'heresy'-makes it more apparent
that the Market is becoming the first truly world religion, binding all corners of
the globe more and more tightly into a worldview and set of values whose
religious role we overlook only because we insist on seeing them as 'secular.'
Id.
65. GAMWELL, supra note 51, at 70-71.
66. See BRIAN Bix, JURISPRUDENCE: THEORY AND CONTEXT (2nd ed. 1999).
Commenting on the definition of law, Bix claims that:
[O]ne might not be able to say that a particular conceptual analysis was 'right' or
'true,' at least not in the sense that there would be only one unique 'right' or
'true' theory for all conceptual questions, but I do not see this as a significant
loss. It should be sufficient that one can affirm (or deny) that an analysis is good,




considered to be normative claims about authentic human existence. In
other words, this formal definition of religion identifies that these claims
have an equivalence in terms of both their type ("extra-legal") and their
logical function (normative claims about "authentic human existence").
It does not put any material limitation on what kinds of claims about
authentic human existence are to be considered religious. For example, a
theistic definition of religion would include the material requirement that
claims about authentic human existence are religious only if they are
theistic claims about authentic human existence. This would
presumptively treat theistic and non-theistic claims about authentic
human existence differently even though they serve the same logical
function. Not surprisingly, this distinction is often used arbitrarily to
presume that theistic claims about authentic human existence must be
excluded from judicial decision making but that non-theistic claims
should not. This formal definition of religion does not prejudge this
issue. It helps make explicit all the "extra-legal" normative claims about
authentic human existence that may be informing legal decision making.
Once the role of extra-legal claims about human authenticity in judicial
decision making is made explicit, the normative determination of
whether some of them ought to be excluded can then be approached
without presupposing that some beliefs (non-theistic extra-legal claims
about human authenticity) are presumptively more justifiable than
others (theistic extra-legal claims about human authenticity).
Finally, Ogden's definition of religion further supports an account of
how judges can validate or justify their religious or comprehensive
convictions through theological and philosophical reflection. As
discussed more thoroughly in Part X, Ogden maintains that reason plays
an essential role in the articulation and evaluation of religious
convictions.6 8  He argues that religious convictions are different in the
sense that they are comprehensive but that does not mean they are
67. For an example of how assuming (without argument) that religious convictions
are necessarily theistic leads to confused thinking about what is "religious" and what is
"secular," see KAI NIELSEN, ETHICS WITHOUT GOD (rev. ed. 1990). Nielsen argues that
"[t]he sense in which any morality is and must be independent of religion is this: that from
the recognition and consequent statement that there is a being that some call 'God' no
moral statements whatsoever follow." Id. at 109. Even if Nielsen is right about the latter
claim (which he is, in a trivial way, but is not in an important sense), he fails to provide a
justification for his assertion that all religious morality depends on a conception of God.
See id. In other words, if religion is defined broad as Ogden defines it, ethical convictions
about authentic human existence are still religious convictions even though they do not
include a conception of God. For example, humanism, capitalism (when proposed as a
normative rather than as a positive theory), communism, and other so-called secular
answers to the existential question are religious convictions just like Christianity, Judaism,
Islam and Hinduism.
68. See infra Part X.B.
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beyond critical or rational validation. In fact, he maintains that "it is the
very nature of a religion to make or imply the claim to formal religious
truth." 69  Assuming that Ogden's arguments succeed, this means that
judges and other officials should validate their religious convictions
before relying on them for fully justifying their interpretation of law.
B. Moderate Legal Indeterminancy
My essential descriptive assumption about the nature of law in general
is that the law is indeterminate such that hard cases arise where the
apparently relevant statutes, common law, contracts, or constitutional
law provisions at issue do not clearly resolve the dispute. Many theorists
now refer to this broadly as legal indeterminacy.70 There appears to be
an overwhelming consensus that the law is indeterminate but little
consensus about what that means.7' For example, extreme-radical
deconstructionists such as Anthony D'Amato have argued that even the
U.S. constitutional requirement that the President be thirty-five years of
age is not an easy case (i.e., indeterminate)." However, even
contemporary legal formalists, such as Ernest Weinrib, claim that
"[niothing about formalism precludes indeterminacy., 73 He argues that
"formalism does not rely on the antecedent determinacy for particular
cases of the concepts entrenched in positive law," but that "the organ of
positive law has the function of determining an antecedently
indeterminate controversy. 7 4 Consequently, in its weaker forms, the
indeterminacy thesis merely signals the almost universal rejection of
strong legal formalism.
Both the Legal Realists and Critical Legal Studies Movement ("CLS")
have forcefully undermined the feasibility of strong legal formalism. In
fact, the origin of the consensus about the indeterminacy of the law can
be traced back to the Legal Realists critique of Langdell and other strong
legal formalists. 75 For example, Karl Llewellyn rejects deductive legal
69. OGDEN, Is THERE ONLY ONE, supra note 49, at 13.
70. See, e.g., Kress, supra note 20, at 200-15.
71. See supra note 19.
72. D'Amato, Aspects of Deconstruction, supra note 19, at 250. D'Amato notes that
"[d]econstructionists say that all interpretation depends on context. Radical
deconstructionists add that, because contexts can change, there can be no such thing as a
single interpretation of any text that is absolute and unchanging for all time." Id. at 252;
see also Anthony D'Amato, Aspects of Deconstruction: The Failure of the Word "Bird", 84
NW. L. REV. 536 (1990).
73. Ernest J. Weinrib, Legal Formalism: On the Immanent Rationality of Law, 97
YALE L. REv. 949, 1008 (1988).
74. Id.
75. Christopher Columbus Langdell is often considered the archetype of strong legal
formalism. See GRANT GILMORE, THE AGES OF AMERICAN LAW 42-43 (1977). He
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certainty and argues that "legal rules do not lay down any limits within
which a judge moves. 7 6 Rather, Llewellyn argues:
[A] legal rule functions not as a closed space within which one
remains, but rather as a bough whose branches are growing; in
short, as a guideline and not as a starting premise; not as
inflexible iron armor which constrains or even forbids growth,
but as a skeleton which supports and conditions growth, and
even promotes and in some particulars liberates it."
For legal realists, this understanding of legal rules entails a rule
scepticism that recognizes the indeterminacy of law.
CLS is also well known for its claim about the radical indeterminacy of
the law. However, it rejects not only strong legal formalism but also any
attempt to find a rational principle that can resolve legal indeterminacy.
For instance, Mark Kelman argues that there is a CLS version of legal
indeterminacy that:
is quite distinct from the Realist one. This stronger CLS claim
is that the legal system is invariably simultaneously
philosophically committed to mirror-image contradictory norms,
each of which dictates the opposite result in any case (no matter
how "easy" the case first appears). While settled practice is not
unattainable, the CLS claim is that settled justificatory schemes
are in fact unattainable.8
considered law a science and claimed that "all the available materials of that science are
contained in printed books." ARTHUR E. SUTHERLAND, THE LAW AT HARVARD 175
(1967). For further discussion of the dominance of strong legal formalism from the Civil
War to World War I, see GILMORE, supra, at 41-67. Supporters of Langdell argued that
common law cases could be reduced to a formal system and that the judge, like a
technician, could determine the right decision as a matter of deductive logic by
pigeonholing cases into the formal system. See id. at 43-44. In other words, strong legal
formalism maintains that legal decision making is essentially a deductive process whereby
the application of legal rules results in determinative outcomes from the constraints
imposed by the language of the law. Cf MICHEL ROSENFELD, JUST INTERPRETATIONS:
LAW BETWEEN ETHICS AND POLITICS 33 (1998) (discussing the "new" versus the "old"
legal formalism); see also David A. Strauss, The Role of a Bill of Rights, 59 U. CHI. L. REV.
539 (1992). In discussing the conception of the Bill of Rights as a Code, Strauss defines
formalism as including "three things: a heavy reliance on the precise language of the text;
a pretense that the text resolves more issues than it actually does; and an effort to shift
responsibility for a decision away from the actual decisionmaker and to some other party,
such as the Framers." Strauss, supra, at 544.
76. KARL LLEWELLYN, THE CASE LAW SYSTEM IN AMERICA, sec. 56, at 80
(Michael Ansaldi, trans., Paul Gewirtz, ed., 1989)
77. Id.
78. MARK KELMAN, A GUIDE TO CRITICAL LEGAL STUDIES 13 (1987). David
Kairys similarly argues that:
The lack of required, legally correct rules, methodologies, or results is in part a
function of the limits of language and interpretation, which are subjective and
value laden. More importantly, indeterminacy stems from the reality that the
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In The Concept of Law, the prominent legal positivist H.L. A. Hart
further provides a helpful account of legal indeterminacy with his idea of
the "open texture of the law." Hart advocates a middle path between
formalism and rule scepticism such that the indeterminacy of the law
allows for "varied types of reasoning which courts characteristically use
in exercising the creative function left to them by the open texture of law
in statute or precedent."7 Hart helps make clear that this open texture
or indeterminacy concerns not only "particular legal rules," but also "the
ultimate criteria of validity," which he refers to as "the rule of
recognition..' With respect to the rule of recognition, this results in a
paradoxical situation where courts are determining the ultimate criteria
of legal validity in the process of deciding whether a particular law is
valid ' Hart claims that "the law in such cases is fundamentally
incomplete: it provides no answer to the questions at issue in such cases"
and that courts must exercise the restricted law-making function which
he refers to as discretion.82 As a result, in hard cases, the judge "is
entitled to follow standards or reasons for decision which are not dictated
by the law and may differ from those followed by other judges faced with
similar hard cases.'
3
For the purposes of this article, the larger question raised by the
indeterminacy thesis is whether legal interpretation can be rationally
justified or legitimated under the conditions of legal indeterminacy. Ken
Kress has noted that "[t]he indeterminacy thesis asserts that law does not
constrain judges sufficiently, raising the specter that judicial decision
making is often or always illegitimate.""4 Is judicial decision making
law usually embraces and legitimizes many or all of the conflicting values and
interests involved in controversial issues and a wide and conflicting array of
"logical" or "reasoned" arguments and strategies of argumentation, without
providing any legally required hierarchy of values or arguments or any required
method for determining which is most important in a particular context. Judges
then make choices, and those choices are most fundamentally value based, or
political.
David Kairys, Introduction, in THE POLITICS OF LAW: A PROGRESSIVE CRITIQUE 4
(David Kairys ed., 3d ed. 1998).
79. H. L. A. HART, THE CONCEPT OF LAW 144 (2d ed. 1994). Hart notes that the
rule of recognition can be partly, but never completely, indeterminate. Id. at 148. For
example, in the United States, the United States Constitution could be indeterminate in.
some sense, but the rule of recognition conferring authority (jurisdiction) on the court to
exercise its creative powers to settle the ultimate criteria of validity raises no doubts even
though the precise scope of that power may raise some doubts. See id. at 152.
80. Id. at 148.
81. Id. at 152.
82. Id. at 252 (emphasis in original).
83. Id. at 273.
84. Kress, supra note 20, at 203.
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merely the arbitrary exercise of political power?"' Or is it just the
product of the particular life experience of the judge? 6  The
indeterminacy thesis thus puts into question the notion of the "Rule of
Law." Lawrence Solum claims that
if the indeterminacy thesis is true, then legal justice will fall
short of the ideal of the rule of law in at least three ways: (1)
judges will rule by arbitrary decision, because radically
indeterminate law cannot constrain judicial decision; (2) the
laws will not be public, in the sense that the indeterminate law
that is publicized could not be the real basis for judicial
decision; and (3) there will be no basis for concluding that like
cases are treated alike, because the very ideal of legal regularity
is empty if law is radically "d •i 87
Moreover, in a democratic society, this means that judges are allegedly
subverting democratic rule by creating the law outside of the legislative
process and that judicial decision making is illegitimate.
The indeterminacy debate, however, has been referred to as "the key
issue in legal scholarship today,. 8 and a fuller treatment of this issue is
beyond the scope of this article. Rather than resolve this debate, my
intention is to adopt the widespread assumption that the law is
indeterminate in at least a moderate sense. By assuming only a moderate
level of indeterminacy, I hope to achieve two things. First, I want to
present a descriptive account of law that at least partially reflects most
theorists' conclusions about the determinacy of the sources of law.
Second, I want to bracket the question about the breadth or depth of
legal indeterminacy and its implications for the legitimacy of the law. In
85. For example, CLS rejects the claims that law and morality can be based on an
apolitical method or procedure of justification and that the legal system can be objectively
defended as embodying an intelligible moral order. See generally Roberto Mangabeira
Unger, The Critical Legal Studies Movement, 96 HARV. L. REV. 563 (1983). The legal
order is merely the outcome of power struggles or practical compromises. See id. at 565.
Thus, they advocate "the purely instrumental use of legal practice and legal doctrine to
advance leftist aims." Id. at 567.
86. Jerome Frank is well known for his claim that judicial decisions can, in principle,
be explained by a psychoanalysis of a judge's life experiences. See generally JEROME
FRANK, LAW AND THE MODERN MIND (Peter Smith 1970) (1930). He comments that:
What we may hope some day to get from our judges are detailed autobiographies
containing the sort of material that is recounted in the autobiographical novel; or
opinions annotated, by the judge who writes them, with elaborate explorations of
the background factors in his personal experience which swayed him in reaching
his conclusions. For in the last push, a judge's decisions are the outcome of his
entire life-history.
Id. at 123-24.
87. Lawrence B. Solum, Indeterminacy, in A COMPANION TO PHILOSOPHY OF LAW
AND LEGAL THEORY 489 (Dennis Patterson ed., 1996).
88. Anthony D'Amato, Pragmatic Indeterminacy, 85 Nw. U. L. REV., 148 (1990).
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other words, I do not want controversy over my starting assumptions to
sabotage the central focus of the article. My central focus is on whether,
in hard cases involving a modicum of legal indeterminacy that most
theorists would recognize, judges should rely on religious or
comprehensive convictions for resolving disputes.
IV. THE NECESSITY OF RELIGIOUS OR COMPREHENSIVE CONVICTIONS
FOR FULLY JUSTIFYING JUDGES' DECISIONS IN HARD CASES
Given this descriptive account of legal indeterminacy, a normative
account of law (i.e., a rational justification or legitimation of law) must
specify what "standards or reasons for decision[s] which are not dictated
by the law,"' 9 a judge should rely on in hard cases. In this respect, I will
elaborate a normative account of law only to the extent required to
determine whether religious convictions ought to play a role in judicial
decision making. Assuming that the law is determinate in some sense
(i.e., some cases are easy) and that judges have a duty to apply the law,
judicial decision making is independent of comprehensive convictions in
easy cases. The central question then is whether judicial decision making
should be independent of religious or comprehensive convictions in all
cases or only in easy cases. Either all judicial decision making is justified
independently of comprehensive convictions (even in hard cases)
(separationist model) or judicial decision making is independent of
comprehensive convictions in easy cases but not in hard cases
(religionist-separationist model). To address these issues, this Part will
discuss the nature of full justification, a caveat with respect to full
justification, and whether full justification requires judges to become
theologians.
A. Full Justification
In hard cases, judges must rely on extra-legal norms because hard cases
are, by definition, those cases in which the relevant legal norms do not
provide a determinate outcome to the dispute in question. For example,
the law may be indeterminate because it includes an abstract norm such
as the concept of liberty under the Fourteenth Amendment, or it may
include conflicting legal norms such as property rights and free exercise
of religion rights, or it may involve conflicting public policy
considerations such as fairness and certainty. Given that judges deciding
hard cases must rely on extra-legal norms such as political, historical,
societal, and moral norms, they must determine which of these extra-
legal norms are appropriate. Why is one political norm decisive and not
another? Why is a historical norm, rather than a societal norm, decisive?
89. See HART, supra note 79, at 273.
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Why are any of these norms appropriate? In other words, if judges fully
justified their decisions, they would also justify these extra-legal norms
and provide reasons why one norm is the most appropriate norm for
deciding these hard cases.
To provide this full justification, my religionist-separationist model
maintains that judges ought to rely on religious convictions in their
deliberations about hard cases to justify the extra-legal norms required to
decide those cases. If the political, historical, societal, and moral norms
in question are noncomprehensive extra-legal norms, they will not fully
justify judges' decisions. A full justification of judges' decisions in hard
cases requires judges to rely on a particular type of extra-legal norm-a
religious conviction about authentic human existence. Religious
convictions are explicit comprehensive convictions which provide the
comprehensive condition of validity for all normative thinking.
Religious convictions should thus inform judicial deliberations in hard
cases in several ways. First, any noncomprehensive extra-legal norm
relied on must be justified by a religious conviction. Justifying extra-
legal norms requires judges to determine that the norms in question
would positively contribute to authentic human existence in the context
of the case at issue. Second, the choice among extra-legal norms should
also be justified by determining which norm or norms best contributes to
authentic human existence. In addition, judges should rely on the
religious conviction that they have determined, based on critical
reflection, to be true. Consequently, in deliberating about hard cases,
judges should fully justify their decisions by relying on their religious
convictions to justify all noncomprehensive extra-legal norms and the
choice among them.
Although he has a much different conception of what fully justifying
judicial decisions in hard cases entails, Dworkin makes a similar point
when he argues that:
Any practical legal argument, no matter how detailed and
limited, assumes the kind of abstract foundation jurisprudence
offers, and when rival foundations compete, a legal argument
assumes one and rejects others. So any judge's opinion is itself
a piece of legal philosophy, even when the philosophy is hidden
and the visible argument is dominated by citation and lists of
facts. Jurisprudence is the -general part of adjudication, silent
prologue to any decision at lawi1
In my terms, any practical legal argument in a hard case presupposes a
comprehensive conviction about authentic human existence. A judge's
choice among extra-legal norms is either fully justified based on an
90. DWORKIN, LAW'S EMPIRE, supra note 19, at 90.
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explicit comprehensive conviction (i.e., a religious conviction about
authentic human existence) or blindly based on an implicit
comprehensive conviction. Comprehensive convictions are the "hidden"
and "silent prologue" to any judicial decision in a hard case.
Ironically, the separationist model of judicial decision making prevents
judges from fully justifying their decisions in hard cases. This model
requires judges to choose extra-legal norms to decide hard cases without
fully justifying those norms or the choice among them. Although this
choice implies a comprehensive conviction, judges are prohibited from
deliberating on how this choice is explicitly related to that
comprehensive conviction. Judges should "deliberate" as if
comprehensive convictions about authentic human existence are not
involved in the process. They are further prohibited from reflecting on
the validity of the implied comprehensive convictions; they must merely
believe that these comprehensive convictions are true. Accordingly,
under this model, judges must rely on a blind belief in the validity of their
decisions without fully justifying them.
B. Caveat. The Role of Fully Justified Noncomprehensive Norms
My argument that a full justification of judicial decisions in hard cases
requires judges to rely on comprehensive or religious convictions,
however, requires a caveat because this claim is not as demanding as it
may initially seem. I am not arguing that in deliberating about every
hard case, judges must specify a full justification of their decisions. My
claim is more modest than this. What responsible judicial decision
making requires is that judges have, at some point, fully justified all the
extra-legal norms they rely on to decide hard cases. For example, in a
hard case dealing with conflicting precedent, the judge must choose
which line of precedent to follow. The law does not tell the judge which
direction to go or which path to take. The judge must rely on extra-legal
norms to determine which precedent to follow. If the extra-legal norms
are noncomprehensive, then the judge will have to justify these
noncomprehensive extra-legal norms in accordance with her
comprehensive conviction. The judge can do this either during, prior to,
or alongside of the process of deliberating about this hard case. In other
words, even if the judge does not fully justify these noncomprehensive
extra-legal norms during her deliberation about the case, she can rely on
these norms if they have been fully justified prior to or alongside of her
deliberation in that case.
This raises the question of the origin of these noncomprehensive
norms and how judges fully justify them prior to and alongside of their
judicial decision making. Specifying noncomprehensive norms is part of
determining the nature of authentic human existence. Religious or
[Vol. 53:709
Reenchanting the Law
comprehensive convictions attempt to order and organize all of life
around a comprehensive purpose. This includes the moral, political,
social, economic, and legal dimensions of life, and it requires relating that
comprehensive purpose to the particular circumstances of each
individual's life. Noncomprehensive norms such as "obey your parents,"
"do not lie," "promote democratic government," and "pursue justice"
are part of the specification of authentic human existence which depend
upon a religious or comprehensive conviction. These noncomprehensive
norms are essential for organizing and leading a self-reflective life
because they allow us to make decisions without ascending to the
comprehensive level of reflection in every decision we make. They also
allow us to focus on the particular circumstances of a normative issue.
Most practical normative deliberation focuses on getting the facts
straight and deciding what to do based on the most appropriate
noncomprehensive norm. Most of our normative thinking occurs at this
level and ascends to the comprehensive order of reflection only in hard
cases where the noncomprehensive norms are indeterminate.
One of the major functions that religious traditions have performed for
their followers is to specify the noncomprehensive norms that promote
living life authentically and to provide the comprehensive or religious
justification for these noncomprehensive norms. In the Christian
tradition, one of the main tasks of practical and moral theology consists
of specifying for believers what noncomprehensive norms are essential
for living the "Christian life" in a historically appropriate manner.9' For
91. In discussing the nature of theology in general and Christian theology as a
particular example of theological reflection, Schubert Ogden argues that "[alIthough
theology is a single movement of reflection, it has three distinct moments which allow for its
differentiation into the interrelated disciplines of historical, systematic, and practical
theology." OGDEN, ON THEOLOGY, supra note 58, at 7. Practical theology, in its
Christian form, can be broadly understood "as reflective understanding of the
responsibilities of Christian witness as such in the present situation." Id. at 13-14. He
further claims that practical theology can also be more narrowly understood as focusing on
the "explicit witness of faith" in the specific religious forms and practices of the
representative Christian church. Id. at 98-101. By contrast, moral theology focuses on the
"implicit witness of faith" constituted by the actions of each individual Christian and
formulates general principles to inform all Christian praxis. Id.; see also DON S.
BROWNING, A FUNDAMENTAL PRACTICAL THEOLOGY: DESCRIPTIVE AND STRATEGIC
PROPOSALS 10 (1991) (arguing that religious communities "can and often do constitute
powerful embodiments of practical rationality" and demonstrating this argument with case
studies of three Christian communities); DAVID TRACY, BLESSED RAGE FOR ORDER:
THE NEW PLURALISM IN THEOLOGY 240 (1975) (arguing that the "practical theologians
task ... is to project the future possibilities of meaning and truth on the basis of present
constructive and past historical theological resources"). For an example of how the
wisdom of the Lutheran tradition could provide rhetorical and analogical insight for
judges (especially Chief Justice Rehnquist), see Marie A. Failinger, The Justice Who
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instance, the Papal Encyclicals have addressed matters of moral theology
such as abortion, artificial conception, economic exploitation, and
euthanasia.9 The World Council of Churches has likewise addressed
issues such as racism, sexism, and defining a "'just, participatory, and
sustainable society.' ' 93 In the Jewish tradition, the classic example of the
specification of noncomprehensive norms is the Jewish Talmud. The
Talmud is a great compendium of Jewish law and includes commentary
on the Jewish law by esteemed Babylonian and Palestinian rabbis.94
These laws contain very particular directives pertaining to daily life such
as "LOVE WORK, HATE LORDSHIP, AND SEEK NO INTIMACY
WITH THE RULING POWERS."9'5 Furthermore, given that all explicit
comprehensive convictions are religious convictions, any tradition of
comprehensive reflection, such as comprehensive liberalism, could serve
the function of a religious tradition by specifying and fully justifying
noncomprehensive norms.9 6 Religious traditions thus provide valuable
assistance to their followers in specifying and fully justifying
noncomprehensive norms to help them deal with important moral,
political, social, and legal issues.
With respect to judicial decision making, two things should be
emphasized. First, the noncomrehensive extra-legal norms judges rely on
in hard cases do not just magically appear during the process of judging.
We all inherit a plethora of noncomprehensive norms from our culture,
including the religious traditions which are part of that culture. 7 In the
Wouldn't Be Lutheran: Toward Borrowing the Wisdom of Faith Traditions, 46 CLEV. ST.
L. REV. 643, 702 (1998).
92. See, e.g., Pope John Paul II, Veritatis Splendor (1993), in READINGS IN
CHRISTIAN ETHICS: A HISTORICAL SOURCEBOOK 307-11 (J. Philip Wogaman & Douglas
M. Strong, eds. 1996).
93. World Council of Churches, in READINGS IN CHRISTIAN ETHICS: A HISTORICAL
SOURCEBOOK 315-40 (J. Philip Wogaman & Douglas M. Strong, eds. 1996) (includes
excerpts from Official Reports from Periodic Assemblies in Amsterdam (1948), Evanston
(1954), New Dehli (1961), Vancouver (1983), and Canberra (1991)).
94. See, e.g., THE LIVING TALMUD: THE WISDOM OF THE FATHERS AND ITS
CLASSICAL COMMENTARIES (Judah Goldin ed. & trans. 1957).
95. Id. at 62.
96. See, e.g., JOHN RAWLS, A THEORY OF JUSTICE (1971). In Political Liberalism,
Rawls acknowledges that "although the distinction between a political conception of
justice and a comprehensive philosophical doctrine is not discussed in Theory, once the
question is raised, it is clear, I think, that the text regards justice as fairness and
utilitarianism as comprehensive, or partially comprehensive, doctrines." JOHN RAWLS,
POLITICAL LIBERALISM xviii (paperback ed. 1996) [hereinafter RAWLS, POLITICAL
LIBERALISM].
97. The work on "social norms" in law and society and law and economics has been
helpful in identifying that the obligations generated by social norms determine behavior in
addition to, or instead of, the law. See Richard H. McAdams, Comment: Accounting for
Norms. 1997 WIS. L. REV. 625. 632: Robert C. Ellickson. Law and Economics Discovers
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process of maturation, self-reflective individuals reflect on these
inherited noncomprehensive norms and come to terms with them.
Religious traditions provide assistance in this process both by specifying
noncomprehensive norms which aid adherents in living life authentically
and by fully justifying these noncomprehensive norms. However,
individuals must finally determine for themselves which religious or
comprehensive conviction about authentic human existence is valid and
which noncomprehensive norms can be fully justified by their
comprehensive conviction. In addition, this is a life-long task. Self-
reflective individuals continually reexamine both whether their
noncomprehensive norms can be fully justified by their comprehensive or
religious convictions and whether their comprehensive convictions are
authentic or valid. To the extent judges have been self-reflective, they
come to the bench with a body of noncomprehensive extra-legal norms
that have been fully justified ahead of time, and they continue to reflect
on these noncomprehensive convictions alongside of, or outside of, their
role as judges. Certain hard cases may cause or prompt further reflection
about the noncomprehensive extra-legal norms they thought were fully
justified, but in most cases, the full justification of these
noncomprehensive extra-legal norms has occurred prior to, and
continues to occur alongside of, judicial decision making.
Second, once a judge has determined that certain noncomprehensive,
extra-legal norms are fully justified by her comprehensive conviction, she
can rely on these noncomprehensive extra-legal norms in subsequent
hard cases for fully justifying her decisions without explicitly ascending to
her comprehensive conviction. Future ascent may be unusual or rare.
Unless something about a subsequent case calls their validity into
question, these previously justified noncomprehensive extra-legal norms
Social Norms, 27 J. LEGAL STUD. 537 (1998) (arguing that the "founders of classical law
and economics ... exaggerate[] the role of the law in the overall system of social control
and, conversely, underestimated the importance of socialization and the informal
enforcement of social norms). However, the discussion of "social norms" in legal theory
and especially in the economic analysis of law has tended to focus on a descriptive analysis
of the role of social norms in regulating behavior along with law, the market, and
"architecture." See, e.g., Lawrence Lessig, The New Chicago School, 27 J. LEGAL STUD.
661, 662-64 (1998) (arguing that "behavior is regulated by four types of constraint,"
including law and social norms). Social norms are taken as a given (like preferences) and
used to explain behavior in addition to legal norms, as an alternative to an explanation
based on legal norms, and as a response to legal norms. Id. at 662. By contrast, I am
focusing on the normative question of how extra-legal norms, whatever their source,
should be justified. The inquiry is not an empirical or descriptive account of how extra-
legal norms influence judicial decision making in hard cases but a normative account of
how extra-legal norms that are inherited from our culture should be justified or
legitimatized. The question is what validates or justifies the extra-legal norms that are
required for judges to decide hard cases.
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will suffice for deciding subsequent hard cases. The occasional nature of
the ascent to comprehensive convictions may be one of the reasons that
this ascent is absent from most accounts of judicial decision making.
Once judges have fully justified noncomprehensive extra-legal norms
about politics, morality, economics, etc., they may not consciously link
this process of justification with the process of judicial deliberation in
hard cases. In addition, judges continue to justify extra-legal norms
alongside of and during judicial decision making in hard cases. If judges
do so during judicial deliberation, they are self-aware that they are
relying on noncomprehensive extra-legal norms that must be fully
justified. If judges do so along side of their judicial deliberation, they
may be fully justifying noncomprehensive extra-legal norms without
connecting this process to the full justification of their decisions during
judicial deliberation. Ideally, judges would recognize that both of these
processes are essential to a full justification of their decisions in hard
cases. Nevertheless, their decisions would still be fully justified even if
judges perform these processes separately and do not recognize that they
are connected. As a result, although requiring judges to justify their
decisions fully, my religionist-separationist model of judicial decision
making does not require that judges fully justify the noncomprehensive
extra-legal norms they rely on during their deliberations about each hard
case.
C. Judges as Theologians?
Does this mean that judges must become theologians? Yes and no.
On the one hand, all people should critically reflect on their religious or
comprehensive convictions. The process of full justification requires
critically reflecting on comprehensive convictions in a manner similar to
"theological" reflection and "theological" reflection is an integral part of
living authentically for all people.9" In this sense, judges, like all other
self-reflective persons, are theologians.
On the other hand, with respect to judicial decision making proper, the
process of fully justifying noncomprehensive extra-legal norms does not
have to proceed like theological inquiry. According to Schubert Ogden,
theology consists of "critical reflection on the validity claims of some
specific religion." 99 In answering the existential question, religion makes
claims about the nature of ultimate reality and about the nature of
98. Because religion has been defined broadly as a "comprehensive convictions about
authentic human existence," the analogy between judges and theologians does not intend
to suggest that only comprehensive convictions that are theistic are religious. Rather it is
to meet and refute the possible objection that judges would have to employ a method of
practical reasoning similar to a systematic theologian or a philosopher of religion.
99. OGDEN, Is THERE ONLY ONE, supra note 49, at 34.
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authentic human existence. Theology is thus critical reflection on these
claims. In this process of critical reflection, theologians attempt to
articulate and validate a systematic formulation of the nature of ultimate
reality and the nature of authentic human existence. "" This reflective
understanding of authentic human existence is then intended to inform
all subsequent human activity in order to assist followers in living
authentically. In this respect, Ogden argues that:
[i]n short, the scope of theology's practical discipline is as broad
as the whole of human culture, and it properly considers every
form of human activity as potentially bearing the contemporary
witness of faith. This is the reason its natural Gespridchspartner
are all the human sciences and the various arts, including law,
medicine, business, government, education, etc., that in any way
have to do with the realization of human good. "
Although sometimes drawing on this comprehensive reflection provided
by theologians, I am assuming that the practical deliberation of ordinary
people, lawyers, and judges does not usually proceed like this. Rather
than proceeding in a systematic fashion, ordinary people, lawyers, and
judges usually proceed in an ad hoc manner. They validate their
comprehensive convictions and noncomprehensive norms as part of an
on-going process or as needed to face the dilemmas and crises that
confront them in the course of their lives. They do not usually attempt to
formulate and validate a comprehensive understanding of ultimate
reality and authentic existence systematically ahead of time and then
apply this understanding when political, moral, social, and legal issues
arise.
In response to criticisms of his philosopher-judge Hercules, Dworkin
makes a helpful distinction between Hercules, reasoning "outside-in,"
and ordinary people, lawyers, and judges, reasoning "inside-out."'"2
Before deciding any cases, Hercules builds "a gigantic, 'over-arching'
theory good for all seasons" including decisions about "metaphysics,
epistemology and ethics, and also of morality, including political
morality."" 3 "When a new case arises," he works from the "outside" or
from his over-arching theory
towards the problem at hand: finding the best available
justifications for law in general, for American legal and
constitutional practice as a species of law, for constitutional
interpretation, for tort, and then finally, for the poor woman
100. Id. at 10.
101. Id. at 14.
102. Ronald Dworkin, In Praise of Theory, 29 ARIZ. ST. L.J. 353, 358 (1997).
103. Id.
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By contrast, Dworkin claims that ordinary people, lawyers, and judges
may only rarely ascend to this theoretical level of thinking. Dworkin
argues that as ordinary people, "[w]e reason from the inside-out: we
begin with discrete problems forced upon us by occupation or
responsibility or chance, and the scope of our inquiry is severely limited,
not only by the time we have available, but by the arguments we happen
actually to encounter or imagine. ' °5 These approaches are not
inconsistent because sometimes even ordinary people, lawyers, and
judges must ascend to the kind of higher justification developed by
Hercules ahead of time. As Dworkin writes, "justificatory ascent is
always, as it were, on the cards: we cannot rule it out a priori because we
never know when a legal claim that seemed pedestrian and even
indisputable may suddenly be challenged by a new and potentially
revolutionary attack from a higher level."' '
With respect to the religionist-separationist model of judicial decision,
Dworkin's descriptive distinction between reasoning outside-in and
inside-out is helpful in one sense and misleading in another. It is helpful
in distinguishing judicial and theological reflection, but it is somewhat
misleading with respect to the question of whether judges rely on their
comprehensive convictions in deciding hard cases. As indicated above, I
assume that self-reflective or religious judges usually fully justify
noncomprehensive extra-legal norms prior to and alongside of their
decision making. In this sense, judges are ascending to their
comprehensive convictions for fully justifying noncomprehensive extra-
legal norms in a manner not acknowledged by Dworkin. However, this is
an ad hoc process rather than a systematic inquiry. Theologians
systematically develop a comprehensive account of the nature of ultimate
reality and authentic human existence ahead of time and then proceed to
determine answers to practical dilemmas. Unlike theologians, I am
assuming that most judges fully justify noncomprehensive extra-legal
norms in a piecemeal fashion. In the course of their lives, prior to and
alongside of judicial decision making, they encounter practical dilemmas
that require normative decisions. By appealing to their comprehensive
conviction in these dilemmas, they justify noncomprehensive norms that
will later aid them in making legal decisions. They also receive assistance
from religious traditions in this process. In many hard cases, judges thus
draw on noncomprehensive extra-legal norms that have already been
104. Id.
105. Id.
106. Id. at 357-58.
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fully justified in this ad hoc process. Judges focus on the particular facts
of the case at hand and try to determine which previously justified
noncomprehensive extra-legal norm is the most appropriate to resolve
the dispute. In addition, judges do not usually affiliate their ad hoc
process of fully justifying extra-legal norms prior to and alongside of
their judicial decision making with the process of judicial deliberation as
such. Unlike theologians who fit practical decisions into their
comprehensive schemes, judges take these noncomprehensive extra-legal
norms as a given and rely on them in hard cases.
Only in exceptionally hard cases, like Washington v. Glucksberg,"'7 do
judges encounter disputes that may put these previously justified norms
into question. Like Dworkin, I argue that these cases require ascent
during judicial decision making. It is especially important in these cases
that judges know what is at stake. My religionist-separationist model
attempts to specify what has always been required for a full justification
of their decisions but which has been occurring only piecemeal prior to
and alongside of their judicial decision making. Once previously justified
noncomprehensive extra-legal norms have been put into question, judges
become more aware that the process of justifying their decision requires
justifying the extra-legal norms they rely on to decide these cases.
Exceptionally hard cases rupture the normal process of judicial decision
making and make ascent to comprehensive convictions during judicial
decision making imperative. These cases then present an opportunity for
judges to understand what is happening in all hard cases but which often
goes undetected. °8
V. THE FULL JUSTIFICATION OF WASHINGTON V. GLUCKSBERG
Washington v. Glucksberg'°9 is one of the exceptionally hard cases
where the necessity of relying on comprehensive convictions for fully
107. 521 U.S. 702 (1997).
108. Benjamin Cardozo seems to have been aware of something like the religionist-
separationist model of judicial decision making. He embraces William James's claim that:
[E]very one of us has in truth an underlying philosophy of life, even those of us
to whom the names and notions of philosophy are unknown or anathema. There
is in each of us a stream of tendency, whether you choose to call it philosophy or
not, which gives coherence and direction to thought and action. Judges cannot
escape that current any more than other mortals. All their lives, forces which they
do not recognize and cannot name, have been tugging at them--inherited
instincts, traditional beliefs, acquired convictions; and the resultant is an outlook
on life, a conception of social needs, a sense of James's phrase of 'the total push
and pressure of the cosmos,' which, when reasons are nicely balanced, must
determine where choice shall fall.
BENJAMIN N. CARDOZO, THE NATURE OF THE JUDICIAL PROCESS 12 (1921) (emphasis
added).
109. 521 U.S. 702 (1997).
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justifying judges' decisions becomes more evident."" The indeterminacy
of the relevant legal norms is quite evident in this case, and the judicial
reliance on extra-legal norms is more pronounced. This kind of case thus
presents a unique challenge to the ideal of legal autonomy and lends
support to the religionist-separationist model of judicial decision making.
To support this argument, I will first argue that the issue in this case-
whether citizens have a right to determine the time and manner of their
death with the aid of a physician " ' -is precisely the kind of issue whose
resolution inherently depends on a religious or comprehensive conviction
about authentic human existence. Subsequently, I will analyze the Ninth
Circuit en banc and Supreme Court opinions in this case to show that
both opinions fail to provide a full justification of the decisions reached
by these courts. I will then explain that a full justification would require
relying on religious or explicit comprehensive convictions. Thus, this
Part attempts to demonstrate that the autonomy of law fails in practice,
as it does in theory, and to explain how judges can fully justify their
decisions in hard cases.
A. The Right to Die: An Inherently Religious Question
Washington v. Glucksberg12 involved a Washington state criminal
statute that makes promoting a suicide attempt a felony. The
Washington statute provides that "'[a] person is guilty of promoting a
suicide attempt when he knowingly causes or aids another person to
attempt suicide.""' 3  The central issue before the court was whether
Washington's ban on assisted suicide violated the Due Process Clause of
the Fourteenth Amendment. 1 4 The district court held that "a competent,
terminally ill adult has a constitutionally guaranteed right under the
Fourteenth Amendment to commit physician-assisted suicide.""'
110. Note that this is not a descriptive argument, but a normative argument that in
principle, a full justification of judges' decisions in hard cases requires them to rely on
comprehensive convictions. The judges in question may have based their decisions on a
blind belief in the validity of an implicit comprehensive conviction, but they should have
relied on the religious convictions that they consider true to justify their decisions fully.
111. Glucksberg, 521 U.S. at 705-06.
112. 521 U.S. 702 (1997).
113. Id. at 707 (quoting WASH. REV. CODE 9A.36.060(1) (1994)).
114. Id. at 705-06. The Fourteenth Amendment of the United States Constitution
provides that "[no State shall make or enforce any law which shall abridge the privileges
or immunities of citizens of the United States; nor shall any State deprive any person of
life, liberty, or property, without due process of law." U.S. CONST. amend. XIV, § 1.
115. Compassion in Dying v. Washington, 850 F. Supp. 1454,1462 (W.D. Wash. 1994),
rev'd, 49 F.3d 586 (9th Cir. 1995), aff'd en banc, 79 F.3d 790 (9th Cir. 1996), rev'd sub nom.
Washington v. Glucksberg, 521 U.S. 702 (1997). The plaintiffs included four Washington
physicians who would assist certain of their terminally ill patients end their lives but for
the statute banning assisted suicide, three gravely ill patients of these doctors who died
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Furthermore, the district court held that Washington's ban on assisted
suicide violated the Due Process Clause because it placed an undue
burden on this "constitutionally protected liberty interest" and that it
violated the Equal Protection Clause. 1 6  The Ninth Circuit initially
reversed, but on rehearing en banc, the Ninth Circuit affirmed the district
court's decision on Due Process Clause grounds.' 7 Sitting en banc, the
Ninth Circuit held that "there is a liberty interest [under the Fourteenth
Amendment's Due Process Clause] in choosing the time and manner of
one's death" (i.e., there is a right to die) and that "the Washington
statute banning assisted suicide, as applied to competent, terminally ill
adults who wish to hasten their deaths by obtaining medication
prescribed by their doctors, violates the Due Process Clause.''.
Subsequently, the Supreme Court reversed this decision." 9 The Court
held that there was not a fundamental right to, or liberty interest in,
assistance in suicide protected by the Due Process Clause and that the
Washington state ban on assisted suicide did "not violate the Fourteenth
Amendment, either on its face or 'as applied to competent, terminally ill
adults who wish to hasten their deaths by obtaining medication
prescribed by their doctors. '
Although both courts claimed to resolve the right to die issue based on
the "law," the right to die is inherently a religious question. On the one
hand, the right to die question is a comprehensive question like any other
normative question. Answering this question implies a comprehensive
conviction or an answer to the comprehensive or existential question.
Comprehensive convictions are the comprehensive condition of all valid
normative claims. So in this sense, all normative questions are, at least
implicitly, comprehensive questions.
On the other hand, it is precisely in addressing questions such as the
right to die, abortion, and homosexual marriage that the comprehensive
question becomes most apparent. Any sophisticated discussion of these
issues usually involves an explicit recognition of the competing religious
convictions about authentic human existence that dictate disparate
answers. In this sense, these questions are "inherently religious." Even
someone like Ronald Dworkin, who argues that issues of justice,
including legal justice, can be decided independently of religious or
after the case began, and a non-profit organization ("Compassion in Dying") that counsels
people contemplating physician-assisted suicide. Compassion in Dying v. Washington, 49
F.3d 586, 589 (9th Cir. 1995).
116. Compassion in Dying, 850 F. Supp. at 1465, 1467.
117. Compassion in Dying v. Washington, 79 F.3d 790, 798 (9th Cir. 1996).
118. Id. at 838.
119. Glucksberg, 521 U.S. at 735-36.
120. Id. at 735 (quoting Compassion in Dying, 79 F.3d at 838).
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comprehensive convictions (i.e., the priority of the right over the good),
acknowledges the essentially religious nature of these issues. He remarks
that:
Our convictions about how and why human life has intrinsic
importance, from which we draw our views about abortion, are
much more fundamental to our overall moral personality than
the other convictions about inherent value I mentioned. They
are decisive in forming our opinions about all life-and-death
matters, including not only abortion but also suicide,
euthanasia, the death penalty, and conscientious objection to
war. Their power is even greater than this suggests, moreover,
because our opinions about how and why our own lives have
intrinsic value crucially influence every major choice we make
about how we should live.12'
He further notes that these essentially religious beliefs "surface, for
almost everyone, at exactly the same critical moments in life-in
decisions about reproduction and death and war" and that "[s]omeone
who is an atheist, because he does not believe in a personal god,
nevertheless has convictions or at least instincts about the value of
human life in an infinite and cold universe, and these convictions are just
as pervasive, just as foundational to moral personality, as the convictions
of a Catholic or a Moslem.,
12
Similarly, the rhetoric and methodology of the Ninth Circuit en banc
opinion recognize the inherently religious nature of the right to die
question. The Ninth Circuit noted that the right to die and abortion
cases present issues of "profound spiritual importance" and that "both
arouse similar religious and moral concerns. 1 23  In beginning its
consideration of whether there was a liberty interest in the right to die,
the Ninth Circuit also reiterated a "few fundamental precepts" that
guided them.124 One of these precepts was a "cautionary note" from Roe
v. Wade:1
25
We forthwith acknowledge our awareness of the sensitive and
emotional nature of the . . . controversy, of the vigorous
opposing views, even among physicians, and of the deep and
seemingly absolute convictions that the subject inspires. One's
philosophy, one's experiences, one's exposure to the raw edges
of human existence, one's religious training, one's attitudes
121. RONALD DWORKIN, FREEDOM'S LAW: THE MORAL READING OF THE
AMERICAN CONSTITUTION 99 (1996) [hereinafter DWORKIN, FREEDOM'S LAW].
122. Id. at 99-100.
123. Compassion in Dying, 79 F.3d at 800-01.




toward life and family and their values, and the moral standards
one establishes and seeks to observe, are all likely to influence
and to color one's thinking and conclusions.
26
In determining the scope of liberty, the Ninth Circuit also employed the
same methodology used by Justice Blackmun in his majority opinion in
Roe v. Wade, and it surveyed "historical attitudes" and "current societal
attitudes" about suicide. 27 The court's survey of historical attitudes
included Christian, English, Greek, Stoic, and Roman attitudes toward
suicide.'28 The court's discussion of these attitudes even often identified
the comprehensive notion of authentic human existence that legitimated
or prohibited the act of suicide. For instance, the court noted that "'the
more powerfully the Church instilled in believers the idea that this world
was a vale of tears and sin and temptation, where they waited uneasily
until death released them into eternal glory, the more irresistible the
temptation to suicide became..'...9
These comments and the inherently religious nature of the right to die
issue might suggest that the court could not have avoided relying on an
explicit comprehensive or religious conviction in its deliberation.
However, the Ninth Circuit's rhetoric and methodology suggest at least
two main interpretations. The first, and most likely, interpretation is that
the court was recognizing the inherently religious nature of the right to
die issue to support its conclusion that individuals have a fundamental
liberty interest under the Fourteenth Amendment protecting their right
to decide such important issues. In this respect, the court emphasized its
"endeavor to conduct an objective analysis" and explicitly claimed that
the notion of liberty (a noncomprehensive principle) recognized by prior
Supreme Court cases interpreting the Fourteenth Amendment,
supported its decision. 30 In addition, the Ninth Circuit's consideration of
this wide range of attitudes about suicide resulted from its adoption of
126. Id. at 800 (quoting Roe v. Wade, 410 U.S. 113, 116 (1973)) (emphasis added).
127. Compassion in Dying, 79 F.3d at 806-12; see also Roe, 410 U.S. at 160-62; Peter G.
Daniels, Comment, An Illinois Physician-Assisted Suicide Act: A Merciful End to a
Terminally Ill Criminal Tradition, 28 Loy. U. CHI. L.J. 763, 765 n.24 (1997) (claiming the
origin of laws against suicide is found in Judeo-Christian values).
128. Compassion in Dying, 79 F.3d at 806-09. Like the formal definition of religion
proposed above, the parallel treatment of these different historical attitudes and
contemporary societal attitudes by the courts in both Compassion in Dying and Roe treats
all of these attitudes as religious or comprehensive claims about authentic human
existence. This treatment suggests that these attitudes perform the same logical function
in justifying norms for resolving these hard cases.
129. Compassion in Dying, 79 F.3d at 808 (quoting Thomas J. Marzen, et al., Suicide:
A Constitutional Right, 24 Duo. L. REV. 1, 25 (1985)).
130. Id. at 800.
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the broad method of Due Process Clause analysis. 3' This method
focuses on preventing a premature limitation of the scope of liberty.'32
The goal is to treat liberty as "'a rational continuum which, broadly
speaking, includes a freedom from all substantial arbitrary impositions
and purposeless restraints.""33 The broad method avoids prejudging the
issue based on previous wisdom and previous cases by ascertaining this
"rational continuum" "in light of the existing circumstances as well as our
historic traditions." , 34 The review of historical and current societal views
thus serves to challenge judges to rethink their presuppositions about
liberty (i.e., how the scope of liberty is determined by their
comprehensive convictions) and to ensure that the court is not missing an
important restriction on liberty. Consequently, the court's rhetoric and
methodology could have been based on its Due Process method and its
interpretation of the notion of liberty protected by the Fourteenth
Amendment.
Alternatively, the Ninth Circuit could have been following the
religionist-separationist model of judicial decision making. On this
reading, the court's explicit recognition of a noncomprehensive principle,
the principle of liberty, in their opinion would prevent Establishment
Clause problems arising from an explicit recognition of a religious
conviction. The process of explanation would be properly separationist.
In the process of deliberation, the judges may have explicitly relied on a
religious conviction to decide the scope of liberty. The process of
deliberation would then have been properly religionist. Below I argue
131. The Ninth Circuit's broad method of Due Process analysis proceeded in two
steps. In the first step, the court considered "whether there is a liberty interest in choosing
the time and manner of one's death .... Is there a right to die?" Id. at 798-99. In the
second step, the court considered "whether prohibiting physicians from prescribing life-
ending medication for use by terminally ill patients who wish to die violates the patients'
due process rights." Id. at 799. The second step involved applying a balancing test under
which the court 'weigh[ed] the individual's liberty interests against the relevant state
interests." Id. As a result of this method, the Ninth Circuit held that:
[A] liberty interest exists in the choice of how and when one dies, and that the
provision of the Washington statute banning assisted suicide, as applied to
competent, terminally ill adults who wish to hasten their deaths by obtaining
medication prescribed by their doctors, violates the Due Process Clause.
Id. at 838.
132. In this respect, the court emphasized that "'[t]he full scope of liberty guaranteed
by the Due Process Clause cannot be found in or limited by the precise terms of the
specific guarantees elsewhere in the Constitution. This 'liberty' is not a series of isolated
points pricked out in terms of the taking of property, the freedom of speech, press, and
religion .... .- Id. (quoting Poe v. Ullman, 367 U.S. 497, 543 (1961) (Harlan, J.,
dissenting)). This discussion of the scope of liberty guaranteed by the Due Process Clause
clearly indicates that the term liberty is indeterminate and that this is a hard case.
133. Id.
134. Id. at 803.
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that determining the scope of liberty necessarily requires judges to rely,
at least implicitly, on a comprehensive conviction. Here, I am merely
suggesting that the court could have been following the religionist-
separationist model of judicial decision making and that their
separationist opinion would not have clearly identified their adoption of
the religionist-separationist model. I suggest this not merely because this
could be the case, which is true of both the Supreme Court or the Ninth
Circuit, but because the Ninth Circuit's rhetoric and methodology
explicitly recognize the inherently religious nature of the right to die
issue.
From the standpoint of the religionist-separationist model, the Ninth
Circuit's opinion is attractive because its rhetoric and survey of religious
attitudes about suicide minimizes the concealment of the inherently
religious nature of the right to die issue. On this reading, the opinion
further suggests that resolving the issue of whether liberty ought to
include the right to terminate one's own life requires deciding whether
authentic human existence requires liberty to have such a scope. The
effect of the Ninth Circuit's adoption of the broad method of Due
Process analysis would then prompt the court to explore alternative
comprehensive evaluations of suicide and disclose the necessity of relying
on comprehensive convictions to determine whether individuals ought to
have the liberty to terminate their lives under certain circumstances. The
opinion thus does what a good judge following the religionist-
separationist model would do. The judge would minimize the
concealment of the religious dimension of judicial decision making in
hard cases (i.e., the religionist nature of fully justifying judicial
deliberation in hard cases) but stop short of explicitly adopting a
particular religious convictions in her written opinion. This approach
allows for the possibility of a plurality of comprehensive convictions to
support the same conclusion and prevents the establishment of one
comprehensive conviction as the basis for determining the scope of
liberty.
Obviously, the Ninth Circuit's rhetoric and methodology do not
establish the necessity of relying on comprehensive convictions for fully
justifying a decision in this case. However, when considered in relation
to the other aspects of this opinion and the Supreme Court's opinion,
these statements have the cumulative effect of reinforcing the other ways
in which these opinions support the religionist-separationist model. In
this respect, the following discussion attempts to demonstrate that both
the Supreme Court and Ninth Circuit opinions fail to provide a full
justification of their decisions and that a full justification of their
decisions entails relying on religious or explicit comprehensive
convictions.
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B. Washington v. Glucksberg
In contrast to the Ninth Circuit, the Supreme Court used a restrained
method of Due Process Clause analysis and attempted to justify its
decision based on this method and on the Court's interpretation of legal
history. The Supreme Court's method of Due Process analysis had two
primary features: 1) the fundamental right or liberty must be
"objectively, 'deeply rooted in this Nation's history and tradition'.. . and
'implicit in the concept of ordered liberty"'; and 2) there must be "a
'careful description' of the asserted fundamental liberty interest."'35 As is
evident from the Supreme Court's "careful description of the asserted
fundamental liberty interest" in defining the issue, the second feature
determines what history is relevant. The Supreme Court defined the
issue as: "whether the 'liberty' specially protected by the Due Process
Clause includes a right to commit suicide which itself includes a right to
assistance in doing so. '' '36  This framing of the issue combined the
question of the existence of a fundamental liberty interest (right to die)
with a means of implementing that right (assistance) so that the issue
becomes whether there is "an interest in implementing that general
liberty interest by a particular means.' 3 7 Because the issue was framed
as "assisted suicide" rather than "suicide," the Court could cite a
substantially uniform legal prohibition of assisted suicide to support its
claim that there was no historically recognized fundamental right. The
Court found that "[t]he history of the law's treatment of assisted suicide
in this country has been and continues to be one of the rejection of
nearly all efforts to permit it."'38 As a result, the Court held that the right
to assisted suicide is not a fundamental liberty interest (i.e., not
"objectively, deeply rooted in this Nation's history and tradition") and
that Washington's ban on assisted suicide did "not violate the Fourteenth
Amendment." 9
On the other hand, if the court instead focused on whether the right to
die or commit suicide was a fundamental right, their historical analysis
would have resembled the Ninth Circuit's analysis. The Ninth Circuit
focused its historical inquiry this way because they defined the issue in
two parts. The first part concerned "whether there is a liberty interest in
135. Glucksberg, 521 U.S. at 720-21. See Michael W. McConnell, The Right to Die and
the Jurisprudence of Tradition, 1997 UTAH L. REV. 665, 681 (arguing that "the Court's
traditionalist approach to adjudication of unenumerated rights claims announced in
Glucksberg is wise, workable, and firmly grounded in principles of American
constitutionalism").
136. Glucksberg, 521 U.S. at 723.
137. Compassion in Dying, 79 F.3d at 801.
138. Glucksberg, 521 U.S. at 728.
139. Id. at 735 (quoting Compassion in Dying, 79 F.3d at 838).
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choosing the time and manner of one's death" (i.e., "[i]s there a right to
die?"), and if so, the second part concerned "whether prohibiting
physicians from prescribing life-ending medication for use by terminally
ill patients who wish to die violates the patients' due process rights."'
4
'
The right (right to die) and the means of exercising that right (medical
assistance) were kept separate. Consequently, the relevant history
considered by the Ninth Circuit was the historical and current societal
attitudes on suicide, not on assisting suicide. Contrary to the Supreme
Court's finding of a pervasive prohibition on assisting suicide, the Ninth
Circuit found that "[t]oday, no state has a statute prohibiting suicide or
attempted suicide; nor has any state had such a statute for at least 10
years."' 4 ' Thus, the effect of the Supreme Court's restrained method was
to conceal as much as possible their reliance on a comprehensive
conviction by framing the issue in such a way that the historical materials
appeared to lead to one result.
The Supreme Court "justified" its restrained Due Process method on
the grounds that it "tends to rein in the subjective elements that are
necessarily present in due process judicial review" and "avoids the need
for complex balancing of competing interests in every case. ,14 In other
words, this method could be reformulated as a claim that Due Process
Clause analysis must refer to some public values ("objectively, 'deeply
rooted in this Nation's history and tradition"') rather than some
"subjective element" (e.g., comprehensive or religious conviction). We
could call this the "Public Values Objection" to the religionist-
separationist model because it prohibits judges from relying on
comprehensive or religious convictions to determine the scope of liberty
found in the Due Process Clause. Accordingly, the Supreme Court cited
the history of regulating assisted suicide but did not consider the history
of comprehensive or religious thinking on that issue or on the issue of
suicide. In this respect, the Supreme Court's restrained Due Process
method appears to embrace the separationist model of judicial decision
making so that "historical attitudes" and "current societal attitudes" (i.e.,
comprehensive convictions) are treated as subjective and irrelevant to
the determination of the scope of liberty. Conversely, history
"objectively" determines the scope of the political value of liberty by
identifying which notion of liberty is "objectively, 'deeply rooted in this
Nations' history and tradition."'
140. Compassion in Dying, 79 F.3d at 798-99.
141. Id. at 810. Although the Ninth Circuit recognized that a majority of states still
have laws against assisting suicide, it further found that "[b]y the time the Fourteenth
Amendment was adopted in 1868, suicide was generally not punishable, and in only nine
of the 37 states is it clear that there were statutes prohibiting assisting suicide." Id. at 809.
142. Glucksberg, 521 U.S. at 722 (emphasis added).
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The religionist-separationist model, however, could respond to the
Political Values Objection as the Ninth Circuit did in Compassion in
Dying. The Ninth Circuit found that "historical evidence alone is not a
sufficient basis for rejecting a claimed liberty interest" because history is
not the sole guide for deciding whether a liberty interest exists. ' 43 In
other words, the indeterminancy of the scope of the Due Process Clause
notion of liberty cannot be "solved" by referring to history. History is
indeterminate and must also be interpreted. 44 It must first be evaluated
to determine which aspect of it is the "relevant" history. In addition, the
-positions expressed in the relevant history must be evaluated to
determine which position is authoritative or normative. Consequently,
both the Ninth Circuit and the Supreme Court had to rely on an extra-
legal norm to determine which aspect of history was relevant and then
which position expressed in the relevant history was authoritative.
Rather than indicating what these extra-legal norms might be, the
Supreme Court focused on the historical pattern of enacted laws to
support its decision. The Court reviewed not only U.S. legal history but
also English legal history and stressed that "[i]n almost every State-
indeed, in almost every western democracy-it is a crime to assist a
suicide.' ' 145 The Court further underscored that "for over 700 years, the
Anglo-American common-law tradition has punished or otherwise
disapproved of both suicide and assisting suicide.' ' 46 The Court's opinion
was more of a tabulation of historical data than an argument. The Ninth
Circuit poignantly emphasized that "[w]ere history our sole guide, the
Virginia anti-miscegenation statute . . . would still be in force because
anti-miscegenation laws were commonplace both when the United States
was founded and when the Fourteenth Amendment was adopted.'
47
The Ninth Circuit implicitly asked why history should be normative with
143. Compassion in Dying, 79 F.3d at 805 (9th Cir. 1996) (citing Loving v. Virginia, 388
U.S. 1 (1967)). Note that this argument about the necessary reliance on a comprehensive
norm to evaluate history would also apply to claims that judges should rely on
"community morality" in hard cases. In this respect, the Ninth Circuit's comments were
referring to their own historical survey of comprehensive evaluations (community
moralities) of suicide.
144. See, e.g., MICHAEL J. PERRY, THE CONSTITUTION IN THE COURTS: LAW OR
POLITICS? 54-69 (1994) (arguing that originalists' attempts to determine the original
meaning of the U.S. Constitution fail to resolve the indeterminacy of constitutional history
and that they usually resolve this indeterminacy based on their conception of the proper
judicial role); Suzanna Sherry, The Indeterminacy of Historical Evidence, 19 HARV. J.L. &
PUB. POL'Y 437, 437 (1996) (arguing that "history is indeterminate" based on the
contradictions demonstrated by legal historical research).
145. Glucksberg, 521 U.S. at 710.
146. Id. at 711.




respect to the prohibition on physician-assisted suicide but not with
respect to anti-miscegenation laws. The Supreme Court failed to explain
why things are different here.
Because history is indeterminate, the Court had to rely on an extra-
legal norm to determine why this history was relevant and authoritative.
Further, this extra-legal norm and its priority over other norms must be
justified. Justifying this norm and its priority would require relying on a
comprehensive conviction. Thus, even though the Court suggested that
the historical record determined whether there was a fundamental right
to physician-assisted suicide, the Court would have to rely on a
comprehensive or religious conviction to fully justify this normative
interpretation of history.
Similarly, the Ninth Circuit also looked at history to ascertain what this
indeterminate notion of liberty required. Unlike the Supreme Court, the
Ninth Circuit examined the historical and current comprehensive
evaluations of suicide rather than tallying the history of legal prohibitions
or surveying conceptual analyses of the concept of liberty.' 4" This
historical analysis showed that history supports both sides of the suicide
issue. To choose which history is relevant and authoritative, the court
had to rely on an extra-legal norm or norms. Even though the Ninth
Circuit did not identify what more than history (i.e., what extra-legal
norm) informed their determination of the scope of liberty, their
historical analysis suggests that they were cognizant that they had to rely
on an extra-legal norm to make this determination. As indicated above,
one reading of this survey of historical and current comprehensive
convictions about suicide suggests that the Ninth Circuit was cognizant
that they had to rely on a particular type of extra-legal norm-a
comprehensive conviction-to ascertain whether there was a
fundamental right to die. Even if this is not the case, fully justifying these
extra-legal norms would require judges to rely on their comprehensive
convictions, at least implicitly.
The Supreme Court might further respond that its restrained method
of Due Process analysis, not an extra-legal norm, determined which
history was relevant and authoritative. This response merely raises
another question: how do judges choose between the restrained and the
broad methods of Due Process analysis? The Supreme Court followed
the restrained method, and the Ninth Circuit followed the broad method.
The Supreme Court precedent on the Fourteenth Amendment also
supports both methods.1 49 This means that judges must justify the choice
148. Id. at 806-12.
149. Id. at 801 (noting that "[t]he broader approach we employ in defining the liberty
interest is identical to the approach used by the Supreme Court in the abortion cases").
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between these two methods of Due Process analysis. An extra-legal
norm is required to make this decision. The judge may respond that the
legislature ought to decide these issues when the U.S. Constitution is not
clear. The reply is: Why ought the legislature decide or why ought not
the judge decide? The U.S. Constitution does not adopt a specific theory
of constitutional interpretation, such as judicial minimalism"" or
originalism,' that requires that the legislature decide these issues. By
citing a position on constitutional interpretation to "justify" her
methodological choice, the judge does not provide a sufficient reason for
this choice that would eliminate the necessity of relying on an extra-legal
norm. It may signal that the judge's choice depends on a series of extra-
legal norms. The judge might then attempt to justify her theory of
constitutional interpretation by claiming that letting the legislature
decide is consistent with the best understanding of democracy. It is the
best form of democracy, the argument might go, because it allows for a
fuller participation of citizens in self-ruling, and it promotes majority
rule. Why is self-rule a good thing? Why is majority rule relevant to a
question of individual rights? More extra-legal norms are required
because a theory of democracy or a determination of how it is best
understood is not itself a part of the law.
While looking elsewhere to justify democracy as the highest form of
government, the judge may finally adopt Aristotle's position. Aristotle
maintained that humans are uniquely suited for living in states, and that
the state, which exists for the sake of "the good life,"'' 2 is uniquely suited
150. Cass Sunstein notes that "[n]ot only has the [Supreme] Court as a whole refused
to choose among the four positions [of constitutional interpretation he identifies as
originalism, rule of clear mistake, independent interpretive judgments, and democracy-
reinforcement] or to sort out their relations, but many of the current justices have refused
to do so in their individual capacities." CASS R. SUNSTEIN, ONE CASE AT A TIME:
JUDICIAL MINIMALISM ON THE SUPREME COURT 9 (1999). Sunstein then argues that five
current justices of the Supreme Court, Ruth Bader Ginsburg, David Souter, Sandra Day
O'Connor, Stephen Breyer, and Anthony Kennedy, are minimalists. Id. Sunstein
advocates judicial minimalism because "certain forms of minimalism can be democracy-
promoting, not only in the sense that they leave issues open for democratic deliberation,
but also and more fundamentally in the sense that they promote reason-giving and ensure
that certain important decisions are made by democratically accountable actors." Id. at 5.
151. Michael Perry argues that "originalism does not entail minimalism, either
interpretive minimalism or normative minimalism." MICHAEL J. PERRY, THE
CONSTITUTION IN THE COURTS: LAW OR POLITICS? 9-10 (1994). He further emphasizes
that "normative minimalism holds that the [Supreme] Court ought to assume, not the
primary responsibility for specifying indeterminate constitutional norms, but only a
secondary responsibility, deferring to any 'reasonable' specification implicit in the
governmental action under review." Id. at 10.
152. ARISTOTLE, NICOMACHEAN ETHICS 1280a:33 (W. D. Ross trans. & rev.'d J. 0.




to enable individuals to achieve their highest end-happiness
(eudaimonia).'53 In other words, to live authentically, humans must live
in a state which assists them in attaining happiness or the good life, the
highest good or end for humans, by participation in democratic self-
ruling. The point here is that the judge may continue to cite
noncomprehensive extra-legal norms, but eventually, she must justify
those norms with a comprehensive or religious conviction about
authentic human existence. A full justification of a judge's decision in a
hard case cannot avoid this final step. Judges must rely on a
comprehensive conviction because comprehensive convictions are the
comprehensive condition of all normative judgments and cannot be
avoided. Judges must rely either explicitly or implicitly on
comprehensive convictions. In the former case, judges can fully justify
the extra-legal norm or norms they rely on and the choice among extra-
legal norms based on their explicit comprehensive or religious
convictions. In the later case, judges must blindly believe in the validity
of those extra-legal norms and the comprehensive convictions they
imply.
C. Compassion in Dying v. Washington
Alternatively, one may respond that a full justification of the Supreme
Court's denial of the right at issue required reliance on an understanding
of authentic human existence but that the Ninth Circuit merely left the
decision of suicide up to the individual.14 For example, in Compassion in
153. Of course, "the best and most perfect" life is the philosophical life of
contemplation, but the political life is the perfect life of action. See RICHARD KRAUT,
ARISTOTLE ON THE HUMAN GOOD 237-44 (1989); see also Mark C. Modak-Truran,
Corrective Justice and the Revival of Judicial Virtue, 12 YALE J.L. HUMAN. 249, 263-70
(2000). In addition, Jean Bethke Elshtain notes that Aristotle excluded certain categories
of persons (e.g., women, slaves, mechanics, and laborers) from politics because he did not
think they had the rational capacity required for ruling or citizenship. JEAN BETHKE
ELSHTAIN, PUBLIC MAN, PRIVATE WOMAN: WOMEN IN SOCIAL AND POLITICAL
THOUGHT 47 (2d ed. 1993). For example, "Aristotle's women were idiots in the Greek
sense of the word, persons who either could not or did not participate in the polls or the
'good' of public life, individuals without a public voice, condemned to silence as their
appointed sphere and condition." Id. at 47. Although she rejects Aristotle's particular
evaluations of the nature of these categories of persons, she argues that we can still adopt
Aristotle's notion of politics as a form of action and his claims about the relationship
between the individual good and the good of the state. Id. at 53.
154. See, e.g., Ronald Dworkin et al., Assisted Suicide: The Philosophers' Brief, N.Y.
Rev. Books, Mar. 27, 1997, at 41, 47 (arguing that "any paternalistic justification for an
absolute prohibition of assistance to such patients would of necessity appeal to a widely
contested religious or ethical conviction many of them, including the patient-plaintiffs,
reject"). But cf John H. Garvey, Control Freaks, 47 DRAKE L. REV. 1, 8 (1998)
(characterizing the notion of freedom offered by the philosophers' brief as "a right to
make choices" and arguing that freedoms are better understood as "rights to go in some
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Dying, the court quoted Planned Parenthood v. Casey for the proposition
that "'[a]t the heart of liberty is the right to define one's own concept of
existence, of meaning, of the universe, and of the mystery of human life.
Beliefs about these matters could not define the attributes of personhood
were they formed under the compulsion of the State. ' ' ' 5 Further, the
court claimed that "Casey and Cruzan provide persuasive evidence that
the Constitution encompasses a due process liberty interest in controlling
the time and manner of one's death-that there is, in short, a
constitutionally recognized 'right to die. ' ' ,11 In its conclusion, the Ninth
Circuit also emphasized that
Those who believe strongly that death must come without
physician assistance are free to follow that creed, be they
doctors or patients. They are not free, however, to force their
views, their religious convictions, or their philosophies on all the
other members of a democratic society, and to compel those
whose values differ with theirs to die painful, protracted, and
agonizing deaths. 1
7
From these comments, one may infer that the Ninth Circuit did not rely
on comprehensive convictions but merely decided that the liberty
interests stipulated in the Due Process Clause provide a legal
noncomprehensive norm supporting the autonomy of individuals to
decide these matters.
However, the court declared that Planned Parenthood v. Casey 15 and
Cruzan v. Director, Missouri Department of Health 59 provide "evidence"
for their conclusion rather than stating they logically entail this
conclusion.'"' Neither case addressed the question of whether citizens
possess a right to have a physician assist in a patient's death or suicide
(i.e., active euthanasia). Casey reaffirmed the "essential holding of Roe
v. Wade" that abortion cannot be legally prohibited in the first
trimester.' Cruzan held that competent patients (including incompetent
patients who have expressed a clear and convincing intent against
unwanted medical treatment before becoming incompetent) have a
liberty interest in refusing unwanted medical treatment and that this
ways and not others," protecting "childbirth but not abortion, religion but not atheism, life
but not death").
155. Compassion in Dying, 79 F.3d at 813 (quoting Planned Parenthood v. Casey, 505
U.S. 833,851(1992)).
156. Id. at 816.
157. Id. at 839 (emphasis added).
158. 505 U.S. 833 (1992).
159. 497 U.S. 261 (1990).
160. Compassion in Dying, 79 F.3d at 816.
161. Casey, 505 U.S. at 846.
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includes patients who would otherwise die from withholding medical
treatment (i.e., passive rather than active euthanasia). 6 2 The scope of
liberty circumscribed by those cases does not yet reach the right to die
with the assistance of a physician. Consequently, extending the rational
continuum of liberty from Casey and Cruzan to support a right to die
requires that the court determine that it should be extended.
In other words, the Ninth Circuit had to rely on an extra-legal norm
to determine that the protection of liberty in Casey and Cruzan ought to
be extended to include the right to die, and the Supreme Court had to
rely on an extra-legal norm to reach the opposite conclusion. The right
to die issue has to do with whether individuals ought to be able to
determine the time and manner of their own deaths. Bracketing the
question of whether the government has any interests that may limit this
right, whether an individual ought to be able to make that decision
depends on whether one thinks that decision is essential for an individual
to live authentically. It requires judges to rely on a particular kind of
extra-legal norm-a comprehensive or religious conviction about
authentic human existence. Here, a judge cannot even pretend that some
noncomprehensive extra-legal norm fully justifies her decisions.
By contrast, assuming this is a case where the law and public reason
are indeterminate, Lawrence Solum has argued that the only choice is
not to allow judges to rely on "nonpublic grounds, including religious
grounds.', 3 He proposes the alternative solution that in such cases "[w]e
could adopt a principle that a judge may not decide to impose civil or
criminal liability on the basis of nonpublic reasons, including religious
reasons. ' However, positing an extra-legal conception of liberty would
not fully justify this decision. That conception of liberty would have to
be based on comprehensive liberalism 61 or some other comprehensive
conviction.
Furthermore, some comprehensive convictions would support granting
individuals this liberty, and others would not. For example, two judges
holding theistic comprehensive convictions could come to opposite
conclusions even though they both view authentic human existence as
entailing a proper relationship with God. One judge may maintain that
God has the power and the wisdom to determine the best time and
manner of our death and that individuals should not have a right to die
because God is better able than humans to decide when "it is our
162. 497 U.S. at 277-82.
163. Lawrence B. Solum, Faith and Justice, 39 DEPAUL L. REV. 1083, 1101 (1990).
164. Id.
165. See supra note 96.
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time. ' ' 6 For this judge, allowing physician-assisted suicide is akin to
legalizing murder. Responding to this judge by claiming that individuals
should decide if "murder" is justified, is not a valid response. His
rebuttal is that murder is murder, and it is prohibited by law. In other
words, positing a notion of liberty as a solution to this case requires
justifying that notion of liberty by a different comprehensive conviction.
A second judge may answer that God does not have the power to
determine the time and manner of our death and that individuals should
have the right to die because humans (hopefully with divine guidance)
must determine when life has become meaningless (e.g., permanent
vegetative state) and death is warranted. Similarly, a third judge could
believe that there is no apparent divine influence in the universe (i.e.,
agnostic or atheistic) and that humans alone (without divine guidance)
must determine when life has become meaningless and death is
warranted. In all of these cases, the judges had to rely on their religious
convictions to determine whether the scope of liberty ought to be
extended to include the right to die. No neutral conception of liberty is
available. The judges had to decide whether authentic human existence
necessitated humans having that right. Thus, the question of what equal
liberties citizens ought to have cannot be decided independent of a
comprehensive conviction about authentic human existence. The
concept of liberty does not float unattached to a comprehensive
conviction.'
67
Moreover, the juxtaposition of the these opinions on the same
fundamental liberties question helps disclose the necessity of relying on
comprehensive convictions for a full justification of the judges' decisions
in this case. All the relevant legal norms-the concept of liberty,
precedent, legal history, and the method of due process analysis-were
indeterminate. To make a decision, the judges had to rely on extra-legal
norms to decide which due process method to use, which history was
relevant and authoritative, whether prior precedent should be extended
to include a right to die or limited to prohibit a right to die, and finally,
whether the concept of liberty includes a right to die. In fact, the
definition of the legal issue itself depended on extra-legal norms. With
respect to the due process method, history, and precedent, the extra-legal
norms were noncomprehensive extra-legal norms which in turn required
166. This view is an example of a comprehensive conviction that would have
supported the Supreme Court's view of the scope of liberty in Washington v. Glucksberg.
167. This is not to deny that people with differing comprehensive convictions might
agree on a particular conception of liberty, each believing that her or his comprehensive
conception justifies it. As indicated here, both a theistic and atheistic position could
support recognizing a right to die. In Sunstein's terms, there could be an "incompletely
theorized agreement" on this conception of liberty by different comprehensive
convictions. See infra note 385 and accompanying text.
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justification by a comprehensive or religious conviction. With respect to
the concept of liberty, the extra-legal norm required was a
comprehensive or religious conviction about authentic human existence.
No noncomprehensive extra-legal norms were required. The
indeterminacy of the concept of liberty went directly to bedrock
comprehensive or religious convictions. The juxtaposition of these
opinions also makes evident the reenchantment of the law both for
courts that may embrace the religionist-separationist model (the Ninth
Circuit) and for those that adopt the separationist model (the Supreme
Court). As a result, these opinions graphically corroborate the
religionist-separationist model by revealing the logical necessity of
relying on comprehensive or religious claims about authentic human
existence for fully justifying judges' decisions, at least in this hard case.
VI. FULLY JUSTIFYING LYNG V. NORTHWEST INDIAN CEMETERY
PROTECTIVE ASS'N
One may concede that an exceptionally hard case about the right to die
requires judges to rely on comprehensive or religious convictions but
deny that this is also true of other hard cases. Some may argue that there
is substantial consensus about certain noncomprehensive extra-legal
norms and that judges can rely on this consensus to avoid fully justifying
these norms in terms of their own comprehensive or religious
convictions. To address this possible objection to the religionist-
separationist model of judicial decision making, I will briefly consider the
role of noncomprehensive extra-legal norms in Lyng v. Northwest Indian
Cemetery Protective Ass'n'6 and demonstrate that fully justifying these
extra-legal norms requires judges to rely on religious convictions.
In Lyng, the Supreme Court characterized the central issue as
"whether the First Amendment's Free Exercise Clause prohibits the
Government from permitting timber harvesting in, or constructing a road
through, a portion of a National Forest that has traditionally been used
for religious purposes by members of three American Indian tribes in
northwestern California."'' 69 The district court and the Ninth Circuit held
that this use of public land would violate the Native Americans' free
exercise of religion, and the Supreme Court reversed.'7" The Court held
that "[w]hatever rights the Indians may have to the use of the area ...
those rights do not divest the Government of its right to use what is, after
all, its land."' 7 Writing for the majority, Justice O'Connor found that
168. 485 U.S. 439 (1988).
169. Id. at 441-42.
170. Id. at 443-44.
171. Id. at 453.
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this road and timber harvesting may have an "extremely grave" impact
on the efficacy of these religious rituals, which are site specific, and may
even "'virtually destroy . . . the Indians' ability to practice their
religion." '7'  Despite this finding, Justice O'Connor held that the
incidental effects, no matter how severe, on the Native American
religious practices did not support a free exercise claim requiring the
government to demonstrate a compelling governmental interest in
completing the road and engaging in timber harvesting.' 73 In other
words, Justice O'Connor maintained that the Free Exercise Clause does
not mean an individual's religious practices are protected from incidental
impact by governmental activity. 74 Rather, it only protects individuals
from governmental activity that directly prohibits the free exercise of
religion by coercing "individuals into acting contrary to their religious
beliefs" or from governmental activity which results in "indirect coercion
or penalties.' 17' For example, Justice O'Connor noted that "a law
prohibiting the Indian respondents from visiting the Chimney Rock area
would raise a different set of constitutional questions.' ' 76 Consequently,
because it did not prohibit the Native Americans from visiting that area,
the Government did not violate the Native Americans' free exercise
rights, and the Government had the right to use its land for its own
purposes despite the negative impact on Native American religious
practices. 177
Conversely, Justice Brennan's dissent maintains that "[i]n the final
analysis, the Court's refusal to recognize the constitutional dimension of
respondents' injuries stems from its concern that acceptance of
respondents' claim could potentially strip the Government of its ability
to manage and use vast tracks of federal property. '' 7" For instance,
Justice O'Connor emphasizes that if the Native Americans' free exercise
claim was recognized, they could try to "exclude all human activity but
their own from sacred areas of the public lands" and "that such beliefs
could easily require de facto beneficial ownership of some rather
spacious tracts of public property. '1 7  In other words, the Court's
decision is best understood as an attempt to protect the Government's
right to use and enjoy its property in whatever manner it desires rather
than as a endeavor to attenuate the Native Americans' free exercise
172. Id. at 451.
173. Id. at 450-51.
174. Id.
175. Id.
176. Id. at 453.
177. Id. at 450-53.
178. Id. at 473 (Brennan, J., dissenting).
179. Id. at 452-53.
[Vol. 53:709
Reenchanting the Law
rights. The priority of the Government's property rights over the Native
Americans' free exercise rights thus derives more from Justice
O'Connor's conception of property rights than from her interpretation of
the Free Exercise Clause.
Justice O'Connor's opinion suggests that property law cannot
accommodate the Native Americans' use of Chimney Rock for religious
rituals without leading to an erosion of the government's property rights.
Rather than reflecting the flexibility of the law of property, Justice
O'Connor's opinion posits an absolute notion of property rights. To the
contrary, property law recognizes many limitations on and interferences
with the use of land. For example, nuisance law prohibits operating a
cattle feeding operation near a city because this interferes with other's
use and enjoyment of their property. 'm' In addition, easements constitute
"[a]n interest in land owned by another person, consisting in the right to
use or control the land, or an area above or below it, for a specific limited
purpose."'' " For instance, an access easement provides a right to ingress
and egress across the property of another to access a street appurtenant
to that property. As indicated by these examples, the legal definition
of property rights does not provide property owners with an absolute
right to use their land without regard for the rights of others. In some
cases, property owners must allow others to use their land, but this use
does not eradicate their right to use their land for other purposes. In this
respect, Justice Brennan recognizes that "the competing claims that both
the Government and Native Americans assert in federal land are
fundamentally incompatible."'8' 3 He argues that the Court should have
adopted a balancing approach to adjudicate the competition between the
government's ability to manage federal land and the Native Americans'
site-specific religious practices.'8M He also notes that prior to this case,
this balancing approach was followed by several U.S. Circuit Courts of
Appeal and that it supported recognition of the free exercise rights of
Native Americans to use public land for religious rituals if the public land
180. See, e.g., Spur Indus., Inc. v. Del E. Webb Dev. Co., 494 P.2d 700 (Ariz. 1972) (en
banc) (enjoining cattle feeding operation that interfered with the use and enjoyment of
retirement community property owners).
181. BLACK'S LAW DICTIONARY 527 (7th ed. 1999).
182. Id. With respect to Lyng, Chip Lupu has argued that "[t]he undisputed facts and
the government's own investigation in Lyng strongly support the conclusion that the
Indian tribes and their members would have had a strong easement claim against a private
landowner .. " Ira C. Lupu, Where Rights Begin: The Problem of Burdens on the Free
Exercise of Religion, 102 HARv. L. REV. 933, 973 (1989).
183. Lyng, 485 U.S. at 474 (Brennan, J., dissenting).
184. Id. at 475.
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was shown to be "'central' or 'indispensable' to their religious
8I'5practices."
These conflicting interpretations of the nature and priority of the
government's property rights and the Native Americans' free exercise
rights indicate that neither the law governing real property nor the law
concerning the free exercise of religion provided a clear resolution to this
case. Because the law was indeterminate, the Justices had to rely on
extra-legal norms to determine whose rights had priority. Consequently,
Justice O'Connor relied on an extra-legal norm or norms to justify her
absolute notion of property rights and the resulting priority of the
government's property rights over the Native Americans' free exercise
rights. The categorical nature of her statement of these property rights
suggests that she thinks there is substantial social consensus about the
extra-legal norms supporting these property rights and their position of
priority.
To the contrary, Justice Brennan's dissent clearly demonstrates in two
ways that this posited consensus does not exist and that the Justices had
to rely on comprehensive convictions to justify the priority of the
government's property rights over the Native Americans' free exercise
rights. First, Justice Brennan maintains that "the Court's concern that
the claims of Native Americans will place 'religious servitudes' upon vast
tracts of federal property cannot justify its refusal to recognize the
constitutional injury respondents will suffer here.' ' 186 He rejects the
majority's narrow reading of the Free Exercise Clause and argues that
"religious freedom is threatened no less by governmental action that
makes the practice of one's chosen faith impossible than by
governmental programs that pressure one to engage in conduct
inconsistent with religious beliefs."'8 7 Justice Brennan then declares that
building a road of "marginal and speculative utility," is not a compelling
governmental purpose justifying the infringement on Native Americans'
free exercise rights." He concludes that the Native Americans' free
exercise rights support a superior claim on the Chimney Rock area of the
public land than the government's property rights.8 "9 Contrary to the
majority's perceived consensus, Justice Brennan and the lower courts
reject the extra-legal property right norms relied on by the majority, and
they argue for the priority of the Native Americans' free exercise rights
over the government's property rights. '9"
185. Id. at 473.
186. Id. at 476.
187. Id. at 468.
188. Id. at 476.
189. Id.
190. Id. at 477.
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In addition, Justice Brennan notes that "this case . . . represents yet
another stress point in the longstanding conflict between two disparate
cultures-the dominant Western culture, which views land in terms of
ownership and use, and that of Native Americans, in which concepts of
private property are not only alien, but contrary to a belief system that
holds land sacred."' 9' Normally, the noncomprehensive extra-legal
property norms embraced by the consensus in the "dominant Western
culture" would carry the day. Their general acceptance would make it
appear that they were "fully justified" independently of comprehensive
convictions. Despite this appearance, the "conflict of cultures" reveals
that the extra-legal property norms depend on substantially different
comprehensive convictions. Justice Brennan's other comments help
clarify the dramatic difference that these comprehensive convictions
make:
As the Forest Service's commissioned study, the Theodoratus
Report, explains, for Native Americans religion is not a discrete
sphere of activity separate from all others, and any attempt to
isolate the religious aspects of Indian life "is in reality an
exercise which forces Indian concepts into non-Indian
categories." Thus, for most Native Americans, "[t]he area of
worship cannot be delineated from social, political, cultur[al],
and other areas o[f] Indian lifestyle." A pervasive feature of
this lifestyle is the individual's relationship with the natural
world; this relationship, which can accurately though somewhat
incompletely be characterized as one of stewardship, forms the
core of what might be called, for want of a better nomenclature,
the Indian religious experience. While traditional Western
religions view creation as the work of a deity "who institutes
natural laws which then govern the operation of physical
nature," tribal religions regard creation as an on-going process
in which they are morally and religiously obligated to
participate. Native Americans fulfill this duty through
ceremonies and rituals designed to preserve and stabilize the
earth and to protect humankind from disease and other
catastrophes. Failure to conduct these ceremonies in the
manner and place specified, adherents believe, will result in
great harm to the earth and to the people whose welfare
depends upon it .... Where dogma lies at the heart of Western
religions, Native American faith is inextricably bound to the use
of land. The site-specific nature of Indian religious practice
derives from the Native American perception that land is itself
a sacred, living being. Rituals are performed in prescribed
191. Id. at 473.
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locations not merely as a matter of traditional orthodoxy, but
because land, like all other living things, is unique, and specific
sites possess different spiritual properties and significance.
Within this belief system, therefore, land is not fungible; indeed,
at the time of the Spanish colonization of the American
Southwest, "all . . . Indians held in some form a belief in a
sacred and indissoluble bond between themselves and the land
in which their settlements were located."' '
Without getting into the specifics of the variance among "traditional
Western religions" and "Native American faiths," Justice Brennan's
observations bring to light that this "conflict between two cultures"
signals that the judges had to rely on a particular type of extra-legal
norm-a comprehensive or religious conviction about authentic human
existence-to justify their decisions fully.'9
3
Although a full account of this dispute would consider both the judicial
justification of property rights and the free exercise rights,1 4 I will only
192. Id. at 459-61 (emphasis added) (citations omitted).
193. Howard Vogel has characterized the kind of disputes found in Lyng as "cultural
conflicts between communities, arising from a clash between master stories, which inform
the identity and understanding of the peoples who are the parties to these disputes, rather
than simply as disputes involving conflict between individual rights and government
power." Howard J. Vogel, The Clash of Stories at Chimney Rock, 41 SANTA CLARA L.
REV. 757, 759 (2001).
194. A full analysis would further show that the judges' interpretations of the
Establishment Clause of the First Amendment also depend on their religious or
comprehensive convictions. For example, Winnifred Fallers Sullivan has argued that
Chief Justice Burger's and Justices O'Connor's and Brennan's religious beliefs were
central to their interpretations of whether the cr&he in Lynch v. Donelly, 465 U.S. 668
(1984), was sacred or secular. WINNIFRED FALLERS SULLIVAN, PAYING THE WORDS
EXTRA: RELIGIOUS DISCOURSE IN THE SUPREME COURT OF THE UNITED STATES 80,
121, 135 (1994). According to Sullivan, "[r]eligion, is for Burger, a Norman Rockwell-
Hallmark card kind of sentiment; therefore, acknowledging and accommodating are very
much the same thing and are equally harmless. The American religion Burger wishes to
accommodate seems to lack all depth, danger, and particularity. He cannot see the creche
as more than another form of tinsel." Id. at 87. Burger accommodates "a religion with no
difference, no otherness. In doing so, he attempts to collapse the sacred and the secular
into one category." Id. at 89. Sullivan further maintains that "O'Connor is concerned
about discriminatory activity on the part of government, not about religion." Id. at 122.
Sullivan argues that "O'Connor, like .Black, thinks that the only religion the Supreme
Court should be protecting is the religion of the Constitution .... For her, it seems,
religion as religion is irrelevant in the political community .... Whereas Burger's opinion
tends to trivialize religious symbols, O'Connor's simply ignores them, as religion." Id. at
126. On the other hand, Sullivan argues that "Justice Brennan's reading of the creche is
... analogical and characteristically Catholic, and therefore necessarily in sharp contrast to
that of the Protestant justices." Id. at 147. Moreover, she claims that "Burger, a
Protestant, defends the cultural domination of Protestantism while Brennan, a Catholic,
lines up with Jefferson and the eighteenth-century Baptists in support of religion being a
private matter and in support of the separation of church and state." Id. at 156.
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focus on how a full justification of. the judges' extra-legal beliefs about
property rights and their priority over the Native Americans' free
exercise rights requires them to rely on comprehensive convictions. For
example, the Native American conception of property as a unique living
thing that is "sacred" would not support a view of property rights based
on possession and individual ownership. If land has sacred significance
for rituals that "preserve and stabilize the earth and protect humankind
from disease and other catastrophes,"' 95 granting ownership to someone
would put the well-being of humankind at the whim of this individual.
Without access to this land, the earth and all humankind could suffer
greatly because of one person's careless, malicious, or foolish actions. In
this case, granting individual ownership of this land and granting priority
of that ownership over the use of the land for Native American religious
rituals would be inconceivable.
Likewise, the claim that property rights are independent of religious or
comprehensive convictions even in hard cases relies on a comprehensive
conviction. For instance, the judge could claim that property law is a
rational determination of rights and must be separate from all
comprehensive convictions because they are nonrational. This claim
depends on comprehensive evaluation of all comprehensive convictions
as nonrational, which is equivalent to a comprehensive conviction. This
position is incoherent because it relies on a comprehensive conviction
while at the same time denying that rational comprehensive reflection is
possible.1
6
Alternatively, the judge could rely on a more traditional religious or
comprehensive conviction like those found in the Christian tradition. In
the Christian tradition, individual ownership of property is generally
recognized as legitimate. For example, St. Thomas Aquinas contends
that "man has a natural dominion over external things, because, by his
reason and will, he is able to use them for his own profit, as they were
made on his account" by God. 197 He further maintains that "it is lawful
for man to possess property" and that "there is a division of possessions,
not according to the natural law, but rather according to human
agreement, which belongs to positive law. Hence, the ownership of
possessions is not contrary to the natural law but an addition thereto
195. See Lyng, 485 U.S. at 460.
196. For a more complete argument supporting this conclusion, see my critique of the
claims that the law can be rationally justified independently of religious convictions in
hard cases made by Habermas, Rawls, Greenawalt, and Perry. See infra Part VII.B; see
also MODAK-TRURAN, REENCHANTING THE LAW, supra note t7, at 42-178.
197. St. Thomas Aquinas, Summa Theologica, II-ll, q. 66, a. 1, in SAINT THOMAS
AQUINAS, ON LAW, MORALITY AND POLITICS 177 (William P. Baumgarth & Richard J.
Regan, S.J. eds., 1988).
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devised by human reason. '9 In addition, real property is part of God's
good creation over which humans have dominion, and it is not typically
considered sacred in the sense of being the location of the divine."
Because property is not viewed as sacred, allowing individuals to possess
and own land would not likely prohibit or interfere with any sacred
functions that are considered central to authentic human existence.
Consequently, based on a Christian religious conviction, individual
property right disputes could likely be adjudicated independently of
religious or comprehensive convictions.
However, this proves my point because it explicitly depends on a
religious conviction about authentic human existence. The conflict
between the government's property rights and the Native American's
free exercise rights makes this a hard case. This conflict puts the scope of
property rights and free exercise rights into question. This conflict could
only be eliminated by relying on extra-legal norms regarding the scope of
these rights. Fully justifying those extra-legal norms and choosing among
them requires relying on a religious conviction. Mere reliance on a
perceived social consensus about extra-legal property right norms would
mean that the judge merely believed or had faith that those norms and the
priority they determined were fully justified. Further, the perceived
social consensus may be illusory or wrong like the so-called social
consensus supporting slavery. The extra-legal property right norms in
question may not be fully justified. They could be based on an
unwarranted social custom that cannot be fully justified or that implies a
false comprehensive conviction. To ensure that these extra-legal
property rights norms were fully justified, judges must rely on their
religious convictions to fully justify those norms for themselves. This is
the only way they will know that the extra-legal norms are fully justified,
that they warrant priority, and that they are based on what the judge has
determined to be a true religious conviction. A so-called social
consensus will not do; it merely begs the question of justification.
Justice Brennan's opinion thus helps reveal how these different
comprehensive or religious convictions justified very different extra-legal
norms relating to property rights and a different determination of
198. St. Thomas Aquinas, Summa Theologica, Il-11, q. 66, a. 2, in id. at 179. Aquinas
argues that the "natural law is nothing else than the rational creature's participation of the
eternal law." St. Thomas Aquinas, Summa Theologica, I-Il, q. 91, a. 2, in supra note 1, at
750. Through natural law (right reason), human's have an objective link to the eternal law
(the mind of God). Because God is the Supreme ruler of the universe, natural law thus
acts as a check on the human laws promulgated in a particular state; it is the standard for
determining their validity.
199. Further, if this view of religion is taken as normative for an interpretation of the
Free Exercise Clause, the judge may find it harder to recognize the legitimacy of the
Native American claim that land is sacred.
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whether those property rights outweighed the Native Americans' free
exercise rights. Contrary to the majority's reliance on a perceived
consensus, this case was a hard case. The posited social consensus on
extra-legal norms about property rights was not sufficient for fully
justifying the majority's decision in this case. The "conflict between two
cultures" helped disclose that judges must always rely on explicit
comprehensive or religious convictions in deliberating about hard cases
to fully justify their decisions.
VII. THE SECULAR PURPOSE OBJECTION
Another likely objection to relying on religious convictions for fully
justifying judges' decisions in hard cases is that this practice seems
contrary to the widely-shared assumption in pluralist democratic
countries, like the United States, that the law should have a secular
justification or purpose. I will refer to this objection as the "Secular
Purpose Objection" and show that it actually constitutes two possible
objections that are often confused. If taken more generally, the Secular
Purpose Objection maintains that the law should have a rational
justification even in hard cases. Because religion is presumed by many to
be nonrational, a rational justification of law must be "secular" or
independent of comprehensive convictions. This presents a philosophical
objection to the religionist-separationist model of judicial decision
making because it asserts the rational autonomy of law.
Alternatively, the Secular Purpose Objection constitutes a legal
objection that the Establishment Clause of the First Amendment
prohibits judges from relying on religious convictions to justify their
decisions in hard cases. The Supreme Court has required that laws have
a secular purpose to withstand an Establishment Clause challenge. The
following discussion, however, shows that the Supreme Court
Establishment Clause jurisprudence fails to support the legal objection so
that the Secular Purpose Objection is primarily a philosophical, rather
than a legal, objection. I will address both of these forms of the Secular
Purpose Objection in turn.
A. The Legal Objection
In Lemon v. Kurtzman,2 '" the Supreme Court specified three tests
(collectively referred to as the Lemon test) that all must be met for a
statute to pass an Establishment Clause challenge: "First, the statue must
have a secular legislative purpose; second, its principal or primary effect
must be one that neither advances nor inhibits religion, [and] finally, the
statue must not foster 'an excessive government entanglement with
200. 403 U.S. 602 (1971).
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religion.""'2 ' Although the Court has not formally repudiated the Lemon
test, "[a] majority of the justices sitting in 2003 have criticized it, and it
has not been relied on by a majority to invalidate any practice since
1985. "2(2 For instance, both Chief Justice Rehnquist and Justice Scalia
have advocated abandoning the Lemon test and, in particular, have
severely criticized the secular purpose prong.23
In place of the Lemon test, many of the Justices have embraced the
"endorsement test," which was originally proposed by Justice O'Connor
in her concurring opinion in Lynch v. Donnelly.204 The endorsement test
has two prongs: 1) the "purpose prong ... asks whether government's
actual purpose is to endorse or disapprove of religion;" and 2) "[t]he
effect prong asks whether, irrespective of government's actual purpose,
the practice under review in fact conveys a message of endorsement or
201. Id. at 612-13.
202. GEOFFREY R. STONE, ET AL., THE FIRST AMENDMENT 541 (2d ed. 2003).
203. See Wallace v. Jaffree, 472 U.S. 38, 108 (1985) (Rehnquist, J., dissenting)
(criticizing the Lemon test and arguing that "[t]he secular purpose prong has proven
mercurial in application because it has never been fully defined, and we have never fully
stated how the test is to operate"). In his dissenting opinion in Edwards v. Aguillard,
Justice Scalia contended that the secular purpose prong should be abandoned and argued
that "discerning the subjective motivation of those enacting the statue is to be honest,
almost always an impossible task." Edwards v. Aguillard, 482 U.S. 578, 636 (1987) (Scalia,
J., dissenting). Scalia further maintained that there was "relatively little information upon
which to judge the motives of those who supported the Act," and that it was not clear what
source of the legislators intent should be controlling. Id. at 619, 637-38. He also declared
that it is not clear "how many of them must have the invalidating intent" and suggested
that an invalid intent by the bill's sponsor may be enough. Id. at 638. Moreover, he
argued that "[t]o look for the sole purpose of even a single legislator is probably to look for
something that does not exist." Id. at 637. Scalia noted that a legislator in that case may
have voted for several reasons such as fostering religion or education, providing "jobs for
his district," responding to "a flood of constituent mail," or "accidentally voted 'yes'
instead of 'no,' or, of course, he may have had (and very likely did have) a combination of
some of the above and many other motivations." Id. But see Michael W. McConnell,
Religious Freedom at a Crossroads, 59 U. CHI. L. REV. 115, 143 (1992) (arguing that "it
would be unprincipled to abandon the purpose prong of the Lemon test on these grounds
if the Court intends to inquire into legislative purpose in other contexts").
204. 465 U.S. 668 (1984). Just five years later, a majority of the Justices applied the
endorsement test in their analysis of whether a creche in the county courthouse and a
menorah in front of a city-county building constituted an establishment of religion.
County of Allegheny v. ACLU, 492 U.S. 573, 579 (1989) (holding that the creche violated
the Establishment Clause but that the menorah did not). Most recently, all the members
of the Court have explicitly applied the endorsement test or joined in opinions applying
the test. See Mitchell v. Helms, 530 U.S. 793, 801 (2000) (holding that lending educational
materials and equipment to public and private schools (including parochial school) does
not violate the Establishment Clause).
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disapproval., 205 With respect to the purpose prong, Justice O'Connor has
argued that "the secular purpose requirement alone may rarely be
determinative in striking down a statute" but that "[it reminds
government that when it acts it should do so without endorsing a
particular religious belief or practice that all citizens do not share.
206
Consequently, under both the Lemon test and the endorsement test, a
likely legal objection to the religionist-separationist model of judicial
decision making is that judges fail to have a secular purpose for their
decisions if they fully justify them by relying on religious convictions.
Based solely on the text of the Establishment Clause, an argument
could be made that it only applies to Congress and not the Judicial and
Executive Branches. The text of the First Amendment provides that




If the Establishment Clause only applies to Congress, then there is no
legal issue regarding judges' reliance on religious convictions in hard
cases. No secular purpose would be required. Michael Perry has argued
to the contrary that the Establishment Clause is considered
"constitutional bedrock," which means it is hard to imagine that it would
not apply to all branches of the federal and state governments. 208 Also,
the Fourth Circuit has held that a state judge's practice of beginning
court sessions with a prayer violated the Establishment Clause.29 For my
purposes, I will assume that the Establishment Clause will apply to
federal and state court judges and demonstrate how the secular purpose
requirement fails to prohibit judges from relying on religious convictions
in their deliberations about hard cases.
205. Lynch, 465 U.S. at 690 (O'Connor, J., concurring) (arguing that "[t]he
endorsement test is useful because of the analytic content it gives to the Lemon-mandated
inquiry into legislative purpose and effect).
206. Wallace, 472 U.S. at 75-76 (O'Connor, J., concurring).
207. U.S. Const. amend I.
208. PERRY, RELIGION IN POLITICS, supra note 30, at 12. Also, some may argue that
the First Amendment only applies to the Federal government and that state judges will
not be affected even if it applies to federal judges. To the contrary, the Supreme Court
has incorporated and applied the First Amendment to the action of states through the Due
Process Clause of the Fourteenth Amendment. Everson v. Bd. of Educ., 330 U.S. 1 (1947)
(applying the Establishment Clause of the First Amendment to a New Jersey law
authorizing local school boards to repay parents for the cost of their children's bus
transportation to private schools). Although some scholarly debate still occurs on this
issue, the Supreme Court is unlikely to overrule the years of precedent applying the
Establishment Clause to the states. See PERRY, RELIGION IN POLITICS, supra note 30, at
12.
209. N.C. Civil Liberties Union Legal Found. v. Constangy, 947 F.2d 1145 (4th Cir.
1991); see also Glassroth v. Moore, 335 F.3d 1282 (11th Cir. 2003). The Eleventh Circuit
held that "religion clauses of the First Amendment apply to all laws, not just those enacted
by Congress," including actions taken by judges such as displaying a two-and-one-half ton
monument of the Ten Commandments. Id. at 1284, 1293.
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There are several reasons for this conclusion. First, in the application
of the Establishment Clause to legislative enactments, only four Supreme
Court cases have based their decisions on the grounds that the statute in
question was invalid because it lacked a secular purpose."" None of
these cases suggests that the Court would find a problem with judicial
reliance on religious convictions in their deliberations about hard cases.
For instance, all these cases dealt with the sensitive context of public
elementary and secondary schools. The Court in Edwards v. AguillardT"
emphasized that in applying the Lemon test "we must do so mindful of
the particular concerns that arise in the context of public elementary and
secondary schools."22 In this respect, the Court noted that "[t]he State
exerts great authority and coercive power through mandatory attendance
requirements, and because of the students' emulation of teachers as role
models and the children's susceptibility to peer pressure., 213 In addition,
these cases involved statutes advancing or protecting explicit religious
teachings (e.g., the Ten Commandments and Creation Science) or
religious practices (e.g., meditation or voluntary prayer)."4 By contrast,
the reliance on religious convictions in judicial deliberation does not
present the kinds of concerns arising from teaching explicitly religious
material to children or facilitating their performance of religious
practices in public schools. If judges refrain from citing religious sources
or arguments in their opinions, their opinions cannot religiously
indoctrinate citizens or in anyway facilitate a religious practice.
210. Edwards v. Aguillard, 482 U.S. 578, 591 (1987) (holding unconstitutional
Louisiana's "Balanced Treatment for Creation-Science and Evolution-Science in Public
School Instruction Act" because "[tihe preeminent purpose of the Louisiana Legislature
was clearly to advance the religious viewpoint that a supernatural being created
humankind"); Wallace v. Jaffree, 472 U.S. 38, 40, 61 (1985) (holding unconstitutional
Alabama's statute providing for a period of silence for "meditation or voluntary prayer"
because the law lacked a secular purpose); Stone v. Graham, 449 U.S. 39, 39-41 (1980)
(holding that a Kentucky statute requiring the posting of Ten Commandments on the wall
of each public school classroom in the State unconstitutional because it had a "pre-
eminent" religious purpose); Epperson v. Arkansas, 393 U.S. 97, 103 (1968) (holding
unconstitutional an Arkansas statute prohibiting the teaching of evolution in public
schools and universities because the "sole reason" for the anti-evolution law was "that it is
deemed to conflict with a particular religious doctrine; that is, with a particular
interpretation of the Book of Genesis by a particular religious group").
211. 482 U.S. 578, 591 (1987)
212. Id. at 585.
213. Id. at 584. In Lee v. Weisman, the Court similarly stressed that "there are
heightened concerns with protecting freedom of conscience from subtle coercive pressure
in the elementary and secondary schools." 505 U.S. 577, 592 (1992) (holding
unconstitutional the practice of clergy invocations and benedictions at middle and high
school graduations).
214. See supra note 210.
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Moreover, Michael McConnell has argued that except for Wallace v.
Jaffree,25  "the Court would likely have found the statutes




In Wallace, the Court found an Alabama statute providing for a period of
silence for "meditation or voluntary prayer" unconstitutional because
"[t]he sponsor of the bill that became § 16-1-20.1, Senator Donald
Holmes, inserted into the legislative record-apparently without
dissent-a statement indicating that the legislation was an 'effort to
return voluntary prayer' to the public schools. ' 17 It is hard to imagine
that Wallace could be found applicable to a judicial decision unless the
judge explicitly referred to a religious source or argument in her opinion.
In that case, she would not be following the religionist-separationist
model but the religionist model of judicial decision making. Therefore,
Supreme Court precedent provides little basis for maintaining that the
religionist-separationist model of judicial decision making will violate the
Establishment Clause.16
Nevertheless, one might argue that courts will not be fooled by the
partial justification in judges' opinions and that courts will find these
opinions to be merely a "sham" attempting to conceal the "predominant
religious purpose" for the judges' decisions. The Court has required that
the secular purpose be "sincere" and not merely "a sham secular
purpose" to avoid an Establishment Clause violation.21 9 Even so, the
Court held in Edwards that "La] religious purpose alone is not enough to
invalidate an act of a state legislature. The religious purpose must
predominate., 221 1 In that case, the Louisiana legislature's stated purpose
for the Balanced Treatment for Creation-Science and Evolution-Science
215. 472 U.S. 38 (1985).
216. McConnell, Religious Freedom at a Crossroads, supra note 203, at 145.
217. 472 U.S. at 56-57. Senator Holmes also stated in his testimony before the District
Court that: "No, I did not have no other purpose in mind." Id. at 57.
218. Cf. McConnell, Religious Freedom at a Crossroads, supra note 203, at 145.
(arguing that "[slituations in which the legislature lacks any secular justification for its
actions are rare, and in the vast majority of cases the Court has found the purpose prong
easily satisfied").
219. Wallace, 472 U.S. at 75 (O'Connor, J., concurring).
220. Edwards, 482 U.S. at 599; see also Wallace, 472 U.S. at 56 (stating that "the First
Amendment requires that a statute must be invalidated if it is entirely motivated by a
purpose to advance religion"); Lynch, 465 U.S. at 680 (emphasizing that "[tihe Court has
invalidated legislation or governmental action on the ground that a secular purpose was
lacking, but only when it has concluded there was no question that the statute or activity
was motivated wholly by religious considerations"). Cf THOMAS C. BERG, THE STATE
AND RELIGION IN A NUTSHELL 245 (1998) (arguing that Edwards, Wallace, Stone, and
other cases "have not come to stand for the broad principle that a religious motivation for
a law is enough to make the law unconstitutional" but for the principle "that only if a law
has no significant secular purpose whatsoever does it flunk the first part of the Lemon
test-even if legislators may also be intending to help religion").
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in Public School Instruction Act was to "protect academic freedom."22 '
The Court rejected this stated purpose and upheld the "Court of
Appeals' conclusion that the Act does not serve to protect academic
freedom, but has the distinctly different purpose of discrediting
'evolution by counterbalancing its teaching at every turn with the
teaching of creationism."" The key difference between this statute and
a judicial opinion is that the statute promotes the teaching of an explicit
religious doctrine-creation science. The predominant religious purpose
was quite evident because the issue being litigated involved the question
of whether the State of Louisiana could promote an explicit religious
teaching. Accordingly, the courts are unlikely to find a judge's opinion a
sham because the issue being litigated will rarely involve the question of
an explicit religious teaching.
221For instance, in most hard cases like Washington v. Glucksberg, the
central issue will have nothing to do with a specific religious teaching but
rather will involve issues such as whether terminating human life with the
aid of a physician is a fundamental right protected by the Due Process
Clause of the Fourteenth Amendment.224  In Glucksberg, there were
significant secular purposes justifying either prohibiting the right to die,
such as the protection of human life, or acknowledging the right to die,
such as the protection of individual liberty. 22 The Court also had two
key legal precedents, Planned Parenthood v. Casey226 and Cruzan v.
Director, Missouri Department of Health,227 that provided secular
justifications for determining the scope of liberty under the Due Process
Clause. Both the Supreme Court and the Ninth Circuit further found
significant secular purposes in the history of either the legal prohibition
of physician-assisted suicide226 or the decriminalization of suicide.229
Consequently, even in extremely hard cases like Glucksberg, courts will
always, or nearly always, have several significant secular purposes to
justify their decisions so that judicial opinions will rarely, if ever, be held
to posit a sham secular purpose.
Another Supreme Court case rejecting a stated secular purpose, Stone
2110
v. Graham, ° further supports the unlikely finding that a judicial opinion
221. Edwards, 482 U.S. at 586.
222. Id. at 589.
223. 521 U.S. 702 (1997).
224. See Glucksberg, 521 U.S. at 702, 705-06.
225. Id. at 719-21, 728.
226. 505 U.S. 833 (1992).
227. 497 U.S. 261 (1990).
228. Glucksberg, 521 U.S. at 710.
229. Compassion in Dying, 79 F.3d at 810.
230. 449 U.S. 39 (1980).
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posits a sham secular purpose. In Stone, the statute requiring the display
of the Ten Commandments in public schools also required a notation on
the display stating that "'[t]he secular application of the Ten
Commandments is clearly seen in its adoption as the fundamental legal
code of Western Civilization and the Common Law of the United
States."' 23' The Court held that "[t]he pre-eminent purpose for posting
the Ten Commandments on schoolroom walls [was] plainly religious in
nature. The Ten Commandments are undeniably a sacred text in the
Jewish and Christian faiths, and no legislative recitation of a supposed
secular purpose can blind us to that fact., 212 A judge following the
religionist-separationist model, however, would not explicitly cite
religious texts like the Ten Commandments in her opinion. She would
cite legal precedents, the U.S. Constitution, statutes, and public policy.
Without an explicit reference to a religious text, there would be no basis
to find a preeminent or predominate religious purpose.
This conclusion would likely stand even where the judge's holding
coincided with her religious convictions (i.e., her holding would imply her
comprehensive conviction). Indeed, in McGowan v. Maryland,233 the
Supreme Court rejected the claim that the Establishment Clause is
violated by "federal or state regulation of conduct whose reason or effect
merely happens to coincide or harmonize with the tenets of some or all
religions., 234 The Court further emphasized that:
In many instances, the Congress or state legislatures conclude
that the general welfare of society, wholly apart from any
religious considerations, demands such regulation. Thus, for
temporal purposes, murder is illegal. And the fact that this
agrees with the dictates of the Judaeo-Christian religions while
it may disagree with others does not invalidate the regulation.
So too with the questions of adultery and polygamy. The same
could be said of theft, fraud, etc., because those offenses were
231also proscribed in the Decalogue.
Even though the Sunday closing law originally had a religious origin, the
Court then rejected the Establishment Clause challenge because having
"a uniform day of rest" was a significant secular purpose for such a law. 6
231. Id. at 40n.1.
232. Id. at 41.
233. 366 U.S. 420 (1961).
234. Id. at 442.
235. Id.
236. Id. at 445. Cf Scott C. Idleman, Religious Premises, Legislative Judgments, and
the Establishment Clause, 12 CORNELL J. L. & PUB. POL'Y 1, 2 (2002) (arguing that the
case law and doctrines that comprise contemporary Establishment Clause jurisprudence
support his claim "that laws that are discernibly informed by religious moral premises"
generally do not, by that fact alone, violate the First Amendment).
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Harris v. McRae211 presented a similar challenge to the Hyde
Amendment, which prohibits federal Medicaid funds for most abortions.
The plaintiffs argued that "the Hyde Amendment violates the
Establishment Clause because it incorporates into law the doctrines of
the Roman Catholic Church concerning the sinfulness of abortion and
the time at which life commences. 2 38  The Court held that the Hyde
Amendment could just as well be "a reflection of 'traditionalist' values
towards abortion" and that mere coincidence with Roman Catholic
religious tenets, "without more," does not constitute an Establishment
Clause violation.239
Similarly, in his dissenting opinion in Bowers v. Hardwick Justice
Blackmun suggested that Georgia's anti-sodomy law violated the
Establishment Clause because it lacked a justification "beyond its
conformity to religious doctrine. 241 Although the case focused primarily
on the question of whether the Due Process Clause protects homosexual
sodomy as a fundamental right, the State of Georgia's arguments and
Chief Justice Burger's concurring opinion supported Blackmun's
suggestion. The State of Georgia invoked "Leviticus, Romans, St.
Thomas Aquinas, and sodomy's heretical status during the Middle Ages"
in support of the anti-sodomy law.2 42 Chief Justice Burger similarly
claimed that the anti-sodomy law was "firmly rooted in Judaeo-Christian
2,43
moral and ethical standards." To the contrary, the majority held that
the law was based on "ancient roots" in the common law, which
237. 448 U.S. 297 (1980).
238. Id. at 319.
239. Id. at 319-20. By contrast, Justice Stevens stated in his dissent in Webster v.
Reproductive Health Services that a Missouri law regulating abortion was unconstitutional
for various reasons including a violation of the Establishment Clause. Webster v.
Reproductive Health Servs., 492 U.S. 490, 566 (1989). He argued that "the absence of any
secular purpose for the legislative declarations that life begins at conception and that
conception occurs at fertilization makes the relevant portion of the preamble invalid under
the Establishment Clause of the First Amendment to the Federal Constitution." Id.
Rather than maintaining that this statement merely coincided with certain religious tenets
or that legislators were motivated by religious considerations, he maintained "that the
preamble, an unequivocal endorsement of a religious tenet of some but by no means all
Christian faiths, serves no identifiable secular purpose. That fact alone compels a
conclusion that the statute violates the Establishment Clause." Id. at 566-67. This may
serve as a warning that judges should avoid taking positions on matter such as when life
begins or ends. As indicated in Part V, these are essentially religious questions and
unnecessarily answering them may lead judges to make their implicit comprehensive
convictions needlessly explicit.
240. Bowers v. Hardwick, 478 U.S. 186 (1986) (Blackmun, J., dissenting).
241. Id. at 211.
242. Bowers, 478 U.S. at 211.
243. Id. at 196 (Burger, J., concurring).
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constituted a rational basis for the law.244 Moreover, consistent with its
holding in McGowan, the Supreme Court has never held that a law
violated the Establishment Clause merely because it coincided with the
religious tenets of a particular religion. As a result, it remains highly
unlikely that a judicial opinion will be found unconstitutional if judges
fully justify their decisions in hard cases by relying on religious
convictions in their deliberations so long as they do not explicitly set
forth those religious convictions in their opinions.
Given this Supreme Court precedent, the religionist-separationist
model of judicial decision making can help perform the task of clarifying
the secular purpose prong. Because all judicial decisions imply a
comprehensive conviction, the secular purpose prong cannot mean that
judicial decisions must not be based on a comprehensive conviction.
Even in easy cases, existing law implies a comprehensive conviction or
convictions but does not require judges to rely on those convictions for a
full justification of their decision. The prohibition against murder is a
good example. Approaching a stranger and killing him without any
cognizable legal defense (e.g., self-defense or insanity) is clearly
prohibited by the criminal laws of every state. As McGowan points out,
the legal prohibition of murder implies many comprehensive
justifications.2 4' The criminal law, however, does not reference the
Christian Bible, the Torah, or the Koran. The possible comprehensive
justifications remain implicit. Requiring that the law have a "secular
purpose" thus cannot mean that a law must be capable of prohibiting
actions like murder without implying a comprehensive conviction or
convictions.
Rather, the secular purpose requirement must mean that the text of
the law can only provide a noncomprehensive justification for its
requirements. When judges apply the law in easy cases, the law only
provides a noncomprehensive justification for judges' decisions. The law
implies comprehensive justifications but does not explicitly incorporate
those comprehensive justifications into the law. Likewise, even though
judges must rely on comprehensive convictions for fully justifying their
decisions in hard cases, the law still has a secular purpose if judges resort
to only noncomprehensive norms to explain their decisions in their
written opinions. As in easy cases, their opinions only imply
comprehensive justifications. In other words, the text of the law in both
easy and hard cases only partially justifies judges' decisions. The key
difference between easy and hard cases is that the latter requires judges
to provide a full justification of their decisions in their deliberation while
244. Id. at 192-96.
245. McGowan, 366 U.S. at 442.
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the former does not. In both cases, judicial opinions stating only
noncomprehensive norms, whether legal or extra-legal, provide a secular
purpose for judges' decisions and do not violate the Establishment
Clause.
Therefore, the Supreme Court precedent requiring that the law have
"a secular purpose" does not appear to present a significant problem for
the religionist-separationist model of judicial decision making. Given the
weakness of the legal Secular Purpose Objection, the frequent claim that
the law must have a secular purpose makes more sense as a philosophical
objection than as a legal objection.
B. The Philosophical Objection
My arguments against the philosophical version of the Secular Purpose
Objection have included both a theoretical and a practical critique of
legal autonomy. With respect to the theoretical critic, I have argued at
length elsewhere that the attempts of Jurgen Habermas, John Rawls,
Kent Greenawalt, and Michael Perry to preserve the autonomy of the
law have failed.246 Rather than repeat those arguments here, I will briefly
summarize their models of judicial decision making and indicate why
they are incoherent.
Juirgen Habermas and John Rawls propose versions of the
separationist model of judicial decision making and argue that judges'
decisions are legitimate only if they are rationally justified independently
of their religious or comprehensive convictions. Rawls argues for a non-
universal rational justification of the law based on a political conception
of justice ("implicit in the public political culture" of a democratic
society).2 47  He further maintains that this "political and not
metaphysical" conception of justice is part of public reason, which
provides a justification for constitutional essentials and matters of basic
248justice. Rawls holds out the U.S. Supreme Court as the "exemplar of
public reason" and emphasizes that "[t]he justices cannot, of course,
invoke their own personal morality, nor the ideals and virtues of morality
249generally," even when the law is indeterminate. In both the
deliberative process and the process of explanation, Rawls asserts that
judges should rely solely on the political values of public reason, which
246. For the argument supporting these conclusions about Habermas, Rawls,
Greenawalt, and Perry, see references to prior articles and current book contained in
supra note 17.
247. See RAWLS, POLITICAL LIBERALISM, supra note 96, at 192.
248. Id. at 10.
249. Id. at 236, 237.
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are independent of any particular comprehensive religious, philosophical,
250)
or moral doctrines.
Similarly, Habermas argues for a universal rational justification of the
law based on the procedures of the discourse principle (intersubjective
rational agreement among all those affected after free and full debate).25'
He maintains that the discourse of application (including both the
process of deliberation and explanation) allows for an impartial
application of law that is independent of religious or metaphysical
worldviews. To determine which valid legal norm is most appropriate in
a particular case, Habermas contends that "one must first enter a
discourse of application to test whether they apply to a given situation
(whose details could ngt have been anticipated in the justification
process) or whether, their validity notwithstanding, they must give way to
another norm, namely the 'appropriate' one., 252 The selection of the
"single appropriate norm" for a particular situation is what first confers
"the determinate shape of a coherent order on the unordered mass of
valid norms., 25 3 Although the coherence among the norms shifts, the
answer to the legal issue is derived for the existing norms. The judge is
not an interstitial legislator creating new legal norms from extra legal
norms. Rather, she searches for the appropriate norm in the system of
legal norms and reconstructs that system to make it the best she can in
light of her application of the appropriate norm. Thus, both Habermas's
and Rawls's separationist models recognize a complete independence
between judicial decision making and judges' personal convictions-
whether they are comprehensive, religious, political, or moral.
By contrast, Greenawalt and Perry both propose religionist-
separationist models of judicial decision making and have been pioneers
in taking religion seriously with respect to legal and political issues.
Despite their achievements, Greenawalt's and Perry's religionist-
separationist models set substantial limits on judges' reliance on religious
250. Id. at 139.
251. See HABERMAS, BETWEEN FACTS AND NORMS, supra note 15, at 103-04. Once
the religious and metaphysical worldviews have been eliminated, Habermas argues that
"the legitimacy of law ultimately depends on a communicative arrangement: as
participants in rational discourses, consociates under law must be able to examine whether
a contested norm meets with, or could meet with, the agreement of all those possibly
affected." Id. at 104; see also 1 JURGEN HABERMAS, THE THEORY OF COMMUNICATIVE
ACTION 261-62 (Thomas McCarthy trans., 1984). Habermas further maintains that the
disenchantment of the world eliminated the possibility of an "objective" legitimation of
law. Assuming rationality still has some non-subjective meaning, intersubjective
agreement must then become the arbiter of legitimation. Legitimation thus occurs from
the procedure of coming to a rational intersubjective agreement.
252. Habermas, Between Facts and Norms, supra note 15, at 217.
253. Id.
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and comprehensive convictions in hard cases. For example, Greenawalt
argues that "shared premises and ways of reasoning have priority and
that these will get judges all of the way in the vast majority of cases," but
that "on exceptional occasions the indecisiveness of legal and public
reasons will be sufficiently apparent to allow a judge to make a self-
conscious use of personal convictions [including comprehensive and
religious convictions]. 254 On the other hand, he argues that "the
[judge's] opinion should symbolize the aspiration of interpersonal reason
and be limited to public reasons. 2 5' He identifies three kinds of shared
ways of reasoning or "publically accessible" grounds for political
decisions-realist reasons, shared social reasons, and authority reasons
(constitutional, legislative, and common law) -that judges should rely on
in their opinions and that provide a basis for deciding most legal
disputes.256  Moreover, even if judges can rely on comprehensive
convictions in exceptional cases, these comprehensive convictions must
not appear in the judicial opinions as the public justification for that
decision.
When the relevant legal materials are "underdeterminate," Perry
likewise contends that judges must ascertain a persuasive rational secular
argument to justify all judicial decisions (except those involving claims
about human worth) even though they can simultaneously rely on an
optional or auxiliary religious argument that supports the same
outcome.9 7 Michael Perry maintains that when citizens, legislators, and
other public officials (including judges) make political choices about the
morality of human conduct, both the nonestablishment norm and
political morality dictate that they "should not rely on a religious
argument about the requirements of human well-being unless, in their
view, a persuasive secular argument reaches the same conclusion about
those requirements as the religious argument."258 Perry proposes a more
254. Greenawalt, Private Consciences, supra note 30, at 149.
255. Id. at 150.
256. Id. at 24-32.
257. PERRY, RELIGION IN POLITICS, supra note 30, at 102-03. For further analysis of
Perry's proposal, see MODAK-TRURAN, REENCHANTING THE LAW, supra note 17, at 156-
78; Mark C. Modak-Truran, Book Review, 79 J. RELIGION 160 (1999) (reviewing
MICHAEL J. PERRY, RELIGION IN POLITICS: CONSTITUTIONAL AND MORAL
PERSPECTIVES (1997)). Furthermore, it is not clear whether Perry's proposal should be
classified as a limited religionist model or as a religionist-separationist model. In either
case, he proposes the plausible secular argument constraint on judicial reliance on
religious beliefs that parallels the constraints imposed by Rawls and Habermas
separationist models. See supra note 30 and accompanying text. As noted above,
however, Perry has moderated his position on the plausible secular argument requirement.
See supra note 38.
258. PERRY, RELIGION IN POLITICS, supra note 30, at 6 (emphasis added). By
contrast, with respect to certain religious arguments about human worth (e.g., that all
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expansive role for religious convictions in hard cases than Greenawalt
but still maintains that religious arguments about human well-being are
optional and secondary to the required persuasive secular arguments.
Rawls, Habermas, Greenawalt, and Perry thus all maintain that
judicial decisions can be fully justified independently of judges'
comprehensive convictions in all, or almost all, cases. Law has an
autonomous rational justification. Religious or comprehensive
convictions are not essential for justifying judicial decisions and should in
most cases be avoided.
Despite the ideal of an autonomous legal system, all of these models of
judicial decision making depend upon particular comprehensive
convictions that make their theories incoherent. The models of judicial
decision making espoused by Habermas, Rawls, and Greenawalt all
ironically presuppose a hidden nonrational comprehensive conviction
which makes their models incoherent.25 9 Similarly, Perry's persuasive
secular argument requirement depends upon his Roman Catholic
convictions.60 For the sake of brevity, I will focus only on howreligious i n    eo eiy fou0nyo 
Greenawalt's approach demonstrates this incoherence.
human beings are sacred), Perry argues that these may be relied on by citizens, legislators,
and other public officials "even if, in their view, no persuasive secular argument supports
the claim that all human beings are sacred" without transgressing the nonestablishment
norm or political morality. Id. at 6, 69.
259. Rawls claims that an objective legitimation of law must be independent of
comprehensive doctrines (i.e., based on the political values of public reason) because
comprehensive doctrines are nonpublic (i.e., not rational). This claim entails a
comprehensive denial of all comprehensive doctrines (moral relativism), which according
to Rawls is not possible, and thus results in an incoherent account of judicial decision
making. See MODAK-TRURAN, REENCHANTING THE LAW, supra note 17, at 130-33.
Likewise, Habermas discourse theory of justification and application rely on his claim that
all comprehensive convictions are not rational and cannot be intersubjectively validated.
This claim constitutes a comprehensive evaluation of all comprehensive convictions.
However, this claim is self-contradictory because it presupposes (the possibility of rational
comprehensive evaluation) what it denies (the possibility of rational comprehensive
evaluation). See id. at 77-86.
260. Unlike Habermas, Rawls, and Greenawalt, Perry is self-conscious of his
comprehensive conviction but fails to realize that his distinction between rational secular
arguments and nonrational religious arguments depends on his nonrational Roman
Catholic religious convictions. Perry emphasizes that "[t]he paradigmatic religious
argument about the requirements of human well-being relies (partly) on a claim about
what God has revealed." PERRY, RELIGION IN POLITICS, supra note 30, at 73. The
implications of this characterization of religious arguments is that religious arguments are
finally based on revelation. Perry contrasts religious arguments with secular arguments
that are based on reason, but he does not provide a rational secular argument to support
this distinction. He contends that this view is accepted by "most religious believers in the
United States" and that "[t]he Roman Catholic religious-moral tradition has long
embraced that position." Id. at 72, 74. This distinction is thus based on Perry's Roman
Catholic religious convictions or other religious authority. Consequently, the requirement
that judges, as legislators and executives, must have a persuasive secular argument if they
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Greenawalt's principle of public accessibility requires that "people
should refrain from relying upon all grounds that cannot be reasonably
assessed by others, whether or not the grounds are religious, whether or
not they are features of comprehensive views, and whether or not they
are related to ideas of the good."2 1 This distinction between accessible
and nonaccessible grounds of political judgment depends upon a
comprehensive evaluation of all convictions including comprehensive
convictions. This comprehensive evaluation determines the classification
of convictions as accessible or nonaccessible and the priority or ordering
of the former over the later. Based on this comprehensive evaluation,
Greenawalt determines that certain reasons or convictions are accessible
or public such as authority reasons, realist reasons, and shared social262
reasons. In addition, he maintains that other convictions are
nonaccessible or private, such as most religious and nonreligious
263comprehensive convictions. He further argues that even if
comprehensive convictions are accessible (formulated in realist terms),
they should not usually ground political judgments because of past
conflict and persecution, the perception that they are nonaccessible, and
264the perception that they are prone to error. In effect, comprehensive
• 26.1
convictions are all nonaccessible or private. Consequently, like
Habermas and Rawls, Greenawalt's claim that comprehensive
convictions are all nonaccessible or private is a comprehensive evaluation
also rely on a religious argument about human well being is based on a nonrational
religious conviction (which is based on revelation). For further elaboration on this
argument, see MODAK-TRURAN, REENCHANTING THE LAW, supra note 17, at 158-59,
170-76.
261. KENT GREENAWALT, PRIVATE CONSCIENCES, supra note 30, at 5. He further
argues that there are "at least four kinds of views about which the state might be neutral
and which perhaps should not figure in political decision and argument: religious views,
views about the good life, comprehensive views, and nonaccessible views." Id. at 128.
262. See id. at 24-32.
263. Id. at 39-44.
264. Id. at 44-45.
265. This claim, however, is based primarily on Greenawalt's reports that some people
think comprehensive convictions are nonaccessible, but he does not give us an argument
for why the comprehensive order of reflection is in principle nonaccessible. Apart from
assuming a form of moral realism, Greenawalt does not really explain his assertion that
comprehensive convictions are nonaccessible. This raises the question of whether the
form of moral realism he presupposes is a comprehensive conviction that is implicitly
informing this distinction. To the contrary, Greenawalt maintains that accessible realist
reasons are not comprehensive reasons. They "apply to morality, that is, questions about
the good life and about how we should act toward others," and "they also apply to the
structure of political institutions." Id. at 27. Unlike comprehensive convictions, they do
not provide an overarching philosophy of life or address questions such as the nature and
existence of God. On Greenawalt's terms, then, he is not proposing a comprehensive
conviction by declaring realist reasons, shared social reasons, and authority reasons as
accessible and advocating them as the appropriate grounds for making political judgments.
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of all comprehensive convictions and constitutes a nonaccessible
266
comprehensive conviction. Greenawalt's comprehensive evaluation
distinguishes between accessible and nonaccessible grounds for judicial
decision making based on a nonaccessible comprehensive conviction. In
other words, Greenawalt's principle of public accessibility (a principle of
restraint) is based on his nonaccessible comprehensive conviction.
Accordingly, his religionist-separationist model of judicial decision
making is incoherent because it violates the principle of public
accessibility.
Even if Greenawalt's comprehensive conviction is accessible, basing
his principles of restraint on either an accessible or a nonaccessible
comprehensive conviction contradicts his claim that his political
principles of restraint are independent of any particular comprehensive
267conviction. Greenawalt realizes that if his principles of restraint
depended upon a particular comprehensive view, others would be
required to accept or adopt that comprehensive view in order for his
principles of restraint to gain acceptance. In trying to avoid this
situation, he proposes principles of restraint that he argues do not
depend on any particular comprehensive conviction. For instance, when
the relevant legal materials are indeterminate, Greenawalt maintains that
judges should rely on realist reasons and shared social reasons to decide
cases. Authority reasons, realist reasons, and shared social reasons are
allegedly sufficient to justify judges' decisions fully without relying on
2681comprehensive convictions except in rare cases.
Contrary to his intentions, this ordering of reasons or convictions
depends on his comprehensive evaluation of convictions as accessible or
nonaccessible. Only those judges who deny the accessibility of all
comprehensive convictions could accept Greenawalt's principle of public
accessibility. For these judges, it does not appear that Greenawalt's
principles of public restraint are based on a particular comprehensive
conviction. They likewise accept the nonaccessibility of comprehensive
convictions and fail to recognize their own comprehensive convictions.
266. Cf GAMWELL, supra note 51, at 114 (arguing that "the meaning of religious
freedom on Greenawalt's pluralist view relies on the validity of a particular nonrational
comprehensive conviction."). Gamwell further argues that "[blecause a denial of all
religious or comprehensive convictions is itself a (negative) comprehensive claim, it
prevents the validation or justification of any positive beliefs about human authenticity,
comprehensive or otherwise." Id. at 139.
267. See KENT GREENAWALT, PRIVATE CONSCIENCES, supra note 30, at 125 (arguing
that political theorists "may self-consciously present political principles that do not rest on
any particular comprehensive view").
268. Id. at 150 (claiming that, except for a few exceptional cases, "the judge has a duty
to disregard comprehensive views and nonaccessible reasons in favor of public reasons in
intracourt deliberations and in deciding how to vote").
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No religious judge, however, could accept this ordering of reasons in
hard cases. This ordering is based on a comprehensive conviction they
reject, and these principles of restraint impose an ordering of values that
directly conflicts with the ordering derived from their comprehensive
convictions. As a result, Greenawalt could not depend upon a voluntary
agreement among citizens (like Rawls's overlapping consensus and
Habermas's intersubjective rational agreement) to support these
principles of restraint.
In order for these principles of restraint to be effective, they would
have to be established as part of the law. This would include establishing
Greenawalt's comprehensive conviction that all comprehensive
convictions are nonaccessible grounds (i.e., grounds that judges should
avoid) and would violate the Establishment Clause. Greenawalt himself
recognizes that "[g]iven principles of religious liberty and separation of
church and state that guide us, a reason that rests on a theological truth
that is not generally accepted should not count as a reason for what the
exiting law provides. , 6 9 This same analysis would appear to apply to his
own nonaccessible, comprehensive evaluation of all comprehensive
convictions. Establishing his principles of restraint would thus result in
Establishment Clause problems and objections from those with differing
comprehensive convictions.
These criticisms apply equally to Habermas's, Rawls's, and Perry's
models.2 70 Their models represent the main types of the separationist
model (Habermas's universal and Rawls's nonuniversal separationist
models) and the alternative versions of the religionist-separationist
model (Greenawalt and Perry). Given their incoherence, it is unlikely
that a coherent model of judicial decision making can support the
position that judicial decisions can be fully justified independently of
religious or comprehensive convictions.
Furthermore, Parts IV and V presented practical arguments for the
religionist-separationist model by analyzing Washington v. Glucksberg
271
and Lyng v. Northwest Indian Cemetery Protective Ass'n.2 72 These cases
practically demonstrated that judges, in their deliberations about hard
cases, must rely on comprehensive convictions about authentic human
existence to fully justify their decisions. Noncomprehensive norms were
insufficient. Note that this was not a descriptive argument, but a
normative argument that, in principle, a full justification of judges'
decisions in hard cases requires reliance on comprehensive convictions.
269. GREENAWALT, LAW AND OBJECTIVITY, supra note 9, at 222.
270. See supra note 17.
271. 521 U.S. 702 (1997).
272. 485 U.S. 439 (1988).
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The judges in question may have decided based on a blind assumption of
an implicit comprehensive conviction, but they should have relied on the
religious or explicit comprehensive convictions that they consider true to
fully justify their decisions.
Both these practical and theoretical arguments have put into question
the philosophical claim that judges can fully justify their decisions in all
cases without relying on comprehensive convictions. The assertion of
autonomy of law is longer warranted. Moreover, neither the legal nor
the philosophical Secular Purpose Objection poses a threat to the
religionist-separationist model and the reenchantment of the law.
VIII. THE SEPARATIONIST PROCESS OF EXPLANATION
Despite the necessary reliance on religious convictions in the process
of deliberation, one might respond that these comprehensive convictions
should appear in judicial opinions (religionist model) because the rule of
law requires that judges set forth or make public all the reasons for their
decisions. Concealing these comprehensive or religious convictions about
authentic human existence insincerely suggests (the Insincerity
Objection) that the reasons given in the opinion were the only reasons
273for the judge's decision. Without disclosing these comprehensive
convictions, the Insincerity Objection contends that citizens would lose
faith in the judicial process and that the rule of law would be
undermined.
To address the Insincerity Objection, I will set forth two arguments
supporting the religionist-separationist model's prohibition against
writing comprehensive convictions into the law. First of all, I will argue
that the Establishment Clause prohibits judges from explicitly
articulating the religious or comprehensive convictions on which their
decisions are based. In addition, I will contend that there are persuasive
practical reasons for excluding comprehensive convictions from judicial
decisions.
A. The Establishment Clause
There is substantial disagreement among the Supreme Court Justices
about the parameters of the Establishment Clause. Scholars have often
identified three main positions taken by the Justices-Strict Separation,
Neutrality, and Accommodation-in their interpretations of the
Establishment Clause.274 These theoretical positions appear to influence
273. See PERRY, RELIGION IN POLITICS, supra note 30, at 104.
274. See, e.g., THE FIRST AMENDMENT: A READER 444-84 (John H. Garvey &
Frederick Schauer eds., 2d ed. 1996) (dividing articles on the modern theories of the
Establishment Clause into three main groups: Strict Separation, Neutrality, and
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the Justices' decisions quite substantially. For instance, even when the
Justices all apply the endorsement test, they apply the test differently and
reach vastly different results.275
Despite this disagreement, there has been long-standing agreement
among the Justices as to the most basic parameters of the Establishment
Clause. In the first case applying the Establishment Clause to a state
statute, the Court followed a Strict Separation position and stated that
"[t]he 'establishment of religion' clause of the First Amendment means
at least this: Neither a state nor the Federal Government can set up a
church. Neither can pass laws which aid one religion, aid all religions, or
prefer one religion over another. 276  More recently, Justice Kennedy,
who advocates substantial accommodation of religion by the state, has
declared that "[it is beyond dispute that, at a minimum, the Constitution
guarantees that government may not coerce anyone to support or
participate in religion or its exercise, or otherwise act in a way which
'establishes a [state] religion or religious faith, or tends to do so.' '277 At
the very least, the Establishment Clause appears to prohibit the state
Accommodation); ERWIN CHEMERINSKY, CONSTITUTIONAL LAW: PRINCIPLES AND
POLICIES 1149-55 (2d ed. 2002) (stating that there are "three major competing
approaches" to the Establishment Clause).
275. See, e.g., Mitchell v. Helms, 530 U.S. 793 (2000). In Mitchell, the central issue was
whether the Federal government program for lending educational materials and
equipment to public and private schools (including parochial schools) violated the
Establishment Clause. Id. at 801. The plurality opinion by Justice Thomas (joined by
Rehnquist, Scalia, and Kennedy) took an Accommodation position and held that the
lending of educational materials and equipment to parochial schools does not violate the
Establishment Clause even if some of those materials are used for religious indoctrination.
Id. at 809-10. By contrast, the concurring opinion by Justice O'Connor (joined by Breyer)
took a Neutrality position and argued that lending educational materials and equipment to
parochial schools was constitutional because there were reasonable safeguards to prevent
diversion of materials for religious indoctrination and there was only evidence of de
minimis diversion of materials for religious indoctrination. Id. at 857-67. Finally, the
dissenting opinion by Justice Souter (joined by Stevens and Ginsburg) took a Strict
Separation position and argued that the lending of educational materials and equipment to
parochial schools violated the Establishment Clause because of evidence of some actual
diversion and a risk of future diversion of these materials for religious indoctrination. Id.
at 902-10.
276. Everson, 330 U.S. at 15.
277. Lee v. Weisman, 505 U.S. 577, 587 (1992) (quoting Lynch v. Donnelly, 465 U.S. at
678). In this respect, Michael Perry argues that the essence of "the free exercise and
nonestablishment norms is that government may not make judgments about the value or
disvalue-the true value, the moral value, the social value, any kind of value-of religions
or religious practices or religious (theological) tenets." PERRY, RELIGION IN POLITICS,
supra note 30, at 9. At the very minimum, he contends that the nonestablishment norm
means that the government may not take action favoring one or more religions as such (in
effect discriminating against others). By writing religious convictions into the law, the
state appears to be endorsing a religious conviction as true or favoring one religion over
others. Id. at 14-16.
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from explicitly embracing a particular religious justification for the law.
In the case of judges, this prohibits judges from articulating religious
convictions as a full justification for their decisions. By setting forth
religious convictions in this manner, judges would effectively establish
those religious convictions as an official religious justification for the law.
Thus, even a minimalist interpretation of the Establishment Clause
prohibits judges from providing a full justification of their decisions by
including religious convictions in their written opinions.
The Court has recognized some minor exceptions to this general
prohibition on the state endorsement of specific religious convictions.
The Court has exempted the "statutorily prescribed national motto 'In
God We Trust,"' and the "compensation of the Chaplains of the Senate
and the House and the military services. ,27 Former Chief Justice Burger
refers to these accommodations of religion as "the Government's
acknowledgment of our religious heritage and governmental sponsorship
of graphic manifestations of that heritage., 27" However, none of these
exceptions permit explicit reliance on a predominant religious purpose as
a justification for the law. These exceptions deal with historic or
symbolic recognitions of religion but do not rely on religion as a full
justification for government decision making. To the contrary, the
Supreme Court cases analyzed above revealed that statutes advancing or
protecting explicit religious teachings (e.g., the Ten Commandments and
Creation Science) or religious practices (e.g., meditation or voluntary
prayer) were found unconstitutional because they lacked a secular28(1
purpose. These statutes violated the Establishment Clause because
they were based on a predominant religious purpose rather than merely
recognizing the symbolic or historic significance of religion.
Despite these apparent Establishment Clause problems, the courts
have not yet specifically addressed the Establishment Clause issues
raised by judges relying on religious convictions in their written opinions.
The Fourth Circuit has held that a judge's practice of beginning court
sessions with a prayer violated the Establishment Clause."" In addition,
several courts have considered whether religious references by judges
278. Lynch, 465 U.S. at 676.
279. Id. at 677.
280. See supra Part VII.A. But cf Thomas C. Berg, The Pledge of Allegiance and the
Limited State, 8 TEX. REV. L. & POL. 42, 64 (2004) (arguing that Steven Smith's and
Michael Perry's "arguments that religious freedom, or human rights in general, must rest
on a religious rationale .... provide a powerful reason that the Establishment Clause must
permit the state to recognize this religious rationale" in the Pledge of Allegiance).
281. N.C. Civil Liberties Union Legal Found. v. Constangy, 947 F.2d 1145, 1146, 1152
(4th Cir. 1991).
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during the sentencing process violates the offender's due process rights.2' 2
In this context, the courts have looked at the role or function of judges'
reliance on religious convictions. For example, during the sentencing of
the well-known televangelist James Bakker in United States v. Bakker,
the judge stated that Bakker "had no thought whatever about his victims
and those of us who do have a religion are ridiculed as being saps from
money-grubbing preachers or priests.,23 On appeal, the Fourth Circuit
held that the judge's "personal religious principles" were "the basis of a
sentencing decision. ' '28 The Fourth Circuit then remanded the case for
resentencing because this "explicit intrusion" violated Bakker's right to
due process of law under the Fourteenth Amendment.2 ' By contrast, in
State v. Arnett, the Ohio Supreme Court held that the sentencing judge's
quotation of a portion of the Gospel of Matthew "was but one factor,
among many, that supported this judge's legally unremarkable decision
to assign significant weight to the seriousness of Arnett's offenses against
young victims. ' '2 6 More specifically, the court held that "the judge's
disclosed religious principle mirrored a sentencing factor in the Ohio
Revised Code" and that "the biblical passage could not be said to be the
282. See, e.g., U.S. v. Bakker, 925 F.2d 728 (4th Cir. 1991); State v. Arnett, 724 N.E.2d
793 (Ohio 2000); see also Mark B. Greenlee, Faith on the Bench: The Role of Religious
Belief in the Criminal Sentencing Decisions of Judges, 26 U. DAYTON L. REV. 1 (2000).
Initially, Greenlee appears to offer a religionist view of judicial decision making. He
advocates what he refers to as a "wholist" account of judicial decision making and argues
that judges should be able to rely on religious convictions in their deliberation and
justification of their decisions. Id. at 18. However, he then limits the role of religious
convictions in a manner consistent with the following distinction between Bakker and
Arnett. With respect to Arnett, he contends that "the predominant function of the
[biblical] reference was judicial, rather than confessional" because "it was used to assist
Judge Marsh with her judicial task of determining the appropriate sentence for the
defendant." Id. at 35. By contrast, he argues that the judge in Bakker inappropriately
relied on religious beliefs because he substituted "sermons for judicial analysis." Id. at 37.
Although this distinction makes sense from an Establishment Clause perspective, it hardly
indicates a robust understanding of the function of religion in practical reasoning.
Greenlee notes Tillich's notion of "ultimate concern" and states that "my religious
upbringing plays a role in every decision I make," but fails to provide any account of the
role of religious beliefs in practical reasoning. Id. at 8, 12. Implicitly, he suggests that
religious reasons are allowed when they supplement legal reasons but not when they
provide the primary justification for the judge's decision. Somehow his understanding of
being "called to live out their faith on the bench" means that judges are called to express
their religious convictions when those convictions are not required to resolve the legal
dispute but to avoid relying on them when the law is indeterminate. See id. at 18.
283. Bakker, 925 F.2d at 740.
284. Id. at 741.
285. Id. at 740-41.
286. Arnett, 724 N.E.2d at 804.
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primary premise for the judge's sentencing decision. ,28 7  Thus, with
respect to the Due Process Clause, judges may rely on religious
convictions as an additional reason for their sentencing decisions but not
as the primary reason or basis for those decisions.
Initially, these decisions appear more lenient than the Supreme Court's
Establishment Clause jurisprudence.2  Upon further analysis, these Due
Process cases are consistent with the Supreme Court's interpretation of
the secular purpose prong and support the religionist-separationist
model's prohibition against judges' explicitly relying on religious
convictions in their written opinions. Recall that the Court held in
Edwards that "La] religious purpose alone is not enough to invalidate an
act of a state legislature. The religious purpose must predominate." ' 9 If
judges cite their religious convictions as additional reasons for their
decisions in easy cases, those convictions do not predominate. To the
contrary, if judges cite their religious convictions to fully justify their
decisions in hard cases, their religious convictions predominate over
secular purposes. The religious convictions predominate because when
properly understood, such convictions are the comprehensive condition
of validity for all the judge's convictions. 21 ' Because religious convictions
are the comprehensive condition of validity, setting forth a religious
287. Id. at 802. The Ohio Supreme Court further noted that "[sleveral state supreme
courts ... have declined to vacate sentences where the judge's religious comments merely
acknowledge generally accepted principles, as opposed to highly personal religious beliefs
that become the basis for the sentence imposed." Id. at 803.
288. While these Due Process cases appear consistent with the secular purpose prong
of these tests, the effects prong of the endorsement or Lemon tests may be grounds for
finding an Establishment Clause violation for judicial citation of religious convictions as
additional reasons for their decisions. Under the endorsement test, the reasonable
observer may perceive the citation of religious convictions as an endorsement of those
convictions even if those religious convictions are an additional, rather than the primary,
reason for the judge's decision. The judge's opinion would endorse these religious
convictions and send "a clear message to nonadherents that they are outsiders or less than
full members of the political community." Allegheny County v. ACLU, 492 U.S. 573, 627
(1989) (O'Connor, J., concurring in part and concurring in the judgment). Resolving the
question of whether judicial reference to religious convictions as an additional justification
of a decision, however, is not the central concern of the religionist-separationist model of
judicial decision making. From the standpoint of the religionist-separationist model, the
important question is whether religious convictions can be expressed in judicial opinions
as a full justification of judges' decisions. Both the Establishment Clause and Due Process
Clause appear to prohibit relying on religious convictions for that purpose.
289. Edwards v. Aguilard, 482 U.S. 578, 599 (1987); see also Wallace, 472 U.S. at 56
(stating that "the First Amendment requires that a statute must be invalidated if it is
entirely motivated by a purpose to advance religion"); Lynch, 465 U.S. at 680
(emphasizing that "[tihe Court has invalidated legislation or governmental action on the
ground that a secular purpose was lacking, but only when it has concluded there was no
question that the statute or activity was motivated wholly by religious considerations").
290. See infra Part IV.
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conviction in a judicial opinion as a full justification is writing into the
law a particular comprehensive condition of validity. Any
noncomprehensive reasons, including indeterminate legal norms, given
by the judge in her opinion depend upon this religious conviction for
their validity. Consequently, both the Due Process Clause and the
Establishment Clause prohibit judges from relying on religious
convictions for fully justifying their decisions in their written opinions.
Conversely, as argued above, those same noncomprehensive norms
would constitute a secular purpose if religious convictions were absent
from judges' decisions. Initially, this appears to be a distinction without a
difference. In the first case, the judge explicitly posits her religious
convictions as a comprehensive justification for those noncomprehensive
norms. By expressly relying on a comprehensive conviction in her
written opinion, she endorses that religious conviction as the true
comprehensive condition of validity for her decision. It is the highest
principal or predominate purpose for that decision. In the later case, the
noncomprehensive norms merely imply one or more comprehensive
convictions. By stating these noncomprehensive norms without a
comprehensive justification, the noncomprehensive norms, not the
implied comprehensive conviction, becomes the predominate purpose.
The noncomprehensive norms are the highest level norms that explain
judges' decisions, and judges avoid endorsing a particular religious
conviction. This eliminates the Establishment Clause problems and
allows for the possibility that a plurality of comprehensive convictions
may justify these noncomprehensive norms.i' Thus, contrary to the
Insincerity Objection, judges should only partially justify their decision
based on noncomprehensive norms because the Establishment Clause
prohibits judges from specifying a comprehensive or religious
justification in their written opinions.
B. Practical Considerations
Most judges seem to understand or intuit that judicial opinions should
only provide a partial justification of their decisions. Explicit religious
291. Franklin Gamwell's interpretation of the meaning of the religion clauses of the
First Amendment similarly requires that:
All religions are separated from the state in the sense that the state may not
explicitly endorse any answer to the comprehensive question. At the same time,
religion is essential to the body politic in the sense that political decisions should
imply the valid comprehensive conviction. Politics is consistent in principle with
a plurality of legitimate religions because they are united through democratic
discourse, and adherents of all religions can consistently be democratically civil
precisely because all religions claim to represent the valid understanding of
human authenticity as such.
GAMWELL, supra note 51, at 205.
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references rarely appear in judicial opinions. A recent opinion ignoring
this conventional wisdom helps demonstrate the practical problems that
arise when judges write their religious convictions in the law. These
practical problems also provide further reasons against the Insincerity
Objection.
29In Ex Parte H.H., the Alabama Supreme Court determined that a
previous child custody decision granting physical custody to the father
should not be modified.293 As part of a divorce proceeding, a California
court initially awarded the father and mother joint custody of their three
children, with the mother receiving primary physical custody.9 4 In 1996,
based on the mother's petition, a California court granted the father
physical custody, and the children moved to Alabama to live with him.99
In 1999, she filed a petition to modify the prior physical custody decree
296based on allegations that the father had physically abused the children.
The trial court evaluated the evidence and found that "although the
father's disciplinary actions may occasionally be excessive, no abuse had
occurred," and that the mother had failed to meet her burden for
modifying the child custody arrangement.297 The Court of Civil Appeals
reversed. 29" The Alabama Supreme Court then reversed the Court of
Civil Appeals on the grounds that the Court of Civil Appeals had
"impermissibly reweighed the evidence" without showing that the trial
court had abused its discretion in concluding that there was not sufficient
evidence of child abuse.4
Despite the majority's brief disposition of this case, Chief Justice
Moore's concurring opinion provides an elaborate treatment of the case.
His opinion includes both a noncomprehensive justification and a
comprehensive justification as follows:
I concur in the opinion of the majority .... I write specially to
state that the homosexual conduct of a parent-conduct
involving a sexual relationship between two persons of the same
gender-creates a strong presumption of unfitness that alone is
sufficient justification for denying that parent custody of his or
her own children or prohibiting the adoption of the children of
others.
292. Ex Parte H.H., 830 So.2d 21 (Ala. 2002).




297. Id. at 25.
298. Id. at 24.
299. Id. at 25, 26.
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In this case there is undisputed evidence that the mother of
the minor children not only dated another woman, but lived
with that woman, shared a bed with her, and had an intimate
physical and sexual relationship with her. D.H. has, in fact,
entered into a "domestic partnership" with her female
companion under the laws of the State of California. But
Alabama expressly does not recognize same-sex marriages or
domestic partnerships. Homosexual conduct is, and has been,
considered abhorrent, immoral, detestable, a crime against
nature, and a violation of the laws of nature and of nature's God
upon which this Nation and our laws are predicated. Such
conduct violates both the criminal and civil laws of this State
and is destructive to a basic building block of society-the
family. The law of Alabama is not only clear in its condemning
such conduct, but the courts of this State have consistently held
that exposing a child to such behavior has a destructive and
seriously detrimental effect on the children:' °°
Even though much of the judge's diatribe against homosexuality is
offensive, he bases most of these comments on prior Alabama SuPreme
Court cases and Alabama statutes outlawing homosexual conduct. He
specifies the Alabama law in question and further argues that it supports
the majority's decision.' Although this portion of his opinion is
controversial, it does not present any Establishment Clause issues
because it is based on noncomprehensive norms.
Chief Justice Moore crosses the Establishment Clause line in his
comments italicized above and in his subsequent citations to Genesis,
Leviticus, and St. Thomas Aquinas in support of his claim that
homosexuality is "inherently evil."30 3  In some cases, reference to
religious convictions in judicial opinions is not problematic. For
example, in Compassion in Dying, the Ninth Circuit surveyed religious
positions on suicide but did not adopt one of those views as a justification
for the law.3"" Here, Chief Justice Moore notes that Alabama Supreme
Court precedent and several "Alabama statutes reinforce the idea that
homosexuality is an evil disfavored under the law."' 5 He then justifies
those statutes and precedent by an explicit appeal to revelation. He
argues that "[n]atural law forms the basis of the common law" and that
300. Id. at 26 (Moore, C.J., concurring) (emphasis added) (internal citations omitted).
301. See id. at 27-31.
302. Id.
303. See Ex Parte H.H., 830 So. 2d at 33-35, 37.
304. Compassion in Dying v. Washington, 79 F.3d 790, 806-08 (9th Cir. 1996); see also
Roe v. Wade, 410 U.S. 113, 160-61 (1973) (examining various religious views on abortion).
305. Ex Parte H.H., 830 So.2d at 31.
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"[n]atural law is the law of nature and of nature's God as understood by
men through reason, but aided by direct revelation found in the Holy
Scriptures."' Based on William Blackstone's Commentaries on the
Laws of England, he further claims that "because our reason is full of
error, the most certain way to ascertain the law of nature is through
direct revelation. , 317 Moreover, he maintains that "[hiomosexuality is
strongly condemned in the common law because it violates both natural
and revealed law., 318 Moore quotes passages from Genesis and Leviticus
in the Christian Old Testament to justify the State of Alabama's law on
homosexuality.
The author of Genesis writes: "God created man in His own
image, in the image of God He created him; male and female
He created them .... For this reason a man shall leave his
father and his mother, and be joined to his wife; and they shall
become one flesh." Genesis 1:27, 2:24 (King James). The law of
the Old Testament enforced this distinction between the
genders by stating that "[i]f a man lies with a male as he lives
with a woman, both of them have committed an abomination."
Leviticus 20:13 (King James).
In his opinion, Chief Justice Moore thus writes a particular religious
justification of the legal prohibitions of homosexuality into Alabama law.
This portion of the opinion is completely unnecessary. It adds nothing to
his references to legal precedent and statutory law. For that matter, his
entire opinion is superfluous. Moore could have joined the majority
opinion that deferred to the trial court's factual finding of insufficient
evidence of child abuse. Noncomprehensive legal norms were sufficient
for providing a justification of the court's decision without writing
religious convictions into the law.
If Moore's opinion were the majority opinion, the litigants on appeal
or in future cases would be required to follow or to challenge the judge's
religious justification of "a strong presumption of unfitness" for
homosexual parents. In addition to the Establishment Clause problems,
this opinion raises serious practical problems. The judge's religious
convictions would become an official religious precedent that must be
either embraced or refuted. In a challenge to this presumption, the
litigation would involve litigating the facts, the law, and the judge's
religious justification of this presumption. First, the litigants must
challenge his claim that the common law is based on natural law and
306. Id. at 32.
307. Id. (quoting I WILLIAM BLACKSTONE, COMMENTARIES 42 (1765)).
308. Id. at 33.
309. Id.
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revelation and that revelation is more reliable than natural law. This
challenge involves litigating the issue of "what is law," which is the
central question of jurisprudence, or the philosophy of law. It also raises
the perennial debate in theology and the philosophy of religion regarding
the relationship between reason and revelation. Furthermore, the
litigants must challenge the judge's interpretation of Genesis and
Leviticus, which may require a substantial discussion of biblical
hermeneutics.
In addition, litigants would have to challenge Chief Justice Moore's
understanding of both civil government and the role of judges, which
appears similar to John Calvin's views. Calvin's understanding of civil
government and the role of judges or magistrates is dramatically
different from the view of civil government and judges in our pluralistic
democratic society and conflicts with the Establishment Clause. For
example, Calvin argues that the "civil government has as its appointed
end, so long as we live among men, to cherish and protect the outward
worship of God, to defend sound doctrine of piety and the position of the
church, to adjust our life to the society of men, to form our social
behavior to civil righteousness, to reconcile us with one another, and to
promote general peace and tranquility.""" According to Calvin, the state
exists because of sin. It restrains wickedness and preserves order, but it
also has a pedagogical task of helping to form good Christians (i.e., the
state itself has religious significance). 3'" In addition, Calvin commits "to
civil government the duty of rightly establishing religion."3 2 Thus, the
state has both a secular purpose of protecting citizens and a religious
purpose of promoting the love of God.
Similarly, according to Calvin, judges or magistrates are ordained by
God.33 He notes, "[f]or it signifies that they have a mandate from God,
have been invested with divine authority, and are wholly God's
310. 2 JOHN CALVIN, INSTITUTES OF THE CHRISTIAN RELIGION 1487 (John T.
McNeill ed., Ford Lewis Battles trans., 1960).
311. See id. at 1488. The state:
also prevents idolatry, sacrilege against God's name, blasphemies against his
truth, and other public offenses against religion from arising and spreading
among the people; it prevents the public peace from being disturbed; it provides
that each man may keep his property safe and sound; that men may carry on
blameless intercourse among themselves; that honest and modesty may be
preserved among men. In short, it provides that a public manifestation of
religion may exist among Christians, and that humanity be maintained among
men.
Id.
312. Id. (emphasis added).
313. Id. at 1489.
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representatives, in a manner, acting as his vicegerents.1 4 Calvin cites
Romans 13:1-4 to support his claim that no powers exist except those
ordained by God and to argue that the magistrate is a minister of God
for our good.35 This means that they must "submit to Christ the power




Magistrates carry out or execute the very judgments of God which allows
them to punish evil doers with execution, if necessary, without violating
the Decalogue (i.e., a magistrate's duties are not incompatible with
piety).'" Moreover, Calvin maintains that magistrates "are ordained
protectors and vindicators of public innocence, modesty, decency, and
tranquillity, and that their sole endeavor should be to provide for the
common safety and peace of all."36
As a result, countering Justice Moore's religious justification would
radically expand the interpretative issues involved in subsequent
litigation. Lawyers would find themselves arguing issues of
jurisprudence, theology, philosophy of religion, biblical hermeneutics,
and the proper role of judges in a pluralistic democratic society in
addition to arguing the facts and the law. Most lawyers and judges are
quite ill-equipped to deal with these issues. Furthermore, a battle of
experts would not likely make these issues more manageable. The
magnitude of these issues convincingly demonstrates the interminable
practical problems that would arise from judges writing their religious
convictions into the law. Leaving religious convictions out of judicial
decisions is not "insincere" but wise. It avoids raising additional
interpretative issues that would unnecessarily add substantial complexity
to resolving legal disputes.
In addition, Kent Greenawalt argues that keeping comprehensive
convictions out of judicial opinions is not insincere because citizens do
not "necessarily expect that public advocacy will reflect all bases of
decision., 31  He contends that judges routinely conceal innovative steps
in the law by suggesting that their holdings are already covered by
314. Id.
315. Id. at 1490.
316. Id.
317. Id. at 1497.
318. Id. at 1496.
319. GREENAWALT, PRIVATE CONSCIENCES, supra note 30, at 163. Alternatively,
one may respond that insincerity is more of a problem of what judges say than of what
they do not say. David Strauss notes that there is "a difference between not fully spelling
out all of one's reasons for reaching a conclusion and stating supposed reasons that are not
true-such as (in most cases), 'the Framers decided this question for us,' or 'the test
requires this result."' David A. Strauss, The Role of a Bill of Rights, 59 U. CHI. L. REV.
539, 548 (1992).
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1211principles found in prior cases. In addressing politics in general, he also
argues that "constructive dialogue on deeper concerns is much more
likely in other settings than the resolution of political issues" and that
"there is little point in developing 'more complete' grounds, if the extra
grounds developed are unlikely to enlighten others, may hinder
constructive dialogue, and will probably cause feelings of exclusion and
alienation."
321
In this respect, the religionist-separationist model appreciates that-
legal opinions are not the best place or a helpful place to engage in
debate about the meaning of authentic human existence. Interjecting
religious convictions into legal opinions does not present those
convictions to be tested in debate. It gives those religious convictions
presumptive authority as an official religious justification of the law. The
"truth" of those religious convictions would be based on the authority of
the court rather than the quality of the arguments made to support them.
Consequently, for all these practical reasons and the apparent
Establishment Clause problems mentioned above, the religionist-
separationist model prohibits judges from explicitly relying on their
comprehensive or religious convictions in their written opinions.
IX. JUSTIFYING LEGAL INDETERMINANCY
Given the religionist-separationist model prohibition on setting forth
comprehensive convictions in judicial decisions, judicial opinions should
always be a partial justification for judges' decisions. In effect, this
requirement mandates that the law should be indeterminate in the sense
that legal norms should not be fully justified. Mandating legal
indeterminacy, however, means that judges will not be constrained by the
law and raises "the specter that judicial decision making is often or
always illegitimate." '  Ronald Dworkin argues that "indeterminacy is a
substantive view to be ranked alongside the other substantive views." '323
He maintains that "claims of indeterminacy are not true by default: they
320. GREENAWALT, PRIVATE CONSCIENCES, supra note 30, at 163.
321. Id. at 164. Cf Joan B. Gottschall, Response to Judge Wendell Griffen, 81 MARQ.
L. REV. 533 (1998). Judge Gottschall argues that including religious sources when
justifying decisions is "inappropriate and imprudent." Id. at 534. She further suggests that
by relying on religious sources, a judge's decision would be perceived as "an idiosyncratic
expression of [her] particular personality or background" rather than as a fair decision
based on "recognized sources of legal authority" that both parties would accept. Id. at
534, 535.
322. See, e.g., Kress, supra note 20, at 203.




need if not argument, which may not be available at any impressive
length, at least a basis in more abstract instincts or convictions.
32 4
This Part argues that the Establishment Clause provides a normative
justification for legal indeterminacy in two senses. First, the
Establishment Clause requires that the law is always indeterminate in the
sense that the law cannot include a full justification of legal norms
because that would require writing religious convictions into the law. I
will refer to this as comprehensive legal indeterminancy. The
Establishment Clause mandates that judicial opinions, in both easy and
hard cases, should be indeterminate in this sense. For example, in an
easy case involving evidence beyond a reasonable doubt that someone
intentionally killed another person, the statutory prohibition of murder is
determinate and would warrant a conviction. The judge can apply that
statutory prohibition without fully justifying the prohibition of murder
either in her deliberation or in her written opinion. Although the
murder statute has not been fully justified, the judge, and the legislature,
are prohibited from referencing the Christian Bible, the Torah, the
Koran or any other religious convictions to provide a full justification of
that statute. The possible comprehensive justifications must remain
implicit. In hard cases, judges must rely on their comprehensive
convictions for fully justifying their deliberations, but those
comprehensive convictions should not be part of their written opinions.
Therefore, the law must only provide a partial justification for legal
prohibitions and must exhibit comprehensive legal indeterminacy.
Although I can only sketch the argument here, the Establishment
Clause justification of comprehensive legal indeterminacy also indirectly
justifies legal indeterminacy in the narrow sense assumed at the
beginning of this inquiry. In this sense, the law is indeterminate such that
there are hard cases where the relevant legal norms do not provide
determinate answers to legal disputes. I will refer to this as
noncomprehensive legal indeterminacy. The Establishment Clause
indirectly justifies noncomprehensive legal indeterminacy because, at
least in the context of judicial decision making, noncomprehensive legal
indeterminacy is a function of comprehensive legal indeterminacy.
Comprehensive legal indeterminacy ensures that noncomprehensive
legal indeterminancy will persist in the legal system because the law
cannot include a comprehensive justification for the law on which judges
could rely to resolve hard cases.
This produces noncomprehensive legal indeterminacy in two ways.
The first way that comprehensive legal indeterminacy produces
noncomprehensive legal indeterminacy involves the absence of a
324. Id.
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comprehensive justification within the law to resolve hard cases. To
understand how this occurs, the sources of noncomprehensive legal
indeterminacy must be identified. Although noncomprehensive legal
indeterminacy arises for many reasons, it can be classified into two broad
types -intentional and unintentional. Sometimes the law intentionally
includes indeterminate standards, such as the reasonable person
standard, that provide for judicial discretion. These standards allow
judges the flexibility to determine what is required under the particular
circumstances of the case because the law cannot anticipate with
sufficient precision ahead of time what would be reasonable under the
circumstances of every case."' Noncomprehensive legal indeterminacy
also arises from unintentional sources such as ambiguous and conflicting
legal norms. Despite legislators' and judges' best efforts, these
unintentional sources of noncomprehensive legal indeterminacy will
persist. However, both intentional and unintentional noncomprehensive
legal indeterminacy could be resolved from within the law if the law
included a comprehensive justification (i.e., a comprehensive condition
• • 326
of normative validity) . With an established comprehensive
325. The practical necessity of intentional legal indeterminacy has been long
recognized by philosophers. For example, Aristotle claims that some matters do not lend
themselves to "any general principle embracing all the particulars" and must be decided
by judicial decree. ARISTOTLE, NICOMACHEAN ETHICS 1282b:5 (William. D. Ross trans.
& rev. by J. 0. Urmson) in 2 THE COMPLETE WORKS OF ARISTOTLE (Jonathan Barnes
ed., rev. Oxford trans. 1984). Aristotle notes that "it is impossible that all things should be
precisely set down in writing; for enactments must be universal, but actions are concerned
with particulars." Id. at 1269a:10-12. Aristotle's most extensive discussion of this idea is in
Nicomachean Ethics in terms of equity, which he calls "a corrective of legal justice." Mark
C. Modak-Truran,' Corrective Justice and the Revival of Judicial Virtue, 12 YALE J.L. &
HUMAN. 249, 270-71 (2000). For further discussion of Aristotle's understanding of equity,
see id. at 270-76.
326. Ronald Dworkin's interpretative theory suggests something like this solution.
Dworkin claims that judges must try "to find, in some coherent set of principles about
people's rights and duties, the best constructive interpretation of the political structure
and legal doctrine of their community." See DWORKIN, LAW'S EMPIRE, supra note 19, at
255. The best construction thus includes "convictions about both fit and justification" and
is the "right answer" in that case. Id. Dworkin further claims that "in a modern,
developed, and complex [legal] system" a tie with respect to fit would be "so rare as to be
exotic." DWORKIN, A MATTER OF PRINCIPLE, supra note 19, at 143 (emphasis added).
He further maintains that "It]here seems to be no room here for the ordinary idea of a tie.
If there is no right answer in a hard case, this must be in virtue of some more problematic
type of indeterminacy or incommensurability in moral theory." Id. at 144. Dworkin's
interpretative method posits that there is some determinative notion of "political
morality" (justification or purpose) that along with precedent (fit) could produce this legal
determinacy. See DWORKIN, LAW'S EMPIRE, supra note 19, at 225-58. For this "political
morality" to provide a full justification in all cases, however, it must be a comprehensive
conviction. Otherwise, there would be cases where this political morality was
indeterminate or where there was a conflict among the principles of political morality that
could not be resolved without a comprehensive conviction. Thus, although I am not able
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justification, the law would provide a comprehensive norm that could be
used to resolve conflicts between norms, eliminate ambiguity, and aid
judges in discerning how intentionally indeterminate standards should be
applied in the context of a particular case. Despite these benefits, the
Establishment Clause prohibits establishing this comprehensive
justification or conviction and mandates comprehensive legal
indeterminacy. As a result, noncomprehensive legal indeterminacy
cannot be resolved from within the law.
In addition, comprehensive legal indeterminacy produces
noncomprehensive legal indeterminacy because judges are permitted to
fully justify their decisions in hard cases based on their own
comprehensive convictions. In other words, comprehensive legal
indeterminacy enhances noncomprehensive legal indeterminacy because
judges can draw on a large number of comprehensive convictions for
deciding hard cases. These comprehensive justifications are competing
with one another to shape the law in often conflicting ways. This occurs
because disagreement about comprehensive convictions translates into
disagreements about which noncomprehensive norms, including different
noncomprehensive legal norms, are fully justified. Accordingly, judges
will resolve similar hard cases differently and articulate different
interpretations of the law. The law will thus embody conflicting legal
norms and be indeterminate.
For example, in Washington v. Glucksberg,3 27 the competing
interpretations of the concept of liberty in the Due Process Clause
implied different comprehensive convictions. Given these different
comprehensive convictions, it should not be surprising that the Supreme
Court Justices and Ninth Circuit judges could not agree on the scope of
liberty in the Due Process Clause, on the Due Process Clause method of
interpretation, or even on how to define the relevant issue in the case.
These different comprehensive convictions justified different conceptions
of liberty and different methods of Due Process Clause analysis which
resulted in conflicting opinions in this case.
Without an established religion, there is no comprehensive justification
within the law that can be evoked to settle this disagreement and
eliminate the noncomprehensive legal indeterminacy. The law does not
include a comprehensive condition for legal validity.32 Even if a judge's
to specify the full argument here, this would mean that Dworkin's interpretative theory
would require establishing a comprehensive justification for the law in violation of the
Establishment Clause.
327. 521 U.S. 702 (1997).
328. Critical legal scholars have argued similarly that the law is incoherent because it
does not include a metaprinciple to resolve legal indeterminacy. Ken Kress, Legal
Indeterminacy, 77 CAL. L. REV. 283, 331-34 (1989). However, Ken Kress points out that
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opinion makes the law more determinate, it cannot provide a
comprehensive condition for legal validity within the law. As future hard
cases arise, the law will still not include a full justification that would
eliminate the need for judges to rely on their own comprehensive
convictions. Without establishing a comprehensive condition of legal
validity, the law will continue to include both intentional hard cases,
involving indeterminate legal standards, and unintentional hard cases, in
which ambiguous or conflicting legal norms are inadequate to resolve
legal disputes. Consequently, the Establishment Clause prohibition
against establishing an official comprehensive justification for the law
provides a normative justification for comprehensive legal indeterminacy
and the noncomprehensive legal indeterminacy resulting from it.
The religionist-separationist model takes into account this
Establishment Clause normative justification of legal indeterminacy.
Because the law cannot include a comprehensive justification, the
religionist-separationist model maintains that judges must confine the
full justification of hard cases to their deliberations. Their written
opinions should only partially justify their decisions based on
noncomprehensive norms. Comprehensive justifications can be implied
but not expressed. On this account, the full justification of the law in
hard cases is shifted from the law to individual judges. As a result, a
plurality of comprehensive convictions implicitly informs the law and
provides for its full justification without encountering Establishment
Clause problems.
X. JUSTIFYING RELIGIOUS CONVICTIONS
Given that a plurality of comprehensive convictions informs the full
justification of judges' decisions in hard cases, several questions arise that
need to be addressed. Can judges rely on any comprehensive
conviction? If not, how can religious beliefs be evaluated? Moreover,
how can the law have a rational justification if judges rely on
comprehensive convictions?
These questions suggest some common assumptions about
comprehensive convictions that are rejected by the religionist-
separationist model of judicial decision making. The central assumption
rejected by this model is that religious convictions are nonrational. This
assumption presumes that religious convictions must merely be believed
and are equally true in the sense that they cannot be rationally validated.
If this assumption were true, judges could not determine which religious
they further argue that "we cannot provide, in advance, fully explicit metaprinciples to
resolve all conflicts accurately describes a limitation of all rules of behavior, not just legal
theory." Id. at 334.
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convictions were credible to common human experience and reason.
They could rely on any religious conviction to justify their decisions in
hard cases. Legal indeterminacy would thus result in illegitimacy
because the law would lack a rational foundation.
By contrast, the religionist-separationist model maintains that religious
convictions can be rationally validated through critical reflection.
Although providing a complete defense of this assumption is beyond the
scope of this article, I support this assumption in several ways. First, Part
VII.B. showed that assuming that religion is nonrational resulted in
incoherent separationist and religionist-separationist accounts of judicial
decision making. The accounts of judicial decision making proposed by
Rawls, Habermas, Greenawalt, and Perry were incoherent because they
presupposed comprehensive convictions but denied the possibility of
rational comprehensive reflection. Conversely, Parts IV, V, VI, VIII,
and IX demonstrated that assuming that religion is rational results in a
coherent religionist-separationist account of judicial decision making.
This Part will further support this assumption by briefly noting the
substantial philosophical and theological support for the role of reason in
articulating and evaluating religious convictions. In addition, it will set
forth Schubert Ogden's account of the role of reason in theological and
philosophical reflection on religious convictions and suggest some minor
refinements of Ogden's position.
A. Religion Convictions and Reason
Despite the common assumption that religion is nonrational, many
theologians and philosophers have argued that religious convictions
depend, at least in part, on rational reflection for their articulation and
evaluation. This does not mean that they have agreed upon the
definition of reason, its role in critical reflection, or its priority with
respect to revelation. Differences about these issues should not take
away from the important role reason has played in formulating and
critiquing religious convictions. Most pointedly, some philosophers and
theologians have engaged in "natural theology," which attempts "to
construct a doctrine of God without appeal to faith or special revelation
but on the basis of reason and experience alone.,1 29 Famous attempts at
natural theology include St. Anselm's ontological arguments for the
existence of God3 " and St. Thomas Aquinas's five ways to prove God's
existence.' More recently, Charles Hartshorne has carried on this
329. VAN A. HARVEY, A HANDBOOK OF THEOLOGICAL TERMS 158 (1964).
330. ST. ANSELM, PROSLOGION (M.J. Charlesworth trans., Univ. of Notre Dame Press
1979).
331. ST. THOMAS AQUINAS, SUMMA THEOLOGICA 1-I, Q. 2, A.3 in 1 BASIC
WRITINGS OF SAINT THOMAS AQUINAS 21-24 (Anton C. Pegis ed., 1945) (arguing that
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tradition by arguing that a relativistic conception of God makes it
possible to defend the Ontological Argument for the existence of God. 32
Richard Swinburne also has argued that the concept of God is internally
coherent333 and that the existence of God is a more probable and better
134
explanation of the universe than alternative theories. These are but a
few examples of a long tradition of rational arguments for the existence
of God.
Reason also has been central to systematic theology and philosophical
theology even though there has not been agreement on how the role of
reason should be defined. At one extreme, Immanuel Kant argues that
philosophical theology depends on pure reason to understand the
possibility and the attributes of the concept of God.3 5  At the other
extreme, Paul Tillich claims that reason alone cannot give answers to the
ultimate questions about life because in the existential situation, reason
contradicts itself.336 Philosophy helps analyze the existential situation in
which we live, but "[r]evelation is the answer to the questions implied in
the existential conflicts of reason. '33 7  Somewhere in between, David
Tracy maintains that "contemporary Christian theology is best
understood as philosophical reflection upon the meanings present in
particular features of the world require the existence of God: from change to a "First
Mover," from causation to a "First Cause," from contingent beings to a Necessary Being,
from degrees of goodness to Perfect Goodness, and from order to a Supreme Designer).
332. CHARLES HARTSHORNE, THE LOGIC OF PERFECTION (1962): see also CHARLES
HARTSHORNE, ANSELM'S DISCOVERY: A RE-EXAMINATION OF THE ONTOLOGICAL
PROOF OF GOD'S EXISTENCE (1991); CHARLES HARTSHORNE, A NATURAL THEOLOGY
FOR OUR TIME (1967); CHARLES HARTSHORNE, THE DIVINE RELATIVITY: A SOCIAL
CONCEPTION OF GOD (1948).
333. RICHARD SWINBURNE, THE COHERENCE OF THEISM (rev. ed., 1993).
334. RICHARD SWINBURNE, THE EXISTENCE OF GOD (rev. ed., 1991).
335. See IMMANUEL KANT, LECTURES ON PHILOSOPHICAL THEOLOGY (Allen W.
Wood & Gertrude M. Clark trans., 1978). In Philosophical Theology, Kant focuses on the
role of the regulative idea of God in understanding the necessary conditions of the
possibility of being. He claims that "[h]uman reason has a need of an idea of highest
perfection, to serve as a standard according to which it can make determinations." Id. at
21. In this respect, Kant argues that God is the idea whose being is presupposed by all
other beings. Id. Thus, philosophy (pure reason) aids religion by assisting theology in
determining the nature of the regulative idea of God as the highest being that is implied by
and consistent with the moral law. Id.
336. PAUL TILLICH, I SYSTEMATIC THEOLOGY 18-28 (1951).
337. Id. at 147. Tillich further argues that reason raises the existential questions but
one must take a leap of faith and enter into the theological circle to receive the revealed
answers to these questions. There is no conflict or synthesis between philosophy and
theology. "Philosophy deals with the structure of being in itself; theology deals with the
meaning of being for us." Id. at 22. Thus, the Unconditioned is known only through
religion (revelation); philosophy is thus overcome or surpassed by religion.
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common human experience and the meanings present in the Christian
tradition."33
Although these approaches incorporate reason and philosophy into
theology in different ways, they all support the necessary role of reason
for theological reflection about religious convictions. Religious
convictions are not exempt from critical reflection; they are the product
of critical reflection. This is not to say that other theologians have not
deemphasized or minimized the role of reason in theological reflection."3
Rather, it is to emphasize that there are numerous theologians and
philosophers who have embraced reason as a central part of the
theological task of articulating and evaluating religious convictions.
These positions thus further support the assumption that religious
convictions are rational and subject to critical reflection.
B. Ogden's Account of Rational Religious Reflection
Likewise, Schubert Ogden maintains that reason plays an essential role
in the articulation and evaluation of religious convictions. He rejects two
common assumptions about theology that preclude critical reflection on
religious convictions: "(1) that theology as such has to appeal to special
criteria of truth for some if not all of its assertions; and (2) that the
theologian as such has to be a believer already committed to the truth of
the assertions that theological reflection seeks to establish., 340 To the
338. DAVID TRACY, BLESSED RAGE FOR ORDER: THE NEW PLURALISM IN
THEOLOGY 34 (1975).
339. For John Calvin, a religious argument based on revelation is more reliable
because human reason is corrupted by sin (self-deception). I JOHN CALVIN, INSTITUTES
OF THE CHRISTIAN RELIGION 35-37 (John T. McNeill ed., Ford Lewis Battles trans.,
1960). Calvin begins the Institutes of the Christian Religion with a discussion of "The
Knowledge of God the Creator." Id. at 35. He claims that "[n]early all the wisdom we
possess ... consists of two parts: the knowledge of God and of ourselves." Id. He argues
that the latter is not clearly understood without the former. We must first look upon
God's face, and then descend from contemplating him to scrutinize ourselves. Id. at 37.
Without knowledge of God, we fail to feel "our own ignorance, vanity, poverty, infirmity,
and-what is more-depravity and corruption." Id. at 36 (i.e. existential apprehension is
the meaning of knowledge in a religious context). We fail to see that we owe everything to
God (the source of everything that is good) and that our own powers of self-understanding
are deficient (natural theology is not possible because of sin). Without piety ("reverence
joined with love of God which the knowledge of his benefits induces"), true knowledge of
God is not possible. Id. at 41. Thus, because human powers alone cannot know God
because of sin, revelation is required. In order to have proper knowledge of God and self,
we must read Scripture. Through revelation, God lays down the law of what we should
do. Moreover, Calvin emphasizes that "[b]ecause these [spiritual] mysteries are deeply
hidden from human insight, they are disclosed solely by the revelation of the Spirit." Id. at
280.
340. OGDEN, ON THEOLOGY, supra note 58, at 103. The famous Anglican theologian,
Richard Hooker, makes a similar claim when he argues that "how the books of holy
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contrary, he argues that religious claims are subject to critical validation.
Religious convictions are different in the sense that they are
comprehensive, but they are not beyond critical or rational validation. In
fact, he maintains that "it is the very nature of a religion to make or
imply the claim to formal religious truth. 3 41 In other words, religious
convictions, like any cognitive claim, suggest that they can be validated in
a non-question begging way.
1. Religion and Basic Faith
Before explaining how religious convictions can be critically validated,
more must be said about Ogden's conception of religion. Recall that
Ogden defines religion as "the primary form of culture in terms of which
we human beings explicitly ask and answer the existential question of the
meaning of ultimate reality for US.,, 34 2 The existential question is the
comprehensive question, which is presupposed by all other questions. It
asks "how we are to understand ourselves and others in relation to the
whole. 3 43 In answering the existential question, religion attempts to
make sense of "our basic faith in the meaning of life, given the facts of
life as we actually experience it.
44
As noted in Part II, a basic faith in the meaning of life is an implicit
"answer" to the existential question which is presupposed by all human
activity. Ogden further distinguishes between "the existential
understanding or faith [basic faith] that is constitutive of human
existence as such and the reflective understanding or faith whereby what
is presented existentially can be re-presented in an express, thematic, and
conceptually precise way."' ' This distinction helps clarify the relation
between faith and reason and what this distinction means for
understanding the nature of religious convictions. All humans "live by
faith" in the existential sense because this existential or basic faith is
presupposed by all human activity. "The whole of human life, including
our reflective life, is based on our existential faith.""" This basic faith is
the preunderstanding that informs all reflective thought and activity. In
scripture contain in them all necessary things, when of things necessary the very chiefest is
to know what books we are bound to esteem holy, which point is confessed impossible for
the scripture itself to teach." RICHARD HOOKER, OF THE LAWS OF ECCLESIASTICAL
POLITY 112 (Arthur Stephen McGrade ed., Cambridge Univ. Press 1989) (1593).
341. OGDEN, IS THERE ONLY ONE, supra note 49, at 13.
342. Id. at 5.
343. Id. at 6.
344. Id.
345. Id. at 71.
346. Id. at 72.
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this sense, "faith seeks understanding" because this basic faith has
priority to the expression and understanding of that faith.
By contrast, religion attempts to express the existential or basic faith
thematically. It makes a fully reflective faith or understanding possible
by providing an object for reflection. Religion does this by providing the
concepts and symbols "whose express function is to mediate authentic
self-understanding" by re-presenting this basic faith.4 This mediation of
self-understanding has both a subjective and an objective side. Self-
understanding or an understanding of existence is the subjective side or
reference of religion. The objective side or reference of religion consists
of "the particular [religious] concepts and symbols through which the
question of our existence can alone be asked and answered in an explicit
way. 348  Ogden further argues that every explicit answer to the
existential question is a specific answer in terms of the religious concepts
and symbols of a particular culture. In this sense, religious convictions
are "thoroughly historical" because they derive their particular religious
concepts and symbols from those available in the culture.
At the same time, each particular religion also expresses or implies
that it is "the authorized representation of the answer to this question"
because "every religion at least implicitly claims to be the true
religion.""35 ' By the "true religion," Ogden means the formally true
religion which provides the norm by which all other substantive religions
are measured. 5' In other words, this express or implied claim to validity
means that religions hold themselves out to be the true understanding of
the basic faith that informs all human activity.311 Ogden maintains that
this implies that these religious claims are credible to all humans, such
that they can be validated by reason and common human experience. As
specified more fully below, this further implies that these religious claims
can become fully reflective faith with the aid of philosophy and theology.
Consequently, religious faith is prior to reason in the sense that it is not
yet fully reflective, but it is not prior to reason in the sense that it is
347. OGDEN, Is THERE ONLY ONE, supra note 49, at 8.
348. Id. at 10. Alfred North Whitehead suggests a similar dichotomy between
subjective and objective religion. He defines "religion, on its doctrinal side," as "a system
of general truths which have the effect of transforming character when they are sincerely
held and vividly apprehended." ALFRED NORTH WHITEHEAD, RELIGION IN THE
MAKING 15 (1926). He then defines religion as "what the individual does with his own
solitariness." Id. at 16. He goes on to emphasize that "religion is primarily individual and
the dogmas of religion are clarifying modes of external expression ... Expression, and in
particular expression by dogma, is the return from solitariness to society." Id. at 132.
349. OGDEN, IS THERE ONLY ONE, supra note 49, at 10-11.
350. Id. at 11.
351. Id. at 12-13.
352. See id. at 12.
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exempt from rational reflection."' Rather, religious faith thematically
articulates the basic faith so that philosophy and theology can aid in
articulating and validating this basic faith more precisely.
2. Religion, Philosophy, and Theology
Philosophy and theology are also forms of culture, but they are
secondary forms of culture that reflect on the validity of the claims made
by religion.354 According to Ogden, "[pjhilosophy in general is the fully
reflective understanding of the basic existential faith that is constitutive of
human existence. 355 Through rational reflection, it attempts to raise this
basic faith to "the level of full self-consciousness, in an express, thematic,
and conceptually precise way. 3 56 In order to do this, philosophy analyzes
common human experience to discern how this basic faith is "already
expressed or implied in the whole tradition of human culture.""' This
basic faith is expressed or implied especially in religion but also in law,
morality, social habits, literature, art, science, and "'throughout the
meanings of words and linguistic expressions."''  With respect to
religion, philosophy critically reflects on the credibility of the claims of
religion. It holds religious convictions to the same standards of
credibility-reason and common human experience-as other claims.
Through this process of reflection, philosophy attempts to discern
whether the religious convictions have been able to achieve a fully
reflective understanding of our basic faith.
Similarly, theology consists in "critical reflection on the validity claims
of some specific religion. '" For example, Christian theology critically
reflects on two distinct validity claims: that the Christian witness is 1)
353. Id. at 14.
354. Although religion can be distinguished from philosophy and theology, "there is
no complete separation between primary and secondary forms of culture" because "[t]he
results of theological and philosophical reflection not uncommonly find their way back to
the level of primary culture and there serve a properly religious as distinct from a properly
theological or philosophical function." OGDEN, IS THERE ONLY ONE, supra note 49, at 8.
355. OGDEN, ON THEOLOGY, supra note 58, at 73.
356. Id.
357. Id.
358. Id. at 73, 74 (quoting ALFRED NORTH WHITEHEAD, MODES OF THOUGHT 96-97
(1938)).
359. OGDEN, Is THERE ONLY ONE, supra note 49, at 33-34. In discussing the nature
of theology in general and Christian theology as a particular example of theological
reflection, Schubert Ogden argues that "[ajlthough theology is a single movement of
reflection, it has three distinct moments which allow for its differentiation into the
interrelated disciplines of historical, systematic, and practical theology." OGDEN, ON
THEOLOGY, supra note 56, at 7. For my purposes here, I will focus on theology as a single
moment rather than specifying its three distinct aspects.
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"adequate to its content"; and 2) "fitting to its situation."' Ogden
further clarifies that the claim to be "adequate to its content" is really
two claims. 6  The first claim is that the Christian witness is
• 362
appropriate. He argues that "whether or not a given witness or
theology is appropriate to Jesus Christ must be determined, finally, by
whether or not it is in substantial agreement with this earliest accessible
stratum of Christian witness., 363  Appropriateness then attempts to
discern the core religious concepts and symbols of the earliest Christian
witness as a criterion for evaluating Christian theological claims.
The second claim is that the Christian witness is "credible to human
existence as any woman or man experiences it."3' 4 Ogden recognizes,
however, "that there is nothing like a consensus about what is to count as
such truth [about human existence]. ' 36 Despite this disagreement, he
claims that no claims to truth, including religious claims, are exempt from
this criterion. Ogden asserts that, "[o]n the contrary, any understanding
of theology that insists on its including such validation is bound to seem
more credible than any understanding that precludes it. ' '366 Like in
philosophy, the relevant criteria of credibility are "common human
existence and reason., 36 7 It is at this point that Ogden clarifies that
religious convictions are subject to the same criteria of credibility as any
other claim about human existence. Credible religious convictions are
not just credible to believers but can be shown to be credible for humans
qua humans. In other words, credible religious convictions can be
validated by reason and common human existence. As a result,
"philosophy and Christian theology are not only closely analogous but
because of the peculiar relation between their respective objects,
between our basic existential faith and specifically Christian faith, also
overlap or in a certain way coincide.,
368
What distinguishes theology and philosophy (in its relation to religion)
is their respective objects. Theology is critical reflection on the validity
claims of a specific religion while philosophy may critically reflect on the
360. OGDEN, Is THERE ONLY ONE, supra note 49, at 34-35. The first validity claim is
the specific task of systematic theology while the second validity claim is the specific task
of practical theology. See id. The following discussion will focus on the role of systematic
theology in critically validating religious convictions.
361. SCHUBERT M. OGDEN, DOING THEOLOGY TODAY 7 (1996) [hereinafter
OGDEN, DOING THEOLOGY TODAY].
362. Id.
363. OGDEN, Is THERE ONLY ONE, supra note 49, at 39.
364. OGDEN, DOING THEOLOGY TODAY, supra note 361, at 7.
365. Id. at 19.
366. Id.
367. OGDEN, IS THERE ONLY ONE, supra note 49, at 36.
368. OGDEN, ON THEOLOGY, supra note 58, at 88.
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claims of many different religions or in general on the basic faith implied
by all human activity. Furthermore, philosophy is only concerned about
whether religious convictions are credible to common human experience
and reason, whereas theology must be concerned about whether religious
convictions are both appropriate to the relevant religious witness and
credible to common human experience and reason. The criterion of
appropriateness in theology clarifies that, unlike philosophy, theology
originates in a special revelation. This special revelation is additional
evidence for which theology must account, but which philosophy does
not. However, this special revelation claims to provide the true
understanding of the basic existential faith. It claims to be formally true
"not only for all other true religion, but also for any other existential
truth whatever, including that of philosophy.,1 69  Consequently,
"[blecause theology and philosophy by their very natures finally lay
claim to the same basic ground, appeal to the same historical evidence-
in short, serve an identical ultimate truth-their material conclusions
must be in the last analysis mutually confirming if either is to sustain its
essential claim.,
370
Moreover, common human experience and reason are clearly not self-
defining terms. For example, common human experience could include a
role for religious experience (experience of the Divine). Given that
religious experience is common to at least some humans, it is part of
"common human experience." By the use of the term common, I do not
think Ogden intends to claim that only experiences that all recognize as
common count but that all experiences that could in principle be
common count. Otherwise, the more astute perceptions about
experience would be left out because not all individuals would recognize
their validity. In other words, the insights into the nature of authentic
human existence provided by religious experience can be included in the
resources that individuals use to evaluate the traditional answers to the
existential question. 7'
369. OGDEN, IS THERE ONLY ONE, supra note 49, at 71.
370. OGDEN, ON THEOLOGY, supra note 58, at 88.
371. For example, William Alston provides an extended discussion of the epistemic
significance of perceiving God. See generally WILLIAM P. ALSTON, PERCEIVING GOD:
THE EPISTEMOLOGY OF RELIGIOUS EXPERIENCE (1991). His central thesis is "that
experiential awareness of God, or as I shall be saying, the perception of God, makes an
important contribution to the grounds of religious belief." Id. at 1. William James also
argues that religion "shall mean for us the feelings, acts, and experiences of individual men
in their solitude, so far as they apprehend themselves to stand in relation to whatever they
may consider the divine." WILLIAM JAMES, THE VARIETIES OF RELIGIOUS EXPERIENCE:
A STUDY IN HUMAN NATURE 31 (Martin E. Marty ed., Penguin Books 1982). James
further claims "that feeling is the deeper source of religion, and that philosophic and
theological formulas are secondary products, like translations of a text into another
tongue." Id. at 431.
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However, arguing for a definitive account of reason and common
human experience is not required to establish that religious convictions
are subject to critical reflection just like other claims about human
existence. Ogden's account of philosophy and theology aims to articulate
an understanding of religious convictions that shows they are subject to
critical reflection rather than attempting to settle the interminable debate
about the nature of reason and common human experience. Whatever
reason and common human experience mean, they imply at the very
least that humans have some ability to transcend the religious convictions
and self-understanding given to them by religious traditions in order to
evaluate those convictions. In this respect, reflective self-understanding
or faith (religion in its subjective reference) results from the freedom that
individuals have through critical reflection to transcend both themselves
and the world (including religion in its objective reference). Through
critical reflection, individuals understand themselves and the world as
objects of understanding and evaluate that understanding based on
reason and common human experience. The critical reflection on
religion by philosophy and theology thus allows individuals to transcend
their religious convictions and to reflect on their validity.
3. Pluralistic Inclusivism
Given that religious convictions can be critically validated, Ogden
could be read to suggest that there is only one true religion that can be
arrived at by critical reflection. If this were the case, the state could
establish this religion so that the law would include a comprehensive
justification to aid judges in deciding hard cases. This reading, however,
would be seriously misguided. To the contrary, Ogden maintains that the
debate about religious pluralism has been mistaken because it has
proceeded from the assumption that there is either one true religion
(monism) or that there are many equally true religions (pluralism). He
argues that religious monism comes in two varieties: exclusivism and
inclusivism. For example, in its Christian form, exclusivists claim that
there is "no salvation outside of the Church" or "no salvation outside of
Christianity." '372 By contrast, Christian inclusivists argue that
[T]he possibility of salvation uniquely constituted by the event
of Jesus Christ is somehow made available to each and every
human being without exception [usually through the
fragmentary explication of the true religion (Christianity) by
other religions] and, therefore, is exclusive of no one unless she
372. OGDEN, Is THERE ONLY ONE, supra note 49, at 28-29.
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or he excludes her- or himself from its effect by a free and
responsible decision to reject it.73
The alternative usually proposed to these two forms of monism is
pluralism. Pluralists maintain "not only that there can be many true
religions but there actually are.3 74 On this account, all religions are
equally true, and one religion cannot be shown to be true and another
false.
Conversely, Ogden contends that religious convictions are capable of
critical validation. Some religious convictions are capable of critical
validation by theology and philosophy and others are not. This seems to
suggest religious monism, but Ogden argues for another option, which he
calls pluralistic inclusivism.3 7 He maintains that the logical contradictory
to religious monism "is not that there actually are many true religions,
but only that there can be., 376 In other words, more than one religion
may be capable of critical validation. More than one religion may be the
true reflective understanding of our basic existential faith.
Also, as a product of critical reflection, religious convictions can be
modified and corrected based on further reflection and based on what is
learned from dialogue with other religions. The pursuit of religious truth
is never complete. Through on going reflection and encounters with
other religions, the possibility for improvement is ever present.
Consequently, even if a religion could be shown to be more true than
others, Ogden would oppose the establishment of an official religion.
Establishing an official religion would cut off the opportunity for further
improvement and refinement of religious truth. It would stifle the
pursuit of religious truth and jeopardize further progress from
subsequent rational reflection and dialogue among those holding a
plurality of religious convictions.
4. Consequences for the Religionist-Separationist Model
Assuming Ogden's arguments for justifying religious convictions and
pluralistic inclusivism succeed, there are two significant implications for
the religionist-separationist model of judicial decision making. First, all
comprehensive or religious convictions cannot be presumed to be equally
true. Judges must validate their religious convictions before relying on
them in hard cases. At the very least, they must determine that these
religious convictions are fully reflective-credible to common human
existence and reason. Once this has been done, judges are warranted in
373. Id. at 31.
374. Id. at 27.
375. See id. at x-xi.
376. Id. at 83.
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relying on those religious convictions for fully justifying their
deliberations in hard cases.
However, as noted in Part IV, this does not mean that judges must
become theologians. They are not expected to produce a systematic
theological defense of their religious convictions. Rather, judges may
meet this burden in several other ways. Judges may rely on theological
justifications of a theologian or on the official doctrine of a religious
tradition as long as they examine this theological justification and
conclude that it is fully reflective. Also, judges have likely been
reflecting on their religious convictions, to some extent, their entire lives.
Once they are satisfied that their religious convictions are fully reflective,
this validation will suffice unless something calls this conclusion into
question. In either case, judges will not usually be validating their
religious convictions during their deliberations about hard cases. This
validation will likely occur prior to their deliberations. If so, their focus
in hard cases will not be on validating their religious convictions, but on
justifying noncomprehensive norms and the choice among them. If not,
the religionist-separationist model of judicial decision making requires
that judges critically validate their religious convictions during their
deliberations and before relying on these religious convictions to justify
their decisions. Therefore, if judges follow this process of critically
validating their religious convictions, their full justification of their
decisions in hard cases will provide a rational justification of the law even
though the law is indeterminate.
Second, pluralistic inclusivism provides a further justification for the
religionist-separationist model prohibition against writing religious
convictions into judicial opinions. Judges should not write their religious
convictions into the law, not because religious convictions are
nonrational and incapable of critical validation, but because religious
convictions are always open to further refinement and validation. If
judges adopted an official religious justification for the law in their
written opinions, they would establish that religious justification as
presumptively true. In addition to the Establishment Clause and
practical problems discussed above, this would stifle the pursuit of
religious truth in several ways. The first problem is that judges are not
theologians or philosophers. Most judges are not trained to provide a
systematic account of their religious convictions even if the religious
convictions they hold are true. Any religious convictions written in
judicial opinions would likely be inaccurately or inartfully expressed. In
addition, any state recognition of a religious truth would be problematic.
The act of establishing an official religious justification of the law would
tend to isolate that justification from critique and to make the practical
decision based on that religious justification difficult to modify. That
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religious justification would function like precedent, and it would have
presumptive validity. Those challenging it would not only have the
burden of showing that an alternative religious justification was true and
that the state religious justification was false, but they would also have to
persuade those in power to change this religious justification.
For example, if Chief Justice Moore's account above was taken to be
the official religious justification of "a strong presumption of unfitness"
for homosexual parents, challengers would then have to persuade
subsequent judges both that the presumption was wrong and that the
religious justification was wrong. Further, the challenger would have to
show not only that the Christian argument against homosexuality was
flawed but also that Christianity itself was flawed. If Buddhism could be
shown to be true and Christianity false, the challenger would have to
persuade Christian judges, like Justice Chief Moore, that their Christian
religious convictions were not true. Even if the Buddhist was right, the
practical difficulty of convincing the Christian judge to recognize his
error would be immense.
To the contrary, pluralist inclusivism supports the religionist-
separationist model of judicial decision making because it requires that
the law should only be implicitly informed by religious convictions that
judges have critically validated. This requirement prevents the state
from ruling out religious convictions ahead of time. By not allowing an
establishment of religion, the debate about which religious convictions
provide the fully reflective account of our basic faith can continue. This
requirement also shifts to judges the responsibility for critically validating
their religious convictions before relying on them in hard cases. At the
same time, this requirement and the religionist-separationist model of
judicial decision making allow for the full justification of the law even
though the state does not establish an official religion. Full justification
of the law by individual judges would likely result in a plurality of
comprehensive convictions implicitly informing the law.377 Consequently,
by following the requirements of pluralistic inclusivism and the
religionist-separationist model, judges can reenchant the law by giving
the law a rational religious justification without violating the
Establishment Clause.
377. Similarly, Jean Bethke Elshtain has argued that "a variety of norms and rules are
constitutive of plural communities and that a democratic polity has an enormous stake in
keeping such plurality alive. For this is the only way to keep democratic politics alive."
Jean Bethke Elshtain, The Question Concerning Authority, in RELIGION AND
CONTEMPORARY LIBERALISM 253, 254 (Paul J. Weithman ed., 1997).
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XI. CONSEQUENCES OF REENCHANTING THE LAW
Rather than creating an illegitimate influence on the law, judicial
reliance on comprehensive or religious convictions in accordance with
the religionist-separationist model helps solve several conundrums about
the law. One of the central consequences of reenchanting the law is to
disclose that much of the disagreement between judges in hard cases
does not occur at the level of the law. It is not that some judges
"correctly" interpret the legal norms and others are mistaken. In hard
cases, the law itself does not provide a dispositive answer to the dispute.
Even if judges are completely clear about the parameters of the law they
are interpreting and deal effectively with the legal precedent, statutes, or
other legal norms in dispute, they may disagree about what extra-legal
norms are controlling. Adjudicating these competing extra-legal norms
cannot be done without justifying those norms and the choice among
them. If judges hold different religious convictions, they may fully justify
contrary extra-legal norms based on those religious convictions. This is
not to say that one or both of the judges could not be mistaken about the
validity of his or her religious convictions. That very well may be the
case. Furthermore, some judges may make decisions without explicitly
relying on religious convictions so that their choices only imply
comprehensive convictions. The disagreement between these judges,
however, is not about the "law" but about which comprehensive
conviction is true. This disagreement is at a higher level of reflection and
cannot be resolved by focusing on legal norms and noncomprehensive
extra-legal norms. To resolve this disagreement, the debate should turn
to the comprehensive convictions that justify these different decisions.
Reflection on this level of justification may disclose mistakes in the
process of fully justifying a judge's decision or that a judge was relying on
an unwarranted comprehensive conviction.
Given that the law is constantly being shaped in hard cases by judges'
comprehensive or religious convictions, the law is also not autonomous
or "coherent," the way some, like Ronald Dworkin, wish it to be.3 78 This
incoherence is not necessarily because judges fail to interpret the law
correctly but because they do not all share the same comprehensive
convictions. The incoherence in the law stems, in part, from the plurality
of comprehensive convictions in our society that are reflected in the law.
Without some unlikely conversion of all judges to the same
comprehensive conviction, the law is likely to continue to be shaped by
competing and conflicting comprehensive convictions. David Kairys
notes that the indeterminacy of law
378. See supra note 327 (discussing Dworkin's interpretative theory of law).
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stems from the reality that the law usually embraces and
legitimizes many or all of the conflicting values and interests
involved in controversial issues and a wide and conflicting array
of 'logical' or 'reasoned' arguments and strategies of
argumentation, without providing any legally required
hierarchy of values or arguments or any required method for
determining which is most important in a particular context.
37
9
By contrast, the religionist-separationist model maintains that the
indeterminacy of the law is principled, not happenstance. Even if the law
could specify the "required hierarchy of values" ahead of time, the
Establishment Clause would prohibit it from doing so. The law must
remain indeterminate because making it determinate would require
establishing a religious conviction in violation of the Establishment
Clause."' In other words, if the law included a full justification for hard
cases like abortion, euthanasia, and homosexual marriage, it would
require establishing a religious conviction in the law. As a result, legal
indeterminacy is a constant feature of a legal system, like ours, which
prohibits the establishment of religion.
Rather than the law itself providing a comprehensive and coherent
system for resolving disputes, the demands of coherent decision making
are shifted to the individual judge. In easy cases, judges should apply the
existing law to settle the dispute. In hard cases, judges' deliberation
should aspire to provide a full and coherent justification of their
decisions based on their religious convictions even though the
explanation given in their written opinion is only a partial justification of
that decision. They may rely on noncomprehensive extra-legal norms,
but these norms must, at some point, have been justified by their
religious convictions. The rancorous debate over the appointment of
U.S. Supreme Court justices and other judges suggests that citizens and
legislators already intuitively understand that judges' decisions in hard
cases depend upon their most fundamental beliefs, which are their
explicit comprehensive or religious beliefs." Our citizens and legislators
have not fallen for the illusion of an autonomous legal system.
The contentious debate surrounding this appointment process stems in
large part, however, from the misperception that relying on religious
convictions in judicial decision making undermines the rationality of
judicial decision making. To the contrary, judicial reliance on explicit
comprehensive or religious convictions in hard cases increases rather
than decreases rational judicial decision making and has a disciplining
379. KAIRYS, supra note 78, at 4.
380. For a more developed argument supporting this conclusion, see MODAK-
TRURAN, REENCHANTING THE LAW, supra note 17, at 257-75.
381. See supra note 18.
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effect on judges. Rather than blindly assuming that their decisions are
justified,"' judges fully justify the noncomprehensive extra-legal norms
they rely on to decide hard cases. This entails justifying all the
noncomprehensive extra-legal norms they rely on and the choice among
them. They don't merely assume that these extra-legal norms are
justified and that the choice among them is self-evident. Further, results-
oriented judging is prohibited. Outcomes cannot be embraced merely
because they are politically desirable and/or expedient. Judges cannot
conveniently rationalize their decisions in hard cases by arbitrarily
choosing extra-legal norms to support desired outcomes. They cannot
rely on noncomprehensive extra-legal norms that are inconsistent with
their religious convictions. In their deliberations about hard cases,
judges must determine how the desired outcome connects to
noncomprehensive extra-legal norms. In turn, those noncomprehensive
extra-legal norms and the choice among them must be fully justified by a
religious conviction that the judge holds to be true. This process of full
justification in judicial deliberation should deter, rather than permit,
judges from embracing outcomes that cannot be fully justified by their
religious convictions. Consequently, religious convictions will then have
a disciplining effect on judicial decision making and require judges to
become more rational.
In addition, judges cannot indiscriminately rely on whatever
comprehensive or religious conviction they desire. Comprehensive
convictions are not exempted from rational critical reflection. Self-
critical judicial decision making also requires judges to be self-critical
about their religious or comprehensive convictions. Removing the
constraints prohibiting reliance on religious convictions does not mean
that judicial decision making is based only on "faith" or is nonrational.
Conversely, judicial decision making becomes more self-reflective.
Rather than relying on a basic faith in the meaningfulness of human
existence or an implicit comprehensive conviction, judges are self-aware
about the role of their religious convictions in fully justifying their
decisions in hard cases and about the requirement of critically justifying
382. Cf Failinger, supra note 91, at 703 (arguing that "[i]f we force religion
underground, judges may easily mistake latent religious or moral beliefs for public policy,
creating real monsters of vagueness or unpredictability").
383. There may be circumstances where a more intuitive process of judicial decision
making constitutes a second-best alternative. See Mark C. Modak-Truran, A Pragmatic
Justification of the Judicial Hunch, 35 U. RICH. L. REV. 55 (2001) (arguing that in some
cases, a subjective sense of certainty and pragmatically testing the consequences of a
hunched decision may justify judges relying on their hunches about what the outcome of a
case ought to be). Here, however, I am concerned with an ideal normative account of how
judges should proceed in justifying their decisions in hard cases.
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their religious convictions before relying on them for this full
justification.
Finally, despite the plurality of comprehensive convictions informing
judicial deliberation in hard cases, judges will not necessarily make highly
divergent decisions in hard cases. First, judges may reach the same result
even though their deliberations are informed by different
noncomprehensive extra-legal norms and different comprehensive
convictions. In Cass Sunstein's terms, these situations constitute
"incompletely theorized agreements on practical outcomes. ' 3  There
may also be agreement on certain noncomprehensive extra-legal norms
that are fully justified by different comprehensive convictions and that
can be relied on by judges to decide hard cases. In addition, there are
influences on judicial decision making that promote convergence. For
example, Ronald Dworkin has argued that despite the divergence in
judicial convictions about the justifying purpose, goal, or principle
governing legal practice as a whole, a variety of forces temper these
differences to precipitate convergence. 5 In this respect, he claims that:
Every community has paradigms of law, propositions that in
practice cannot be challenged without suggesting either
corruption or ignorance . . . The most powerful influences
toward convergence, however, are internal to the character of
interpretation. The practice of precedent, which no judge's
interpretation can wholly ignore, presses toward agreement;
each judges' theories of what judging really is will incorporate
by reference, through whatever account and restructuring of
precedent he settles on, aspects of other popular interpretations
of the day. Judges think about law, moreover, within society,
not apart from it; the general intellectual environment, as well
as the common language that reflects and protects that
environment, exercises practical constraints on idiosyncrasy and
conceptual constraints on imagination. The inevitable
conservatism of formal legal education, and of the process of
384. CASS SUNSTEIN, LEGAL REASONING AND POLITICAL CONFLICT 37 (1996).
Sunstein argues that law is basically comprised of "incompletely theorized agreements on
particular outcomes, accompanied by agreements on the narrow or low-level principles
that account for them." Id. This allows for substantial disagreement on more general
theoretical principles that attempt to explain and legitimize the law.
385. DWORKIN, LAW'S EMPIRE, supra note 19, at 87-88. David Strauss echoes a
similar sentiment about the common law and common law constitutional interpretation
when he argues that "[a] judge who conscientiously tries to follow precedent is
significantly limited in what she can do." David A. Strauss, Common Law Constitutional
Interpretation, 63 U. CHI. L. REV. 877, 926 (1996).
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selecting lawyers for judicial and administrative office, adds
further centripetal pressure.386
381Although arguing for much more convergence than I would support,
Dworkin's general point can be extrapolated to apply to judicial reliance
on comprehensive convictions. In addition to the factors mentioned by
Dworkin, the predominance of the Judeo-Christian tradition in the
United States may also lead to convergence by judges in deciding certain
hard cases because of shared aspects of the comprehensive convictions
making up this tradition. These shared aspects will allow full justification
of noncomprehensive extra-legal norms by a plurality of comprehensive
convictions. These shared aspects will also promote convergence if they
are part of the comprehensive convictions that are only implied by
judicial decisions that have not been fully justified. Taking all these
aspects of convergence together means that fully justifying judicial
decisions in hard cases will not necessarily result in radically different
applications of the law. This convergence thus makes it appear as though
judges are not relying on a plurality of comprehensive convictions in hard
cases. As a result, this presents an additional reason why the
separationist model has been so widely accepted and why the religious
dimension of judicial decision making has remained substantially hidden.
XII. CONCLUSION
In conclusion, my religionist-separationist model of judicial decision
making results in a reenchantment of the law in a post-modern form.
Unlike the modern consensus that the law can be rationally justified
independently of religious convictions, religious convictions are required
for fully justifying judges' decisions in hard cases. The demands of full
justification in hard cases reintroduces religious convictions into the
process of judicial deliberation. Rather than resorting to a "premodern"
establishment of a particular religious conviction as authoritative for
justifying the law, a plurality of comprehensive convictions may implicitly
inform and shape the law in the process of judges fully justifying their
deliberations in hard cases. Judicial opinions, however, should only be a
partial justification. The law should remain indeterminate because the
386. DWORKIN, LAW'S EMPIRE, supra note 19, at 88. Cf KARL LLEWELLYN, THE
CASE LAW SYSTEM IN AMERICA, §§ 55-58 (Michael Ansaldi, trans., Paul Gewirtz, ed.,
1989) (arguing that sociological factors such as the operating technique of judges and
lawyers, facts of a case, and real-life norms are powerful sources of certainty or
predictability).
387. Dworkin argues that "[o]ur constitution is law, and like all law it is anchored in
history, practice, and integrity. Most cases at law-even most constitutional cases-are
not hard cases. The ordinary craft of a judge dictates an answer and leaves no room for
the play of personal moral conviction." DWORKIN, FREEDOM'S LAW, supra note 121, at
11.
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Establishment Clause precludes judges from writing their comprehensive
or religious convictions into the law. In other words, the Establishment
Clause prohibits judges from fully justifying their written opinions
because opinions can only include noncomprehensive norms. Although
a full justification of judicial deliberation in hard cases requires religious
convictions, the process of explanation gives the illusion of the autonomy
of law. Religious convictions are thus the silent prologue to any full
justification of judges' decisions in hard cases.
In addition, the anticipated arguments against the religionist-
separationist model have failed. The claim that religionist-separationist
model violates the Establishment Clause because judges' decisions are
not based on a predominant secular purpose does not hold up under
close scrutiny of the Supreme Court Establishment Clause jurisprudence.
The fact that judges' opinions imply a comprehensive justification or
justifications is not enough to find that their opinions lack a secular
purpose. As long as judges do not write their religious convictions into
the law and justify their decisions with noncomprehensive norms, they
provide a secular purpose for their decisions and will not raise any
Establishment Clause problems. The philosophical version of the
Secular Purpose Objection was likewise defeated. Part VII showed that
the separationist and alternative religionist-separationist models of
judicial making that claimed to be independent of comprehensive
convictions all depended on comprehensive convictions and were
incoherent. In addition, judges are not insincere by leaving their
religious or comprehensive justifications out of their opinions but
consistent with the Establishment Clause (i.e., the "rule of law") and a
proper understanding of religious pluralism. Leaving out religious
justifications also facilities consensus on legal results and lower-level
legal rules and principles without raising the thorny philosophical,
theological, and hermenuetical questions implicated by religious
justifications. Surprisingly, the Establishment Clause also provides a
normative justification for comprehensive legal indeterminacy and the
noncomprehensive legal indeterminacy resulting from it. Finally,
Ogden's account of justifying religious convictions and pluralistic
inclusivism provided support for the assumption that religious
convictions can be critically validated. Hence, the religionist-
separationist model has survived its most likely objections and provides a
coherent account of judicial decision making under the conditions of
legal indeterminancy.
The religionist-separationist model, however, does pose some potential
risks. Judges may claim to follow it but not critically validate their
religious convictions or fully justify their decisions. These judges would
be inappropriately relying on religious convictions that may not be
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capable of critical validation. They may also wrongly assume that certain
results, like prohibitions on homosexual sodomy, follow from their
religious convictions without bothering to justify that assumption. Some
judges may further specify their religious convictions in their written
opinions like Chief Justice Moore. Violating normative constraints is not
unique to the religionist-separationist model. There will be some judges
who violate the normative constraints of any model of judicial decision
making. Legal indeterminancy opens the door to illegitimate judicial
decision making in hard cases. Unless it becomes possible to police
judges' thoughts, the most one can do is provide strong arguments in
support of these normative constraints and hope that judges have the
integrity to follow them.
Despite this risk, the reenchantment of the law will substantially
broadened the constitution of jurisprudence and make judicial decision
making more self-critical. Currently, jurisprudence in the legal academy
includes many schools of thought such as law and economics, critical
legal studies, feminist jurisprudence, liberal jurisprudence, and
communitarian jurisprudence. In addition to these, we should, and
already do, see new additions such as Christian Jurisprudence, 3 8 Jewish
Jurisprudence,' and Islamic Jurisprudence. Furthermore, each of
these broad categories can be further subdivided to reflect the plurality
of religious convictions within each category. For example, Christian
Jurisprudence may be subdivided into Episcopalian, Presbyterian,
Methodist, Roman Catholic, Baptist, and Lutheran Jurisprudence.3'9
388. See, e.g., CHRISTIAN PERSPECTIVES ON LEGAL THOUGHT (Michael W.
McConnell, Robert F. Cochran, Jr., & Angela C. Carmella eds., 2001) [hereinafter
CHRISTIAN PERSPECTIVES].
389. See, e.g., Morris Traube, The Right to Die: A Comparison of Jewish Law and
American Constitutional Law, 21 QUINNIPIAC L. REV. 417, 418 (2002) (arguing that
Jewish ethical principles may influence the debate in the halls of the various legislatures
and that "the strong Judeo-Christian heritage of this nation suggests the possibility, albeit
an attenuated one, that such heritage may influence the interpretation of our laws and
Constitution," especially on the question of a fundamental right to die); Steven H.
Resnicoff, Lying and Lawyering: Contrasting American and Jewish Law, 77 NOTRE DAME
L. REV. 937, 937 (2002) (arguing that "Jewish law rules provide useful guidance for the
possible amendment of America's secular legal ethics prescriptions"); Samuel J. Levine,
Teaching Jewish Law in American Law Schools: An Emerging Development in Law and
Religion, 26 FORDHAM URB. L.J. 1041, 1044 (1999) (noting that his students "often gain a
new perspective on American Law as a result of examining the contrast cases in Jewish
law").
390. See generally 15 J. L. & RELIG. 1-632 (2000-2001) (special issue focusing on
Islamic law and jurisprudence).
391. See CHRISTIAN PERSPECTIVES, supra note 388, at 241-403 (including articles
discussing Roman Catholic, Calvinist, Anabaptist, Baptist, and Lutheran perspectives on
the law); see also Failinger, supra note 91, at 702 (arguing that the wisdom of the Lutheran
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However, this does not mean that all comprehensive convictions are
valid bases for judicial decision making in hard cases. Judges must
critically validate these comprehensive convictions before relying on
them. Assuming that many religious convictions can be validated, a
plurality of religious convictions will continue to shape the law implicitly.
The law will be reenchanted not by establishing an official state religion
but by the implicit religious convictions that continue to shape the law in
the process of judges interpreting and applying the law in hard cases.
Normative theories of law will no longer float unattached to religious
convictions, and the autonomy of law will be no more.
tradition could provide rhetorical and analogical insight for judges (especially Chief
Justice Rehnquist who is Lutheran)).
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